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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the study of secure wireless routing protocols, 
which have been deployed for the purpose of exchanging information in an ad- 
hoc networking enviromnent. 
A discrete event simulator is developed, utilising an adaptive systems modelling 
approach and emergence that aims to assess networking protocols in the 
presence of adversarial behaviour. The model is used in conjunction with the 
characteristics that routing protocols have and also a number of cryptographic 
primitives that can be deployed in order to safeguard the information being 
exchanged. It is shown that both adversarial behaviour, as well as protocol 
descriptions can be described in a way that allows for them to be treated as input 
on the machine level. 
Within the system, the output generated selects the fittest protocol design 
capable of withstanding one or more particular type of attacks. As a result, a 
number of new and improved protocol specifications are presented and 
benchmarked against conventional metrics, such as throughput, latency and 
delivery criteria. From this process, an architecture for designing wireless 
routing protocols based on a number of security criteria is presented, whereupon 
the decision of using particular characteristics in a specification has been passed 
onto the machine level. 
x 
Abbreviations 
ACO Ant Colony Optimisation 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard 
AODV Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector 
ARA Ant-Colony based Routing 
BRP Bordercast Routing Protocol 
CBR Constant Bit Rate 
CGSR Clustered Gateway Switch Routing 
DAG Directed Acyclic Graph 
DARPA Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DDOS Distributed Denial Of Service 
DES Data Encryption Standard 
DOS Denial Of Service (a. k. a. DoS) 
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm 
DSDV Destination Sequenced Distance Vector 
DSR Dynamic Source Routing 
DSS Digital Signature Standard 
DSSS Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
DVR Distance Vector Routing 
FHSS Frequency Hoping Spread Spectrum 
FIFO First-In-First-Out 
FILO First-In-Last-Out 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
xi 
IARP Intrazone Routing Protocol 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IEEE Institute of Electronic and Electrical Engineers 
IERP Interzone Routing Protocol 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IINIEP Internet MANET Encapsulation Protocol 
IP Internet Protocol 
IrDA Infrared Data Association 
LCC Least Cluster Change 
LOS Line Of Sight 
LSR Link State Routing 
INTAC Message Authentication Code 
INIANET Mobile Ad hoc Network 
NIN Mobile Node 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NPDU Network Protocol Data Unit 
ONIG Object Management Group 
00 Object-Oriented 
PDR Packet Delivery Ratio 
RREQ Route Request (Packet) 
SA Security Association 
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm 
S1 Swarm Intelligence 
SOC Self-Organised Criticality 
xii 
TORA Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm 
UNIL Unified Modelling Language 
UTAT Universal Turing Machine 
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy 
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
ZRP Zone Routing Protocol 
xiii 
It would have to be, 
To my parents, 
For all the simple logic that they carry 
Chapter 1 
Wireless networking environments 
1.1 Overview 
1.2 Infrastructureless networking 
1.3 The mobile ad hoc networking environment 
1.4 Issues of security 
1.5 Problem description and methodology 
1.5.1 Protocol characterisation 
1.5.2 Emergence, a first encounter 
1.5.3 Model description 
1.6 Original contributions 
1.7 Disposition 
This chapter presents a general review of the thesis, introducing the concept of 
infrastructureless networking as well as one of its realisations, the mobile ad hoc 
network. Furthermore, issues of security are examined and the reasoning behind 
the amplification of routing security in ad hoc networking envirom-nents is 
presented. The main section focuses on the methodology followed in tackling 
issues of routing security, presenting the unique contribution of emergence in 
the modelling process. Finally, the original contributions of this thesis are 
presented, followed by a brief chapter outline and the dependencies between 
them. 
I 
1.1 Overview 
The continuous emergence of mobile handheld devices in daily life has 
necessitated the use of wireless techniques for the exchange of infonnation 
between them. In this rising demand for service availability to non-fixed users 
with varying locations, achieving the same level of connectivity but 'without the 
cat" has proven to be a substantial challenge. Further to this, the dynamic 
structure of any wireless network formed, has yielded an overwhelming 
potential growing beyond the premeditated capabilities of equivalent wire based 
connections. Consequently, the design of protocol implementations for 'no-cat' 
networks, with all the difficulties they might pose, is transpiring as a new field 
of unique prerequisites and conditions, verifying once again that the message is 
the medium. 
In attempting to provide for this surfacing technology and the potential that it 
holds, we must question the driving forces related to it. In the brief history of 
telecommunications network evolution, three forces have been instigating the 
resulting architectures [1]: traffic growth, development of new services and 
advances in technology. From these, traffic growth relates to the continuous 
increase of information exchange, embracing speeds per unit of bandwidth, as 
well as the handling of connections to different users. The development of new 
1 "You see, wire telegraph is a kind of a very, very long cat. You pull his fail in New York and 
his head is meowing in Los Angeles. Do you understand this? And radio operates exactly in the 
same way: You send signals here and receive them there. 771e only difference is that there is no 
cat. "Albert Einstein [ 1879 - 1955] 
2 
services, tightly related to advances in technology, relates to \vays and methods 
of manipulating infonnation and the means by vd-ilch it is being exchanged. 
Despite of the abo\ e not being independent of each other, each one of these 
aspects has lielped shape teleCOMMUnIcation networks in different , vays. 
Table I. I: Brief description oftlie currently available wireless standards. 
II 
Standard De. wi-iplion Usage 
IEEE 802.11 [21 ('ý... use either Direct Sequence Spread Wireless Local Area 
Spectrum (DSSS) or Frequencý, Hopping Networks OVLANs). 
i Spread Spectrum (FHSS) in tile 2.4 Gliz Replacing tile current 
band. as \ý ell as PLIISe Position Ethernet nemork card in 
Modulation for Infrared OR) caMPLIS Office InUltmiser 
transmission. ('ould achle\e data rates of computer eti\ ironnients. 
up to II NIbpS Using DSSS. 
Bluetooth [3] Based on the 802.11 standard, it is in RF In hOLISe appliances. 
specification operating in the 2.45 (111/ ranging from printers to 
band. It Lises freqUeIlCy hopping of about cordless phones. Also 
1000 hops sec changing 79 freq. at I popular ýýith mobile phones 
NIIIz inter\als and is designed for short- vvilere the User doesn't need 
range conimun icat ions Of LIP 10 10 111. to be in contact with the 
Presently. it offers a data rate of approx. handset, thus redLICing 
IM bps. radiation hazards. 
IrDA [4] Týw standards are available: The IrDA IrDA data can be found in 
Data standard. recommended for hI, _, h illost handheld 
de\ ices, 
speed, line of sight (LOS) data transfer of SLIch as mobile phones, 
4 Nlbps and the IrDA Control standard IrDA control is coninionly 
recommended for in-door cordless PC' Used for ire less 
Peripherals. keN boards, etc. 
The applicability of these three driving forces to no-cat nemwks has created a 
plane well outside the one dimensional aptitude of exchanging raxv bits. The 
turn of this century saw a number of developing standards xvith the ability to 
dellver such connectivity. Table 1.1 summarises the currently available, hinting 
on their environment of operation. Having altered the medium of 
Communication from Nvired to wireless, the questions that surface relate more 
and more to the limitations of our means to manipulate information in a 
3 
multiplicity of dynamic users with varying locations, than to the static 
communication environments that we have been utilising all these years. 
1.2 Infrastructureless networking 
In the realm of wireless communications, two system models have been 
proposed weighing their distinction upon the presence of a proxy within the 
nodes wanting to exchange inforination. The first approach, based on existing 
cellular infrastructures, involves a fixed backbone wireless system, where the 
network consists of a number of mobile nodes, as well as a number of fewer but 
more powerful fixed nodes. Such a system requires the presence of a permanent 
infrastructure that is hardwired using landlines. Some of the problems [5] in 
network realisations of this type (apart from the obvious need for a wired 
connection in order to establish a wireless channel) relate to the handoff 
between different devices in the backbone, as well as the smooth transition 
between nodes of the backbone, without noticeable delay or packet loss. 
The second, shifting away from cellular operation, is to form a network on 
demand and in an ad hoc fashion, where all users and devices are not only 
clients in the network but are also willing to forward data packets on behalf of 
other nodes, in an attempt for them to be delivered from source to destination. 
This type of system model, often referred to as infrastructureless networking [6] 
allows for mobile nodes to dynamically establish routing between them and 
(dependant on the limitations their broadcasting range) with other nodes in a 
hop-by-hop fashion as seen in figure I. I. 
Between the two system models, despite that the former, due to the static 
element of the backbone capacitates a lot more power and hence offers a larger 
4 
broadcasting range, ad hoc networking offers a number of advantages spawning 
from the on demand setup that it subsists. An example of this is an environment 
that holds a damaged communication infrastructure such as a battlefield or a 
natural disaster recovery area. In such a situation, ad hoc networking is the ideal 
candidate for fast deployment of a communication channel among the users 
present. 
1.3 The Mobile Ad Hoc Network 
Based on the descnption of infrastructure less networking, comes the concept of 
a Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET). A MANET consists of a number of 
Mobile Nodes (MNs) that have no connectivity to backbone hosts and therefore 
do not require any management with respect to location or handover [7]. 
Fip-ure I. I: A visualisation of a MANET, consistinlz of a number of nodes that 
are made up from merging and fragmenting subnets. 
Each MN acts on the assumption that no centrallsed administration is present 
within the network and relies on neighbouring MNs for the transmission and 
reception of information. As a result, routes are established depending on the 
location and broadcast range of every MN. Further to this, each MN acts as a 
router, forwarding traffic between nodes. 
15 
Ad hoc networks can also exist within a hybrid environment hosting a backbone 
infrastructure where only a few nodes have connectivity to the fixed link points. 
In either case, a MANET consists of a number of subnets or partitions where, as 
illustrated in figure 1.1, certain nodes act as gateways to other subnets within 
the networking environment. This takes place in a dynamic way, with subnets 
merging and fragmenting in real time depending on the mobility of individual or 
groups of MNs. Consequently, a MANET is an environment necessitating high 
cooperation for any data exchange to take place. This, adding to the open 
exchange of information lacking any cats, subsidises the need for greater 
protection in the communication exchange process. 
1.4 Issues of security 
With the removal of the cable as part of our medium for exchanging 
infonnation, there is no' longer a physical link between the two devices 
communicating; all information is out in the open for anyone to get their hands 
on. Thus, bigh susceptibility plus the presence of an unreliable transmission 
medium [8] are the default add-on considerations in the transition from wired to 
wireless security. 
The advantages of an on demand setup in MANETs add to the disadvantages of 
wireless security [9,10]. Information is not only being exchanged in an open 
and more unreliable medium, but also in an environment of continuously 
changing topology, where traffic has to pass through other nodes for it to reach 
its final destination. 
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In an attempt to define the components of it, wireless data security can be seen 
as a superset of three attributes [I I], all of which need to be maintained xvithin a 
secure ,,, stem. These can be seen in table 1.2 followed by a brief description as 
\ý ell as the qLICStIOII Of COIIIPI-0111ISe to see if each attribute has been breached. 
SLICII an approach fOCLISeS on the bits or data being exchanged and not on the 
requirements of the system for it to be labelled as secure. In any case, a secure 
system should have the ability ofmanitaining each of the attributes of table 1.2 
Table 1.2: The threý attributes that constitute data security in communications. 
Attribute Descv-iplion Question of compromise 
Data Users 
having the ability to modify IIa (lie data been 
integrity or 
delete data for which they do not improperly tampered \\ Itli? ha\ c such privileges to do so 
Users ha\ lilt-, the ability to view data 
' Has tile data been Data secrecy I M which they do not have audit - improperly disclosed" permissions to do so 
Users not having, the ability to 
access data that they have 
Data oý\riership of, or has been sent to Can I access my data when 
Availability them. Demal-of-Service (DOS) I \\ ant to" 
attacks are the most common threat 
to availability 
With the escalation of wireless security in an environment hosting a MANET, 
each of the above attributes also becornes harder to maintain. Regarding data 
nitegmtv. anv user can broadcast information in the absence of a cat, as well as 
modify data packets passing through them. 'A"Ith respect to data secrecy, I- 
inforination is no longer sent down a cable, but broadcasted within a specified 
range. Finally with respect to availability, any node within a MANET can refuse 
to forward incoming packets during the exchange of infor-niation causing ,a 
C0111111LIllication breakdown. These issues (that will be examined in greater detail 
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in chapters to come) form the basis of wireless security outlining the principal 
types of attack that can occur in MANETs. 
1.5 Problem description and methodology 
From the general issues of security and how they are amplified in MANETs, at 
the core of the problem lie the freedoms that individual nodes have in viewing, 
manipulating and forwarding incoming data. These, extending to all three 
attributes of table 1.2, define the concept of routing security. 
As we have seen, the cooperation of nodes within such a networking 
environment is integral to its existence. Thus, the protocol describing the rules 
for exchanging information should facilitate for malicious behaviour from one 
or more MNs that are part of the network. If this were not the case, a node 
choosing to compromise the secrecy, integrity or availability of data would 
cause the collapse of any information exchange. Consequently, in order to allow 
for the advantages that a MANET has to offer, we need to secure the 
communication process as that is defined in the routing protocol being utilised. 
Due to the dynamic characteristics of MANETs, the protocol deployed would 
have to facilitate for malicious intent in a number of different situations and 
phases of the communication exchange. As a result, our problem description 
focuses on malicious behaviour within ad hoc networks and the ability of the 
routing protocol utilised to notice, notify and isolate such a node or groups of 
nodes from the remaining network. This task, if seen in proportion to the 
number of available protocol implementations is not at all trivial. 
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1.5.1 Protocol characterisation 
At present a number of protocols exist for the routing of data in ad hoc 
networks. These (as we shall see in chapter 2) fall in a variety of categories, 
weighing a mixture of advantages and disadvantages depending on the 
communication scenario under question. 
In designing a protocol for a MANET, not only must we take into consideration 
the issues of routing security, but also allow for the advantages that such a 
network has to offer. The "3 Anys" - [12,13] Any person, Anywhere and Any 
time, illustrate the level of connectivity that ad hoc networks aim to offer. Thus, 
bearing in mind the nature of infrastructureless networking, any protocol 
specification needs to have the ability to deal with a number of complex 
scenarios stemming from a constantly changing topology. 
As a result, every protocol must be described through a number of global 
characteristics that can withstand the resulting local complexities presented in a 
dynamic information exchange. If this were not the case, we would have to 
premeditate every possible scenario that a protocol can encounter and include it 
in the specification. Clearly, following Ockham's razor2, this is not something 
that we favour, or, in most cases, can actually achieve. 
2 The medieval rule of parsimony, or principle of economy, frequently used by the philosopher 
William of Ockham, Surrey, England (1285-1349) came to be known as Ockharn! s razor: "Entia 
non stint multiplicanda praeter necessitatent or Numquant ponenda est phiralitas sine 
necessitate "; (in free translation) It is vain to do with more that which can be done with less. 
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Following the need for simple rules to govem complex and dynamically 
changing events, yields a system that has the ability to adapt to new situations. 
This process (as revealed in the next section) shares a lot of common 
characteristics with adaptive modelling and emergence. The passage from 
global description criteria, such as a protocol, that prove worthy of local 
phenomena, such as the occurrence of a malicious node, forms the basis of the 
modelling approach followed throughout this work. 
1.5.2 Emergence, a first encounter 
Over the later half of the previous century, studies focusing on the observation 
of collective behaviour in natural systems produced a number of fascinating, yet 
analogous results. The plane that initially enabled researchers to umbrella the 
observed patterns under a single common denominator spawned from an almost 
contradictory model involving complexity and simplicity. Despite the fact that 
the behaviour of the entities involved could be narrowed down to a small set of 
simple rules, the system, as a whole, had the ability to tackle often successfully, 
quite complex problems. As this was first observed in the natural, the results 
often mirrored simple facts that we tend to take for granted such as the way in 
which ants or bees manage their resources in their scavenge for survival. 
Today, this field of research named emergence (due to the similarities that it has 
with the same term as used by 19'h century biologists to describe what happened 
when life arose from non-living matter 4 billion years ago [14] ) finds 
applicability in both natural and artificial systems. Whether it has been a case of 
understanding the behaviour of ant colonies in their struggle for survival [ 15], or 
for consumer websites to offer hints based on a retuming customer's purchase 
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history [ 16], this new kind qfscience3, even at this early stage, has been offering 
unique results through its simp istic perspective. 
Since emergence, as a science, can be hosted in so many different subjects, an 
interpretation of what it stands for comes in many different flavours. Three of 
the most common such descriptions are included below: 
9 Bottom-up systems achieving the same functionality as top-down 
Systems lacking a central administration authority, which are capable of 
functioning in the same manner as if one was present. The myth of an ant 
queen in specific ant colonies is the perfect example of such a natural 
system [ 18] 
*A set of simple rules generating complex behaviour 
Systems governed by a set of very simple rules, having a complex, non- 
chaotic behaviour. A number of examples of such artificial systems can be 
found in [17,19], where the system defined is a cellular automaton 
*. The sum of the parts being greater than the whole 
A principle stemming from Gestalt theory [20], stating that a sufficiently 
complex system can experience properties that cannot be reduced to the 
constituent elements of the system. Hence the resulting structure can tackle 
problems considered outside its initial capacity as that is defined by the 
principle of superposition, widely used in physics. A number of examples of 
such systems can be seen in table 1.3 below. 
3 Title used by Stephen Wolfram in his latest book [17] on cellular automata, which extensively 
describes the surfacing of complex system behaviour, spawning from a set of very simple rules 
goveming the system. 
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Flie above tlirce interpretations of such phenoinena brlctl\, stimmarIse tlie 
distinct belimiour that allows us to interpret a system as one that hosts or 
c\penences emergent belim iour. An important aspect that must not be 
neglected (that shall be revisited in chapter 4) lies in tile necessity but not 
SLIftICIeIlCV of tile condition for emergence to occur. Even thou"ll a living 
organism is made up of molecules, a collection of molecules does not 
necessarily give rise to a li% ing organism. As intuitive as this illustration might 
be, it hints on a reqUired set of conditions for a new system identity to surface. 
Table 1.3: Three systems reaching a certain threshold of complexity where a 
ne\\ iden. l. w., emerges hat cannot be reduced to the suni of its parts. 
Resulting identity of the sN, stem 
OrIgInal constItuent 
parts 
Living organisms Finergeftom Systems of molecules 
Mind, consciousness and 11-oin Emerge Systems of iieurons intelligence . 
Organisations, societies, and Elnergefi-om Systems of individuals cultures 
From obsen, ations in the natural, as Nvell as problem solving techniques applied 
in the artificial. we grow aware of the fact that emergence does not take place 
unless a problem requiring a solution is present. Despite the Darwinian aspects 
of the latter statement. it seems that emergence offers the opportunity to the 
system of almost leaming ail altemative solution technique. thus adaptlnj,,,. to the 
problem at hand. It is this element of adaptation that Nve aim to exploit In the 
development of wireless routing protocols, constantly presented with the 
problem of a malicious attack within a dynamic elivironment. 
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1.5.3 Model description 
The objective of this work is to deliver a functioning system, capable of 
automating the design process for routing protocols. As a result, our focus shifis 
a level up; from the improvement of a single design to a system that can 
facilitate for the requirements of MANETs and deliver working protocol 
implementations. The main tool enabling us to pass the design phase of this 
process to machine level is emergence. 
Developing a model that can adaptively learn to handle occurrences of 
malicious intent within a MANET and embed them on the resulting protocol 
utilised, falls outside conventional control theory [21,22]. Normally, the 
described process would involve a mechanism that would improve the resulting 
process based on the feedback gained from both the good and bad aspects of a 
design. 
Even though this fundamental aspect of feedback is one that should not be 
neglected, conventional methodology only allows for decisions to be made by 
taking into account information on the same level as that of the observed 
phenomenon. To draw a parallel to this, today the acting environment judge 
protocol implementations has been the corresponding community related to this 
field of research. Our objective is not to replace but to simplify this task, by 
further automating elements in the design process. 
Extending on this assumption, our proposed model structure, seen in figure 1.2, 
contains a number of distinct layers. This categorisation comes as a result of the 
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information that each compartment within the model processes. On the top of 
the model lies the decision layer responsible for selecting a best fit for the 
protocol description though its interaction with neighbouring compartments. 
The reason why this compartment is placed at the very top of the hierarchy is 
because ultimately all information is filtered through this layer to a decision 
regarding the design. In choosing to label this compartment as a daemon, we 
take from Oliver Selfridge's Pandemonium described in section 4.2. 
Adaptive Plan Measure of Performance 
Protocol Scenario Of output Communication 
Figure 1.2: The compartmental model description in its constituent layers for 
the system used in automating the design of wireless routing, protocols. 
Layer 2 holds two compartments responsible for providing the information 
necessary to layer I for the decision making process. The first is the plan of 
adaptation stating how the next structure for evaluation should be selected based 
on the results obtained from the previous one. The second is a measure of 
performance providing means for assessing good or bad structures from the next 
layer. Between the two compartments there exists an unavoidable correlation 
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justifying each one's presence on the same layer. A strategy for adjusting the 
selection process cannot exist without quantifying the perfonnance of the 
system and vice versa. 
Finally, the last layer is constituted with the compartments that can be found in 
a model description of a control feedback process. From the three compartments 
found in this layer, the first one holds the protocol description as that would be 
defined for the sole purpose of communication: Stating the rules that govem any 
exchange of information. The second compartment holds the testing ground for 
the protocol allowing for a number of scenarios to be provided, relating to 
routing security. The last compartment of this layer hosts an area where the 
output relating to the performance protocol with respect to the communication 
scenario at hand could be recorded and quantified. 
In this model description, the division of the resulting layers takes place 
according to the information that is being processed on each compartmental 
level. Based on this, the complex description of a MANET experiencing 
malicious activity can act as a test-bed for selecting a routing protocol and 
recursively improving on its characteristics, until it reaches a level of being able 
to overcome the imposed malicious intent. 
1.6 Original contributions 
The main contribution that will be exploited within this thesis focuses on the 
applicability of emergence in the design of wireless routing protocols. Current 
research tangents have only recently started to touch this field and to question 
the advantages that it has to offer. A prime example of this is the routing 
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protocol AntNet [23 - 25,55 - 59] and the support that it has been winning as a 
routing technique in recent years. AntNet bases its operation in the simulation of 
pheromone patterns and the way in which they affect the decision making 
process within an ant colony. We will examine this protocol and the advantages 
that it has to offer in greater detail in section 2.8. 
Despite this recent attempt to utilise a system hosting emergent characteristics 
within the rules underlying the resulting protocol structure, to the author's 
knowledge no attempt has been made in applying such methodology to the 
design phase for wireless routing protocols. It is this idea that forms the basis of 
originality within this work. 
The contributions presented within this thesis can be broken down into three 
constituent parts. 
e Firstly, the design of a system with the ability to in turn design, modify 
and improve on wireless routing protocols. The main toolbox enabling 
this process stems from emergence and practices involving adaptive 
modelling. The material used for this process is presented in chapter 2,3 
and 4, by examining routing protocols, routing security and emergent 
systems respectively. 
* Secondly, the implementation within an object oriented language of a 
discrete event simulator capable of offering an environment that can 
develop routing protocols by correlating the rules of adaptive modelling 
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with the requirements of handling a malicious attack. This work along 
with the decision steps taken is presented in chapter 5. 
* Thirdly, a number of protocol implementations, designed at machine 
level, which can tackle specific types of attack within a MANET are 
presented. For this, we initially focus on attacks that are passive, i. e. 
there are no alterations in the data traffic generated on the network and 
later look at more active types of attack. Chapter 6 focuses on turning 
the handle on the system created to obtain such protocol 
implementations through a set of known conditions and limitations. 
Finally, in the process of achieving a level of contribution in each of the above 
three parts, a number of necessary and more detailed new elements have arisen. 
These are: 
e The derivation of an analogue protocol representation, based on a 
number of characteristic pairs (sub-section 5.4.3) 
* The detailed description and categorisation of any malicious attack 
within a MANET as a five digit number (sub-section 5.4.2) 
*A methodology for accessing a protocol security with respect to 
characteristic pairs (sub-sections 5.4.3 and 6.1.2) 
*A methodology for accessing the way in which encryption techniques 
can be added to a protocol (sub-sections 5.4.3 and 6.2.2 and 6.3.2) 
The combination of the above detailed structures with the goals presented herein 
forms the motivation behind this thesis. 
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1.7 Disposition 
Following the contributions presented, this thesis has a tripartite structure, 
which is designed to get at many of the same themes from somewhat different 
angles. The first part consists of identifying in great detail the operation as well 
as failures of known protocol implementations, presented in chapters two and 
three. This carries an in depth analysis from a security perspective that helps us 
to identify the tools for avoiding communication pitfalls that can be exploited by 
an adversary. 
The second part seen in chapter 4 is an extended analysis of emergent systems 
that includes the rules as well as design pitfalls of their deployment. Both 
previous chapters attempt to identify characteristics that can be used in the 
adaptive modelling process, which are inherent to protocol designs. 
Thus, the final part combines the theory presented in chapters two, three and 
four, presenting the design of a simulator that has the ability to embrace the 
aspects of wireless protocol security and adaptive emergent designs. From this, 
stem a number of results that are presented in the penultimate chapter. This 
thesis concludes with a chapter dedicated to conclusions and further work that 
can be pursued in the cross-section of the correlated ideas that have been seen 
presented herein. 
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Chapter 2 
i 
Wireless routing protocols 
2.1 Classification 
2.2 Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
2.2.1 Route discovery and route maintenance 
2.2.2 Protocol characteristics 
2.3 Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) 
2.3.1 Description and origin 
2.3.2 Protocol characteristics 
2.4 Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
2.4.1 Route tables, route discovery and route maintenance 
2.4.2 Protocol characteristics 
2.5 Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) 
2.5.1 Route creation, route maintenance and route erasure 
2.5.2 Protocol characteristics 
2.6 Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) 
2.6.1 The concept of routing zones 
2.6.2 Protocol characteristics 
2.7 Cluster Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR) 
2.7.1 The interoperation of clusters 
2.7.2 Protocol characteristics 
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2.8 AntNet 
2.8.1 Understanding ant colonies 
2.8.2 Ant based routing 
2.8.3 Similar protocol designs 
2.9 Methods of comparison 
2.9.1 Protocol complexity 
2.9.2 Single based characteristics 
2.9.3 Typical characteristics 
2.10 Conclusions 
This chapter details existing wireless routing protocol implementations, as well 
as the general categories into which these fall in. Selectively, benchmark 
protocol specifications are presented. Each one carries two sections, one 
describing the protocol functionality and another outlining its general 
characteristics as well as drawbacks. In greater detail, a review of DSR, DSDV, 
AODV, TORA, ZRP and CGSR are presented. Also, in the section on AntNet, 
protocols that base their operation on emergent observations from natural 
systems are described. This chapter concludes by reviewing the different 
methods of comparison for known protocol architectures, based on their 
complexity and also a set of typical and single based characteristics. 
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2.1 Classification 
Following the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) packet- 
radio project [26,27] in the late 1970's, numerous protocols have been 
developed for ad hoc mobile networks. The attainment targets of such protocols 
from then until now have been confined to the typical limitations that such 
networks pose. These include [28] high power consumption, low bandwidth and 
high error rates. Up to the most recent specification, that being the IEEE 802.11 
standard for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) as it was first published 
in 1997 [2,29] these limitations remain intact. 
From the various routing protocols that have been proposed in the literature 
[28], a number of different criteria for classifying them exist. These are 
dependant on a number of parameters, such as the information being exchanged, 
the way in which routes are computed as well as the timing of the routing 
infonnation. In synopsis, the criteria for the categorisation of routing protocols, 
reviewed in [30], are as follows. 
e Link state routing (LSR) vs. distance vector routing (DVR) 
In LSR any noticeable change in topology is immediately flooded to the 
entire network, while in DVR every node maintains a distance vector which 
is periodically exchanged with its neighbours. The trade-off is the routing 
overhead (in LSR) versus the slow convergence and routing loops (in DVR)- 
* Table-driven routing vs. on-demand routing 
Table-driven routing, also referred to as proactive routing [3 1 ], involves the 
pre-computation of routes to all MNs present within the MANET. On 
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demand routing relates to the dynamic discovery of a route from the source 
MN to the destination upon wanting to exchange information. The trade-off 
is the attempt to keep an up to date view of all available routes in table- 
driven routing, versus a large latency at the beginning of every transmission 
in on-demand routing. 
9 Periodical update vs. event-driven update 
Depending on the timing of routing information exchange on the network, 
periodical updates involve a slotted time period at which such information is 
transmitted. Event-driven updates are broadcast in the opportune moment 
where other traffic is travelling across the network. The trade-off in this case 
is the risk of consuming bandwidth from the communication channel at a 
constant rate (periodical update) versus not having any information with 
regards to routing unless a communication event takes place. 
* Flat structure vs. hierarchical structure 
In a flat structure all nodes within the MANET have the same responsibilities 
with respect to routing. In a hierarchical structure (also referred to as cluster- 
based routing) specific nodes act as a miniature central authority within a 
subset of MNs within the MANET, having the responsibility of maintaining 
routing and topology related information. The trade-off in this case is the 
long time that it takes to update routing information in flat structures, versus 
network partitioning and denial of service from a cluster head in a 
hierarchical structure, qWing to the dynamically changing topology. 
* Decentralised computation vs. distributed computation 
Depending on the number of nodes that get involved in the computation of a 
route, decentralised computation assumes that each MN keeps track of the 
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complete network topology, thus allowing each node to independently 
compute the route to the destination. In distributed computing, the 
calculation of a route involves the collaboration of one or more nodes 
sharing the partial infonnation that they have on the network. The trade-off 
in this case relates to attempting to keep information about the entire network 
in decentralised computation, versus gathering the necessary information for 
routing when required. 
* Source routing vs. hop-by-hop routing 
Determined by the amount of information that a packet contains concerning 
the route followed, source routing assumes that each packet holds all the 
information of intermediate nodes that the packet must go through to reach 
the specified destination. Hop-by-hop routing on the other hand, assumes 
that each packet carries only enough information about the next MN that the 
packet should go through. The trade-off in this case is bandwidth 
consumption in large networks for source routing, versus all nodes needing 
to maintain up to date information for hop-by-hop routing. 
o Single path vs. multiple paths 
A routing protocol can offer a single route or multiple routes to a specified 
destination. The trade-off is the bandwidth and memory requirements when 
transmitting information on multiple paths, versus the lack of a route 
recovery process in the event of a link failure for a single path. 
Based on the above classifications, a number of protocols exist, embracing 
specific attributes. Selectively, we choose to focus on particular examples that 
present landmarks for wireless routing, in the sections that follow. 
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2.2 Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
Starting with on demand routing protocols, Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
[32,33,34 35] belongs to the class of reactive protocols that allow nodes to 
dynamically discover a new route to the destination using multiple packet hops. 
Each packet sent carries in its header an ordered list of all the nodes that it has 
to pass to reach the destination. Consequently, the protocol offers two modes of 
operation, one for discovering routes within the network and one for 
maintaining an up to date view on a per node basis. 
2.2.1 Route discovery and route maintenance 
From the specification of DSR [33], a main focus is route discovery. When a 
MN, say S, wishes to transmit information to another MN, say D, it first looks at 
the stored information that it has on known routes. All nodes using DSR are 
required to store route caches containing the source routes to destination nodes 
they are aware of Provided that S does not have an unexpired route [35] to the 
destination it will transmit a Route Request (RREQ) packet to all its neighbours. 
The objective of this process is to establish a route record that will be placed in 
the route cache of the MN for future reference. 
Every node receiving this RREQ packet searches through its route cache to see 
if it has an unexpired route to D. If no route exists, the node is obliged to 
forward the RREQ packet further, adding its own address to the recorded hop 
sequence. This process (illustrated in figure 2.1a) continues in this manner 
through the network until either the RREQ packet reaches D, or it reaches a 
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node offering a route to D. When this takes place, the RREQ packet is returned 
back to S. in one of many ways. 
The simplest way of retrieving the RREQ is by reversing the hop record with 
the packet header, as seen in figure 2.1 b. The disadvantage of this method is that 
the network topology might have changed during the propagation of the RREQ 
packet. In order to overcome this limitation, DSR checks the route cache of any 
intermediate node for a more up to date route [33,35]. If one is found, it is used 
instead of the suggested path offered in the header field. 
Source S 
a) 
Figure 2.1: The a) transmission of a DSR RREQ packet from source S- 
targetinv, destination D, b) propagation of the route reply from D back to S. 
DSR further expands its operation by allowing nodes to operate in promiscuous 
mode. This is done when a MN ceases to only pay attention to data packets 
targeted at it, but also scans the headers of all incoming packets, prior to 
forwarding them, for useful routing information. The use of this technique 
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increases the number of data routes stored in the route cache. Once a route has 
been found, the task of maintaining it begins. 
Route maintenance has as an objective to keep an up to date view on network 
topology from every potential node S, with respect to node D. This is 
accomplished through the use of route error packets and acknowledgements. A 
route error packet is sent back to node S when another node being part of the 
transmission path from S to D, reports that it can no longer use that path. DSR 
does not examine the reason behind this failure nor does it provide a 
classification of error packets. When an error packet is received, any route in the 
route cache containing the hop in question is truncated to that point. 
In addition to route error packets, DSR allows for acknowledgements to be sent 
across the network. This has as an objective to verify the correctness of a given 
route. Acknowledgements offer a unique way of detecting malicious node 
behaviour, as they can be used in situations where the originating node already 
has an up to date view of the available paths of the MN to which it is sending 
the acknowledgement. 
2.2.2 Protocol characteristics 
DSR capitalises on the advantages that source routing has to offer. Any MN part 
of the network is not required to have up to date routing information of the 
recipients they aim to reach. Furthermore, the establishment of new routes takes 
place on demand, without any periodic updates taking place at regular intervals. 
The benefit of this reflects on issues of power consumption, as well as issues of 
bandwidth overhead, particularly when there is little or no mobility. 
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However, as hops are added to the packet header field, there is an increase of 
the packet overhead during route discovery. This overhead grows in proportion 
to the number of nodes that a RREQ has to transverse through before reaching 
its destination node. As a result, the advantages seen above when little network 
traffic or mobility is taking place come in a package of disadvantages involving 
higher overheads upon wanting to exchange information. 
Finally, much of the protocol's ability to learn and adapt to a new 
communication environment, presents also a problem in terms of security. As an 
example, a MN acting in promiscuous mode will have the ability to extract a lot 
of information regarding the network and the nodes that constitute it, prior to 
launching an attack. This is further amplified by the fact that in DSR there is 
only a single error packet type that is sent regardless of the type of failure 
occurring in the link between the nodes in question. 
2.3 Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) 
The flip side of on demand routing protocols groups table driven designs. This 
category of protocols operates on the assumption that every node should have an 
up to date view of the entire network at any one time. In order to achieve this, 
table driven routing relies heavily on the transmission of updates to any 
noticeable change in topology. Key elements in their classification involve the 
different routing tables that each node must store, as well as methods of 
transmitting updates throughout the network. 
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2.3.1 Description and origin 
The Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) routing protocol [36,281 
is a hop-by-hop distance vector design [37] relying on the table driven 
approach. It bases its operation on the Fulkerson method [38], also known as the 
Bellman-Ford algorithm [39]. DSDV improves on traditional distance vector, by 
guaranteeing loop freedom in suggested table routes. 
Each MN is required to maintain a routing table storing all of the possible 
destinations within the network, as well as the number of hops to each one. In 
order to guarantee loop free routes, each entry is tagged with a sequence 
number. This number shows the freshness of the route; the higher the sequence 
number, the more favourable the route is. In deciding on which route to select, if 
two routes carry the same sequence number, the route with the least number of 
hops is preferred. Finally, when a node detects that an advertised route within its 
own routing table is no longer valid, it increases the sequence number for that 
route, advertising it to other nodes as a route with an infinite hop count. 
Routing table updates are transmitted in regular time intervals throughout the 
network. As a control mechanism towards the potentially vast amounts of 
network traffic that can be generated from this process, two types of packets 
exist. The first, known as a ftill dump [36], carries all available routing 
information and is generally transmitted during periods of partial to little 
movement. For time periods of high mobility, smaller packets in size are used, 
aiming to relay only information that has changed since the last full dump in an 
incremental update. The classification of these two types of updates takes place 
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with respect to Network Protocol Data Units (NPDUs). For the incremental 
updates, data transmitted should fit into a standard size NPDU, while for full 
dumps multiple NPDUs might be required. 
Every broadcast of a new route contains the address of the destination, the 
number of hops required to reach it, the sequence number that the broadcasting 
node has labelled that route with and a new sequence number unique to the re- 
advertising of that route. Each MN is also required to delay advertising a new 
route, thus allowing for a certain amount of time labelled as settling time [361, 
so that the route with the best metric can be discovered and circulated. 
2.3.2 Protocol characteristics 
DSDV mirrors the distance vector technique as that has been applied to wired 
topologies, adding a number of ad ustments to better suit ad hoc networks. j 
These include updates circulated to the entire network upon any noticeable 
change in topology, as well two types of available message types for 
broadcasting such updates. 
The dependency of this protocol on incremental updates yields a necessary time 
interval of convergence before a route can be used. Even though this 
convergence time can be considered negligible in a static network, it represents 
one of the biggest drawbacks of DSDV [40] in wireless enviromnents. Due to 
the frequently changing network topology, this time of convergence will have as 
a direct result an increased number of dropped packets prior to the full detection 
of a new route. 
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Finally, even though the overhead is nummised with the two types of route table 
dunips that can take place by every node, the requirement that every clian. gre in 
topology is broadcasted to the network in its entirety is still present. As a result, 
the overhead will at all times remain high. relative to other protocols that require 
less or niore partial information to be transmitted in a ii-nilar scenario. 
2.4 Ad hoc On demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
Budding, oil DSDV. tile Ad hoc Oil demand Distance Vector (, -\()D\') routing 
protocol [41.42,43,44] combines the characteristics seen in the previous 
section with a source Initiated on demand design. This protocol is reactive, only 
requesting it route when one is needed, as opposed to proactive implementations 
which attempt to keep a current viexv of the entire network at all times. 
2.4.1 Route tables, route discovery and route maintenance 
MN utilisim-, AODV is required to keep a route table. Each entry III this, 
table has to contain each of the fields described in table 2.1 [41,44]: 
Table 2.1: The fields that each entry within the routing table of AQDV must 
calTy. 
Field Description 
Destination IP address 
The unique address of tile destination 
node 
Destination sequence number 
Sequence number for th Is destination, 
ensuring that the route is loop free 
Hop count The number of hops to the destination 
The neighbour that has been selected 
Next hop for forwarding packets to the 
destination MN of this entrv 
Lifetime The time for which the route is 
considered valid 
Active neighbour list 
NeIghbour nodes that are actively 
using this entry 
Request buffer Buffer making sure that each entry is 
processed only once 
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When a MN, say S, desires to send a message to another node, say D, and 
provided that it does not have a valid route to that destination, it initiates a route 
discovery process. This is achieved through the transmission of a RREQ packet 
broadcast to all its neighbours, who are in turn obliged to forward this request 
until either D is located, or a node with a "fresh" route to D is found. This is 
illustrated in figure 2.2a. Unlike DSR, the RREQ packet maintains a constant 
size with its header not carrying incremental MN IDs of the nodes visited. 
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Figure 2.2: The a) transmission of an AQDV RREO packet from source. S 
taraetinm, destination D, b) propagation of the route reply from D back to S. 
Instead, during the route discovery process, each intennediate node is required 
to record an entry in their routing table of the first node that they received the 
packet from. This has a dual purpose; it establishes a reverse route for the 
packet to follow during the reply phase and also allows for the MN to disregard 
any later received copies of the same packet. Keeping a record of such 
information guards intermediate nodes from processing the same request more 
than once. 
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The requirement in AODV for a node to offer a route reply goes beyond having 
an available route to D. Not only must a MN know of a way of reaching D, but 
also the proposed route must have a destination sequence number greater than or 
equal to that contained in the RREQ packet. If this condition is not met, a route 
cannot be classified as "fresh" and the MN cannot advertise this route. Provided 
that a fresh route is found, it is broadcast back to S, following the entries that 
each neighbouring node has stored with respect to the origin of the request 
packet. This is illustrated in figure 2.2b. 
An optional component of this protocol is the use of 'hello' messages broadcast 
on a periodic basis. Such action aims to keep aware each MN of its neighbours. 
However, this is not the default in the protocol, as every MN is obliged to listen 
for all packet re-transmissions in order for it to be aware of whether or not the 
next hop is still within reach. Still, the ability of a MN to broadcast a hello 
message acts as a getaway in the event of very little traffic being generated 
within that partition of the ad hoc networking environment. 
Finally, when a node detects that a specific route is no longer valid, it broadcasts 
a link failure notification message [41]. This message is simply a RREQ packet 
with an infinite metric towards the node which broke the path within the known 
route. Every node must propagate each failure notification to the nodes that are 
actively using this route. This is the reason behind AODV using an active 
neighbour list (seen in table 2.1) enabling it to keep track of neighbouring nodes 
utilising specific routes. 
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2.4.2 Protocol characteristics 
One of the main characteristics of this protocol is the trade-off that it utilises for 
further reducing the network overhead. To minimise the number of routing 
messages sent across the network, AODV requires MNs to store information 
about generated neighbouring traffic in their routing tables. Furthennore, it 
takes into account the history of proposed routes by utilising sequence numbers. 
For these two reasons, it offers a greatly reduced number of routing messages in 
the network. 
Even though the sequence numbers that AODV uses prevent loops from 
existing within proposed routes, their use implies a strong element of 
synchronisation, which can give rise to other problems. As an example, consider 
a network consisting of a number of partitions, which remain isolated from one 
another for long periods of time. In the event of the two partitions merging, any 
route advertised will carry a sequence number that will be either much too old 
or far too new to some of the MNs. This yields that the use of sequence numbers 
can give rise to other problems, outside those that they have been implemented 
to solve. 
Finally, any triggered route replies involving failure notification messages have 
to always make their way from the MN of failure to the sender. Even though 
this task is further simplified by transmitting this information only to the 
affected senders, it still implies that in a highly dynamic topology the network 
overhead for the protocol would increase. As AODV triggers one RREQ packet 
for every node in each node's active neighbour list, it is more than likely that for 
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every failure more than one notification will arrive at any intermediate node. A 
solution to this problem would involve a more collective approach where 
ncighbouring nodes could group such notification messages, thus controlling the 
number that gets transmitted from a particular partition within the network. 
2.5 Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) 
The Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) [45,46] is a distributed 
routing protocol that is highly adaptive and favoured for greatly mobile ad hoc 
networking environments. It falls in the category of source initiated on demand 
protocols and bases its operation on the concept of link reversal [47]. The main 
feature behind its design lies in the fact that nodes are only required to keep up 
to date routing information about nodes that are 1-hop away. The properties of 
the protocol describe three basic states: route creation, route maintenance and 
route erasure. We shall examine each of these in the section below. 
2.5.1 Route creation, route maintenance and route erasure 
TORA requires every node to carry a "height" metric for both the stages of 
route creation and maintenance. In order to direct traffic to the labelled 
destination MN, the protocol establishes a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). The 
rule for propagating messages applies to the DAG formed: all messages in the 
network flow downstream, from a node of a higher height, to a node of a lower 
height. This is illustrated in figure 2.3. This particular protocol is referred to as 
an algorithm because of the fact that it builds on Internet MANET 
Encapsulation Protocol (IMEP [48]). TORA focuses only on the underlying 
routing mechanism, relying on IMEP for its remaining functionality. For this 
reason, the protocol is often referred to as TORAAMEP [49]. 
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In the process of route discovery, when a node with no downstream links 
requires a route to a destination, it broadcasts a query (QRY) packet. This 
packet propagates through the network, following MNs of less height until it 
reaches a MN that has a route to the destination or the destination itself As a 
next step, this node is required to broadcast an update (UPD) packet containing 
its height value. Every node receiving this packet has to adjust its own height to 
a value higher than the one advertised in the UPD packet. In true pyramid 
fashion, each node upon receiving a UPD packet has to recursively transmit a 
UPD packet with its height value. As this process continues, it creates a path 
between the source and destination, often yielding multiple routes between the 
two. 
Source S 
MW 
h, > h2 hi > h3 MN7 
h3 > h7 
MN2 MN3 hr, < h3 
h3 < h4 MN6 
h2 > h4 
h5 > h3 
h5 > h6 
MN4 MN5 
> h8 
MN8 
Destinabon D 
hs > ho 
h4 > h5 
Figure 2.3: The propagation of a route request in TORA from source to 
destination, based on the respective "height" of each MN. The resulting graph 
represents a DAG. 
In times of high mobility, the resulting DAG route established through the 
above described process is often broken requiring ftirther update. Upon failure 
to transmit, the last downstream MN generates a new height reference that is 
established in a similar way as that taking place during route discovery. 
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Finally, another unique element of TORA lies in the ability of each MN to 
request from a neighbouring node to erase a specific route from its route cache. 
This feature is implemented through the use of CLR messages, carrying 
information about which routes are considered no longer valid. As an example, 
upon the detection of a network partition, all routes involving nodes outside the 
fragmented subnet are cleared from the route cache of "inside" MNs. This takes 
place through the propagation of CLR packets among the subnet, from attempts 
to communicate with nodes outside it. 
2.5.2 Protocol characteristics 
The key characteristic in the implementation of TORA lies in the utilisation of a 
relative metric that can provide a measure of performance between nodes. As 
infonnation is routed based on the height value of individual nodes, it is 
important that the most up to date network topology reflects the values of this 
metric. Thus, synchronisation plays an important role. Since, upon a link failure, 
nodes do not only have to update their height value, but also request that 
neighbouring nodes do the same, it is imperative that each MN is aware of the 
time that a particular event took place prior to altering its height. 
Consequently, one of the biggest drawbacks of TORA lies in the requirement 
for clock synchronisation between communicating nodes. This is seen as a 
necessary condition for the algorithm to function correctly, which lies outside 
the protocol specification and can simply be taken for granted a priori. Even 
though existing standards such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) can 
satisfy this prerequisite, it fonns a dependency for routing that supersedes a 
stand alone protocol implementation. 
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As every MN receives routing updates from all its neighbouring nodes and 
without prioritising incoming packets, fast alterations in the height value of each 
MN can take place. The occurrence of such an effect will be mostly noticed 
during concurrent detections of network partitions from multiple nodes. This 
will in turn trigger each MN to attempt to fix the problem by advertising route 
erasures as well as attempting to rebuild specific links to other destinations. As a 
result, upon a significant change in network topology, height values can vary by 
a significant amount, before stabilising to a set value. 
2.6 Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) 
Moving away from protocol designs that focus on utilising between the choices 
of characteristics described in section 2.1, the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) 
gives a hybrid approach to routing. The specification of this protocol [51,52, 
53] combines the reactive approach of querying for a route on demand, with the 
proactive slant of attempting to keep an up to date view of network topology. To 
achieve this, ZRP partitions the network in a number of routing zones and 
deploys two separate sub-protocols that are used between, as well as inside the 
zones specified. 
2.6.1 The concept of routing zones 
A routing zone is defined [51) as a set of neighbouring nodes that are, at 
maximum, a certain number of hops away. This maximum distance, measured 
in hops, is referred to as the zone radius. To allow for communications to take 
place, ZRP specifies the Intrazone Routing Protocol (1ARP), which operates 
within a given zone and the Interzone Routing Protocol (IERP) used for finding 
routes between different zones. 
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For MNs within the same zone. IARP is used. This sub-protocol is not defined, 
it simply assumes a proactive architecture, such as DSDV or a similar table 
driven implementation. The specification of ZRP does not require all zones to 
operate using the same IARP. The sole requirement is that upon a change in 
network topology all nodes within the affected zone are notified. This can result 
in nodes changing zones and thus zone protocols depending on their mobility. 
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Figure 2A The functionalitv of ZRP, separatina the network into respective 
zones for source node S and destination node D. 
Provided that the destination MN does not lie within the same zone as the 
source, IERP is deployed. This protocol bases its operation on RR-EQ packets 
which get broadcast throughout the different zones, recursively, until the 
requested route is found and a reply is sent back to the source. For this process 
IERP employs the Bordercast Resolution Protocol (BRP), included within the 
ZRP specification. BRP bases its operation on transmitting any RREQ packets 
to the border MNs within a given zone and attempts to keep track of which 
nodes do act as communicating borders within existing zones. 
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As an example of the functionality of ZRP, consider the networking 
environment with the respective links illustrated in figure 2.4. Source node, say 
S (MNI) wants to cstablish a routc with dcstination nodc say D (MN8). 
Assuming a zone radius of 2, since both nodes do not lie within that radius, we 
can see that three separate zones surface, zone I with MNs 1,2 and 4; zone 3 
with MNs 3,2,4,7,6 and 5; zone 8 with MNs 8,7,6 and 5. The derivation of 
these zones comes as a logical consequence of the existing zone radius. Starting 
from the source S, we establish which nodes are peripheral to that zone (namely 
MN 4) and in a recursive manner follow its peripheral nodes. This is done until 
a zone containing the destination node is established. In this case, zone 3 could 
have been replaced with zone 5, containing MNs 2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8. 
Each MN is aware of its routing zone and the nodes within it. Since MN 8 is not 
in the routing zone of MN 1, the latter sends a request to the border nodes, 
which in this case is MN 4. This node is obliged to check if the specified 
destination is within its routing zone. In the event that it is, a route reply is 
generated. As in our example this is not the case, the request is further 
forwarded to the border nodes of MN 4, which are MN 7 and MN 6. As the 
destination is within the routing zone of both these zones a request reply packet 
is generated and sent back to the source following the same principle. 
All requests made within a single zone utilise the IARP. For requests that cross 
zones, such as a route request from MN I to MN 8, IERP is used. Finally, for 
both a route request and a route reply, to prevent requests from entering 
previously queried zones, a process request stack is used. Each node keeps track 
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of previously queried packets, performing a comparison for all incoming traffic. 
If a node receives a request that is has previously processed, the incoming 
packct is simply droppcd. 
2.6.2 Protocol characteristics 
The hybrid design of ZRP bases its operation on establishing a local and global 
network view. On the local level, every MN belongs to a zone of which it 
knows all the members; on the global level, the aspect of exchanging 
infonnation between two distant nodes is divided into the task of routing 
packets between different zones. What enables us to distinguish between the 
two views is the zone radius defining the number of hops that constitute each 
zone. 
From the protocol specification, there is no mention regarding the decision of 
the size of the zone radius; it is suggested [5 1] that this should be selected by a 
central administration, depending on the requirements of the MANET. Since the 
usage of this protocol is targeted at a constantly changing topology, the 
optimum value for the zone radius can vary. However, adjusting its value is 
something that cannot be done dynamically and therefore holds a potential 
drawback for ZRP. 
Another issue lies in the decision not to include the full specification for intra- 
zone communications. As different zones can utilise different proactive 
protocols, any rapid change in the network topology can result in a MN 
attempting to communicate to another node using constantly changing rules. 
Apart from the obvious issue of compatibility (all MNs are required to support 
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any different protocol that they might encounter on the network) this can 
increase the network overhead by a significant amount. Furthermore, as a 
change in topology can have an effect on more than one zone, issues of time 
latency can surface. As nodes adjust to the settings of their new zone, a time 
window will be required before they will be fully aware of the rules utilised in 
their new neighbourhood. 
2.7 Cluster Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR) 
The Cluster Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR) protocol presents an alternative 
implementation to the flat structures that we have so far seen. This protocol [53, 
54], utilises a hierarchical structure diving the MNs present in a number of 
overlapping or disjoint clusters. Each cluster has a cluster head, responsible for 
maintaining information about its members. In order to establish a route within 
a cluster, the head MN is consulted in a reactive manner, establishing a route on 
demand. 
2.7.1 The interoperability of clusters 
In order for this protocol to function correctly, a cluster head algorithm is used. 
This serves a dual purpose among neighbouring nodes; firstly, it informs them 
which cluster they belong to and secondly, which node is acting as a local 
authoritarian MN. The algorithm functions on the principle of electing the node 
with the smallest ID as a cluster head. By transmitting hello messages, which do 
not get forwarded beyond a single hop, each MN computes the node acting as a 
local cluster head. A node is classified as a member of a cluster, if it has a bi- 
directional link with the cluster head. To allow for communications to spawn 
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tile entire network, each node can be a member of more than one cluster. This, 
depending on the physical topology, prevents partitions from being fon-ned. 
Every node that belongs to two or more clusters acts as a gateway between 
them. Each cluster head is responsible for receiving all incoming traffic for the 
cluster, which then gets forwarded respectively, either to nodes that are part of 
the cluster group, or to nodes acting as gateways. A vital condition for this 
functionality is the notification from a MN to a cluster head of its ability to 
communicate with another head. An example of this operation is illustrated in 
figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.5: The process of routing packets fTom the source MN 1, to the 
destination MN 8 via cluster heads, utilisina CGSR. 
In this example, the source node S, wants to transmit to the destination D. For 
this, it first consults its cluster head MN 2, which in turn forwards the request to 
MN 4 that acts as a sole gateway between the two clusters. From MN 2, the 
packet gets forwarded to the respective cluster head (MN 5), which in turn 
forwards it to the other gateways, excluding the incoming node. In this manner 
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the packet reaches the destination. A reply from node D back to S travels 
through the network in a similar fashion to that described above. 
The authors of CGSR [51] state that their protocol utilises a version of DSDV, 
modified to best fit a hierarchical network structure. Each node is required to 
store a cluster member table, which similarly to the routing table of DSDV is 
broadcast periodically across the cluster. In addition to the cluster table, each 
node is required to store a routing table used for determining the next hop for 
reaching the destination. The purpose of this lies in the event of a node having 
to select more than one cluster head to forward the packet to. Upon receiving an 
incoming packet, a MN consults its routing table in order to determine which 
cluster head lies closer to the destination specified. 
2.7.2 Protocol characteristics 
By deploying a cluster head, CGSR offers a method for separating tasks 
involving channel access, routing and bandwidth allocation. Instead of having to 
consider these issues individually, on a per node basis, the cluster head manages 
a group of nodes, transmitting the necessary information when required. When a 
node wants to communicate with another node, it consults its local authority 
MN and transmits packets based on the feedback it obtains. This process 
establishes a trade-off; on the one hand it offers a number of advantages with 
regards to minimising network overheads and on the other, it leaves the 
remaining cluster nodes unable to communicate in the event of not being able to 
access the cluster head. 
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Furthermore, when utilising a cluster head scheme, any frequent change in 
topology, resulting in the partitioning of the cluster will require a cluster head 
re-allocation to be perfonned. Depending on how often this will be required and 
how many clusters it effects, it can result in devastating results with respect to 
performance; MNs will be busy establishing the infrastructure that enables them 
to exchange information, instead of actually using this to process incoming 
information. 
For this reason CGSR limits the ways in which a cluster head can be 
established. By utilising the Least Cluster Change (LCC) clustering algorithm, it 
allows for head reselection only in the event of two cluster heads establishing a 
bi-directional link, or a node moving out of the range of its cluster head. LCC 
creates a scenario that limits the way in which a node can become a cluster 
head; for this the algorithm takes from the dynamic allocation of one cluster 
head, when and as necessary. On the other hand, these two conditions are 
necessary if we are to guarantee the correct functionality of this protocol. 
2.8 AntNet 
Having reviewed a number of protocols that base their operation on utilising the 
different characteristics presented in the first section of this chapter, AntNet 
proposes an agent-based adaptive approach to routing. Spawning from the field 
of emergence, this algorithm [55 - 59,66] takes the survival instincts observed 
in ant colonies and applies them to the problems of wireless routing. 
The framework of operation within the protocol that AntNet encapsulates, uses 
a number of characteristics that lie outside traditional routing techniques. In this 
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section, we aim to provide an overview of the operation of AntNet, without 
questioning the theoretical framework behind it. Chapter 3 (and in particular 
section 3.1) aims to introduce the overlapping fields and theoretical components 
behind this implementation. 
2.8.1 Understanding ant colonies 
Ants in their struggle for survival are characterised by their reproductive 
division of labour, their cooperative brood care, as well as the presence of a sole 
worker caste. It is these three characteristics [60] that classify them along other 
social Hymenoptera (ants, bees and wasps) as highly organised insects that in a 
single word can be described as ettsocial. 
The social organisation of these insects is reflected in the complex form in 
which their colony is managed. Despite lacking a central administrative 
authority for guiding the allocation of tasks and resources [15], ants appear to 
have the ability of overcoming a number of difficulties in their quest for food. 
As simple as this chore might appear, what we must not forget is that these 
insects do not have the ability to communicate with each other directly. As a 
result, the question that rises relates to how they actually manage to cooperate 
and achieve such a complex and organised behaviour for the whole colony. 
The key in their interaction is the well-studied phenomenon of foraging and 
recruiting [61 - 65] embedding the concept of Ant Colony Optimisation (ACO). 
This method of communication explains how ants explore their surrounding 
environment scavenging for food, managing to, not only find their way back to 
their nest, but also indicate the food source to neighbouring insects. Each ant 
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has the ability to release a noticeable chemical substance at their current 
location called pheromone. This acts as a crowd-puller to other ants, which in 
turn, provided they spot something of interest in the vicinity will release more of 
this substance to generate further attention. To our understanding today, a single 
ant does not have any control over the amount of pheromone that it releases in 
the environment, as this is done naturally and depends on the excitement and 
stimulation that is received from the environment. Consequently, ants end up 
moving within trails of pheromone near their nest. The closer to the nest an ant 
is the stronger these trails are due to the presence of more ants. As pheromone 
evaporates in time, each trail by default has a set time of existence prior to either 
disappearing or being remapped by the presence of more ants running across it. 
The resulting behaviour that ants possess, by having the ability to release and 
also feel attracted to pheromone, describes the phenomenon of foraging and 
recruiting. 
As an example of this, consider an ant encountering an obstacle in their way 
towards a pre-defined (in tenns of an established trail) food source. Initially, this 
ant will randomly pick a new direction of travel. Depending on the fractions of 
pheromone that it deposits, it will effect the decision of other ants trailing along 
and stumbling on the same obstacle. If the leading ant manages to randomly find 
a new path to the food source, it will release more pheromone along its trail that 
will in turn attract other ants. If this does not take place, then the second ant will 
pick up a new vanishing trail, having to in turn select a new random direction of 
movement. This process will carry through in a recursive manner, until the food 
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source is reached, or interest for that food source is lost because of all the trails 
having vanished. 
Through this process, a natural system comprised of entities deprived of the 
ability of direct interaction and communication, manages to have an information 
flow serving the purposes of survival for an entire ant colony. 
2.8.2 Ant based routing 
As distant as the process that ants use to survive might seem to mobile ad hoc 
routing, there are a number of protocol designs that use the pheromone approach 
of foraging and recruiting. The common denominator that allows researchers to 
link the two comes from the fact that in both cases a system or network of 
simple interacting entities needs to robustly solve the problem at band with as 
little direct communication as possible. It is this fact that connects two fields 
that would otherwise appear as quite far apart. 
Building on the metaphor that ants looking for food can also represent packets 
looking for destinations, the question that arises is to what extent can routing be 
abstracted as an emergent behaviour from the interaction of packets travelling 
through the network. To help us answer this question, we proceed by reviewing 
one the pioneering protocols of this type: AntNet. 
In the process of prescribing incoming packets to an outgoing path in an ad hoc 
networking environment, AntNet applies the concept of optimisation within the 
ant colony (ACO) [57,61] to wireless routing. This algorithm, as it was first 
presented in [66], introduces control packets on the network, named ant packets. 
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Data is forwarded on the network based on next-hop probabilities and with each 
MN looking for the minimum cost path joining the source and the destination. 
Ant packets are responsible for discovering and maintaining routes, using node 
to node trip times to adjust next hop probabilities. Through this mechanism, ant 
packets follow ant behaviour in colonies, "selecting" their direction of 
movement based on a higher probability ratio. It is this probability value that 
represents the pheromone within the MANET. 
Each packet travels through intermediate nodes on the network, being pointed 
towards its next hop based on a greedy stochastic policy. Within the packet, a 
list of visited nodes is maintained, as well as the time that has elapsed to arrive 
there. Ant packets launched towards the destination are referred to as forward 
packets. Each time a forward packet arrives at an intermediate node, the 
stochastic process, based on uniformly selecting the next hop with a small 
exploration probability, is launched. If the node selected as a next hop has 
already been visited, the next best hop available is chosen. 
When a forward ant packet arrives at its destination, a backward ant packet is 
launched towards the source. This packet follows the reverse path to that found 
in the arriving source packet. At each MN, this backward packet updates the 
routing of each node it passes through. This update involves next-hop 
probabilities to the nodes that the packet has already visited, as well as trip 
times (in terms of the mean and the variance) to the destination. Forward 
packets carry the same priority as data packets on the network experiencing the 
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same congestion and delay as data, while backward packets carry a higher 
priority. Once the packets arrive back at the source, they are simply dropped. 
Through this process, a dynamic alteration in the probabilities that each node 
carries in its routing table is offered, representing the continuous change in 
pheromone trails within an ant colony. Based on this approach, ant packets are 
sent between source and destination pairs, testing the connectivity along that 
path. This is done asynchronously, by selecting destinations at random, in an 
attempt for each node to have a more up to date view of the routing conditions 
on the network. Due to the behavioural characteristics of ant packets and, 
despite the fact that they simply correlate control information between nodes, 
these packets are often referred to as mobile agents or ants in references to 
AntNet. 
2.8.3 Similar protocol designs 
Expanding on ant based routing, a number of other protocols exist that utilise 
the concept of foraging and recruiting in a similar way. Starting from circuit- 
switched telephone networks, Ant Based Control (ABC), first introduced in 
1996 [67] aims to optimise the routing of calls placed between different 
telephone exchanges. Despite being applied to wired networks, this protocol 
bases its operation on ant packets leaving a pheromone trail, being launched at 
regular time intervals towards randomly selected destinations. When a call is 
placed, a circuit must be established between the caller and the destination. The 
highest probability hop is followed from the source outwards; if a circuit cannot 
be established, the call is blocked. In this fashion, when routes are sufficiently 
short, actual calls are placed onto the network. 
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Another design, this time for MANETs, is Ant-Colony based Routing (ARA). 
This algorithm [68] employs a flooding scheme to find destinations, using 
pheromone trails to determine next hop probabilities. Similarly to AntNet, 
forward and backward ants are used for discovering routes between the source 
and destination. For each forward ant that is flooded through the network and 
received by an intermediate node, a backward ant is returned. As a result, 
reverse routes are established automatically as forward ants move from one 
node to the next towards the destination. Upon the occurrence of a route failure 
an automatic retransmission of the packet takes place, backtracking to the 
previous node if necessary. Despite this scheme not being loop free, it offers a 
way of checking for loops through the individual pheromone probabilities that 
each node has. 
A final design, also for MANET routing is Termite [69]. This algorithm, further 
builds on the pheromone characteristics of AntNet, attempting to minimise the 
control traffic generated on the network. Similarly to other routing protocols 
presented in this section, Termite also uses the pheromone approach to in turn 
offer next hop probabilities for data packets. Each packet is forwarded 
probabilistically, based on the amount of destination pheromone found on each 
neighbour link. The unique aspect of this algorithm lies in a neighbouring node 
being dropped from a node's pheromone table if transmission fails. 
Consequently, if a node does contain a needed destination node in its 
pheromone table, a route request is issued via a RREQ packet. It is this process, 
so 
very much resembling the route request of DSR and AODV, which allows for 
further reduction of the control packet overhead on the network. 
2.9 Methods of comparison 
From the protocols presented in the previous sections, a number of different 
approaches to routing have been presented. Starting from table driven designs, 
to on demand and adaptive agent based routing, each protocol builds on the 
characteristics presented in section 2.1, adding further to these through its own 
unique design. In this section, we aim to provide a number of comparison 
characteristics for each of the protocols presented. As these protocols have been 
analysed theoretically, the characteristics that follow are derived from 
theoretical and qualitative analyses based on what properties the protocols have. 
2.9.1 Protocol complexity 
As an initial comparison for measuring the performance, we focus on the 
complexity of the communication process. This is further divided into two 
categories; time complexity, defined as the number of steps required to perform 
a protocol operation, and communication complexity, defined as the number of 
messages needed to perform a protocol operation [70,7 1 ]. For each of the two, 
we consider the complexity during protocol initialisation, as well as protocol 
failure. This distinction, also seen in [28], is useful when comparing the 
protocol's response to one or more topological changes. Commonly, it is source 
initiated on-demand routing designs that mostly alter their behaviour after the 
occurrence of a link failure. Consequently, this measure of performance not 
only takes into account how each protocol operates in terms of the packets 
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transmitted and steps required, but also how this behaviour changes upon one or 
more link state changes within the MANET. 
The measure of comparison is performed with respect to the order 0 of the most 
significant characteristic affecting the performance of the protocol. This is a 
direct derivative of the way in which algorithm complexity is measured [72]. 
The complexity of a protocol is measured by expressing either the number of 
steps (for time complexity) or the number of messages (for communication 
complexity) as a function of one or more of the affecting characteristics. 
Commonly the values in any of these metrics aim to represent the worst case 
behaviour. As an example, a protocol of complexity 0(2d) is of order, twice the 
diameter d of the network, as seen for DSR, AODV and TORA in Table 2.2. 
From the protocols that we have reviewed in this chapter, the characteristics that 
affect their complexity are: the number of MNs N on the network, the diameter 
d of the network, the number of nodes x affected by a topological change, as 
well as (in the case of hierarchical protocols) the height of the routing tree h that 
a cluster forms and the average number of nodes M each cluster has. Naturally, 
more complex designs can be dependant on more versatile characteristics. For 
the case of ZRP, we also use the average number B of border (gateway) nodes 
within a cluster. From the existing characteristics, it is important to have the 
ability to distinguish between them. As an example, the difference between the 
network diameter and the number of nodes lies in the way the nodes are spread 
across the network; the diameter represents the maximum number of nodes in 
the longest path. Each one of these characteristics represents a unique measure 
52 
ot'performance, which. depending on the design, could carry more importance 
with respect to others. 
Table 2.2 shows a comparison of the time and communication complexity of the 
different protocols presented in this chapter. For DSR, TORA, AODV, DSDV, 
ZRP and C'GSR the original tables as well as further explanation for each 
protocol can be t'OLInd in [28,301. This table lacks the time and communication 
complexity of AntNet. As this protocol bases its operation on simulating 
pheromone tralls, the parameters that affect the -way In which ants move across 
the nct\\ oi-k lie outside the com entional characteristics presented in this table. A 
stud\ Oil P-4111.1es, Of Complexity for AntNet and other ailt based aloorithnis can be 
t'()Lliid in [73]. with further mathematical background presented in [74]. 
Table 2.2: Comparison of the complexity characteristics of the protocols 
re\ loved. 
Time 
Parameters DSR DSDV AODV TORA ZRP GCSR 
Time 
c oniplex1tv 0(2d) 
O(M) O(d) 0(2d) 0(2d) O(d) 
. (mitialisation) 0(2d) 
Time 
complexitY 
0(2d) 
or 0 
O(M) O(d) 0(2d) 0(2d) 
0(2d) O(d) (fallure) 
C0111111LInication 
M 
complex1tv 0(2N) ( ) O(x=N) 0(2N) 0(2N) O(x=N) ' 
(mitialisation) 0(2Bd ) 
Communication 
0(m)*/ ' complex1tv 0(2N) OWN) 0(2N) 0(-Ix) O(x=N) 
(failure) 0(2Bd ) 
d: Netxvork diameter 
h: Height of the routing tree 
N: Number of MNs on the network 
M: Average number of nodes within each cluster 
x: Number of nodes affected by a topologwal change 
B: The average number of gateý, vay nodes within a cluster 
In the case of a cache lilt 
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From this table, we can see that the complexity of a protocol can be dependant 
on different characteristics, based on the way that it has been designed. 
Moreover, the order of either the communication or time complexity does 
provide an impartial method of merit, regardless of the simulation scenario at 
hand. For more complex protocol designs, the characteristics used also become 
more complicated. Even though this method of comparison does not offer a 
direct measure of performance between different designs, it does yield the 
dependencies that each protocol uses. 
2.9.2 Single based characteristics 
The opening section of this chapter presents a number of characteristics that 
enable us to classify different routing protocols. Each of these can further 
produce a way of not only distinguishing but also of comparing them. This 
process, when attempting to use the method of comparison as a measure of 
performance, can lead into a number of pitfalls. This section aims to provide the 
necessary clarification between a design characteristic and a comparison 
mechanism in wireless routing protocols. 
As an example we refer to the characteristic of a flat versus a hierarchical 
structure. From the protocols presented, CGSR has a hierarchical structure 
establishing clusters within the MANET, while AODV, for example, has a flat 
structure. Similarly, in both [28] and [30] that we have referred to from the 
previous section, one of the key characteristics when comparing the different 
protocols is their routing philosophy: this can be either flat or hierarchical. In 
this instance, the method of comparison signifies the design criteria. 
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Such characteristics that are identical in both the design as well as the 
comparison stages, we label as single based and continue to question with 
caution. As the information used for the design of the protocol is directly passed 
for its comparison with respect to other designs, no significant conclusion can 
be derived regarding the evaluation of its performance. This criterion simply 
reminds the reader of the design method that was used. 
Ergo, for each characteristic presented in the classification of a routing protocol 
that helps us to further quantify each design, a single based characteristic that 
can be used for comparison exists. This technique should be avoided, as it does 
not give rise to an independent way of assessing the success or failure of the 
resulting design. 
2.9.3 Typical characteristics 
For the comparison of routing protocols, furthcr to protocol complcxity and 
single based characteristics, a number of quantitative metrics can be used to 
measure the performance of any routing protocol. These measures, despite being 
dependant on the simulation scenario at band, provide the most effective way of 
distinguishing between different protocols and accessing their performance in 
situations that are as realistic as possible. 
Following the ongoing efforts of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
[75] working group on MANETs [76], a number of standards and specifications 
relating to ad hoc networking technology and simulation have been peered for 
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public review. Corson and Macker put forward RFC4 2501, in which they 
propose the following quantitative metrics for assessing the performance of any 
routing protocol [77]. These are: 
* End to end data throughput and delay 
Statistical measures of the amount of data that can be transmitted 
between nodes, as well as considerations for any delay between 
transmissions. These measures of effective routing are performed with 
other protocol designs as benchmarks. 
* Route acquisition time 
The time required by a node to establish a route when requested. This 
measure of delay is especially of interest in on demand routing designs, 
but also finds applicability in table driven protocols through 
computational time. 
* Percentage of out of order delivery 
Not only must the amount of data packets dropped be taken into account, 
but also the time in which they are received. This issue of 
synchronisation becomes of great importance when in order delivery of 
information is expected. 
* Efficiency 
Questions the way in which the solution to a problem is reached. This 
takes into account the limiting factors that are experienced in an 
Request For Comments. An RFC is a standard document describing protocols, systems, or 
procedures used by the Internet community. For example, the IP network protocol is detailed in 
an RFC (RFC 79 1), as are many others. All Internet standard protocols are written up as RFCS. 
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environment of high mobility, such as power dissipation, bandwidth, 
continuous link changes, etc. An example of this can be seen on control 
and data traffic sharing the same channel; excessive control packets will 
drain the performance of the network. 
Each of the above metrics has a degree of generality arising mainly from it been 
in a document requesting comments. The authors of [77] leave it to the 
regression of the reader to use their own metrics, provided that a comparison 
with the performance of other protocols is made. For the metric of efficiency, 
they propose the following tracking ratios, stating that there are others which 
have not being considered: 
* Average number of data bits transmitted over the average number 
of data bits delivered: Relates to the bit transmission efficiency on the 
network, as well as the average hop count taken by data packets. 
9 Average number of control bits transmitted over the average 
number of data bits delivered: Measures the bit efficiency of the 
protocol in disbursing control overhead to deliver data. 
* Average number of data packets transmitted over the average 
number of data packets delivered: Measure that tries to assess the 
efficiency towards channel utilisation in tenns of a bit count ratio. 
From the above, we can see that a number of ways of assessing the performance 
or routing protocols exist. As in the case of efficiency metrics, each one can 
become more specific depending on the protocol design as well as the way in 
which the MANET is configured. Parameters that should be varied include the 
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number of MNs, the average connectivity of each one, as well as traffic patterns 
experienced among others. Consistent comparative results while varying each of 
these parameters, does yield a successful protocol that can be used outside 
simulation scenarios in future ad hoc networks. 
2.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the general characteristics possessed by wireless 
routing protocols. Further to this, a number of designs have also been studied, as 
well as methods of comparing between different protocols. Having seen the 
different frameworks of wireless routing operation, our main objective has been 
to familiarise the reader with the key concepts and tradeoffs that distinct 
protocols offer. 
In pioneering a protocol from scratch, our first consideration goes towards the 
characteristics that enable us to classify it. As much as these characteristics are 
not set, their degree of flexibility cross-correlates with others; as an example, a 
cluster based protocol would not be able to function effectively if its operation 
was solely table driven. The two key ways in which this can be seen is through 
simulation results with respect to other protocols and the complexity involved in 
its operation. 
From the methods of comparison studied, protocol complexity yields a 
theoretical upper bound with respect to the network, single based characteristics 
present pitfalls that should be avoided, while the typical characteristics 
presented in the IETF request for comment form the most solid technique. 
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Perhaps the most important factor worth taking away from this chapter lies in 
the fact that in order to understand the performance of a protocol, a simulation 
environment of mobile nodes attempting to exchange information should be 
utilised. This should involve practical scenarios involving the exchange and loss 
of information within a network. Benchmark results from other protocols should 
also be taken into account based on the typical characteristics utilised. For each 
characteristic, the way in which each it has been selected should also be 
considered; this has a high degree of importance especially in the cases where 
two or more exceedingly different designs have to be compared. 
Finally, having presented wireless routing protocols, the next chapter focuses on 
the security that different protocols have to offer. This directly links to 
malicious behaviour and how that can affect any exchange of information. 
Ultimately, security in wireless routing will provide us with a different way of 
measuring protocol perfortnance to thus compare different designs. Such an 
attribute is required for establishing the necessary feedback for an emergent 
system that automates this design process. 
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This chapter focuses on the constituent elements of security in wireless routing. 
Taking a systems approach, the first section identifies the different elements and 
sub-elements within routing protocols from a security perspective. This is 
followed by the consequences of compromise and the different classifications of 
a malicious attack. Next, the attack definitions given are applied to the protocols 
studied in chapter 2. The second part of this chapter examines techniques of 
countering malicious intention within a MANET. For this, a number of 
cryptographic primitives are presented, as well as ways of understanding the 
occurrence of malicious intent across the network. Chapter 3 concludes with a 
brief review (aiming to mainly illustrate the applicability of the concepts 
presented) of two secure protocol designs, namely the Secure Routing Protocol 
and Ariadne. 
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3.1 The elements of security in routing protocols 
Information and system security are multi-faceted disciplines [78] often 
presenting diverse and conflicting objectives5. In its broadest definition, the 
concept of security carries the freedom or protection from a particular danger or 
worry. As much as section 1.4 defines the context in which we use the term, it is 
important to question what the constituent elements of a MANET from a 
security perspective are. In order to achieve this, we first look at the objective of 
the system at hand and how it correlates with its functionality. 
Ultimately, any network aims to allow for the exchange of information among 
users. Since in this case the system is a network of mobile devices, the 
maintenance of the attributes presented in table 1.2 (that represent data security 
in communications), demarcate this objective of exchanging information within 
the ad hoe networking environment. 
As a derivative, the two main elements involved in the communication process 
are the portable devices acting as nodes and the users operating them. Even 
though these two underlying elements exist in virtually all scenarios involving 
computer security, as seen in sections 1.3 and 1.4, in the case of the MANET 
their relation goes beyond conventional levels. Consequently, the actions of 
these two elements reflect on the security of the network, acting as a system in 
the process of any communication taking place. 
' "Ifyou want total security, go to prison. There yourefed, clothed, given medical care and so 
on. 7be only thing lacking.. isfteedom. " Dwight D. Eisenhower [ 1890 - 1969] 
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In security [79,80], you are only as strong as your weakest linký. Thus the 
actions from either the human or computer side within the MANET will always 
reflect on the weakest link of the system. The reason behind security not being a 
single visited topic among researchers in ad hoc networking lies in the trade-off 
between user interoperability and malicious intent. Nodes need to cooperate in 
order to allow for any communication to take place and this cooperation poses 
the main vulnerability of the system. It is exactly this trade-off that outlines the 
weakest link within the MANET. 
Trying to balance this trade-off within the system, the wireless protocol is 
responsible for the exchange of infonnation taking place. As a result, it can be 
argued that the weakest link to security in ad hoc networking is reflected upon 
the routing structure deployed within the protocol. This protocol definition can 
be exploited both from the human, as well as the computer, element of the 
system. Such deductive logic illustrates the importance of deploying a protocol 
that does not leave room for manipulation from either side. The two subsections 
that follow identify the factors affecting security within each of the two 
elements of the system. 
6 This fundamental rule in security places its roots in the famous quote: "Ibe chain is no 
stronger than its weakest link"; quoted in politics by Vladimir Lenin [81], in philosophy by 
William James [82], as well as in a number of applied fields as this example [83] illustrates. 
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3.1.1 The computer element 
Within the device operating as a node, certain actions need to have effect in 
order to allow for any infon-nation exchange to take place. Having their ongin 
in the protocol of communication, these actions reflect their operation in both 
the software as well as the hardware components of the MN. Consequently, 111- 
defined protocol implementations can leave room for software bugs and viruses 
as well as for manipulating hardware. As an attack is most likely to occur upon 
the weakest link of the system, the computer element of wireless routing 
security mulls over all three of its sub-elements, namely the protocol definition 
and how that is being utilised, the supporting software responsible for handling 
incoming traffic and the hardware that controls it. This is illustrated in figure 
3.1, below. 
Protocol definition Supporting Controlling 
and ublisation software hardware 
ffm 
Computer element 
Figure 3.1: The sub-elements within the computer element of ad hoc network 
systems security. 
Not only must the protocol safeguard its target operation by leaving no room for 
manipulation within its algorithm, but also both the software and hardware 
should be designed depriving any external factors from altering their original 
characteristics. Further to this, each of the three should allow in their 
specification the occurrence of misbehaviour from the other two parts and 
facilitate for a technique of detecting and reporting this incident. 
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From these, the hardware is the most secure sub-element, requiring physical 
tampering. Only recently have we seen in the area of software engineering the 
emerging field of secure programming [84 - 86]. In as much as ways of 
verifying routing protocols for MANETs exist [87 - 89], expanding their 
characteristics in a way that takes into account misbehaviour from the software 
or the hardware sub-elements is an area that remains to be studied further. 
3.1.2 The human element 
The human element within the system presents a much tougher adversary than 
the computer element in terms of security. No matter how well the machine is 
programmed and how well the interactions within the sub-elements of the 
device have been thought through, nothing can stop or prevent a physical 
compromise or a hijacking of a node. 
As MANETs can provide a method for establishing communications in 
situations where fixed base station networks cannot be deployed, they find great 
applicability in extreme and highly dynamic scenarios. These include 
battlefields and other military applications as well as a number of emergency or 
recovery situations. As a result, the human element spans scenarios involving 
the capturing of one or more battle units in the battlefield, to search and rescue 
teams caught up in another aftermath of a tomado. 
In computer security, it is often that we see the binary division of users with 
malicious intent and users with a healthy intent towards system. This is a 
characteristic frequently used in contemporary wireless security [90] allowing 
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anyone to promptly classify users, depending on their behaviour. The human 
element within any MANET expands this divide by making it more dynamic in 
time. Thus, any user that has in the past been considered a healthy user can, 
without prior notice, turn malicious towards any other user or group of users on 
the network. This process (illustrated in figure 3.2) summarises the devastating 
effects that the human element can have towards the security of the ad hoc 
networking environment. 
P. 
Factors: 
Type of network 
Pnyvious IVIN beharviour 
ness d an attack 
T 
(dyinamic) moblhty 
-4 
Or 
ISSETY 
Hurimn element 
Malicious users C 
Healthy Lmn a 
Figure 3.2: The decision making process within the human element and the 
main factors affectinp, it. 
In metaphor to the human and computer element of security in MANETs, [101 
presents two types of threats to routing protocols. The first one, inflicted by 
external attackers exploits injecting, replaying or distorting routing infori-nation 
as It is exchanged between nodes on the network. The second, descnbed as 
more severe, comes from compromised nodes, which have in the past being 
healthy ftinctioning nodes within the MANET. Even though each of these two 
threats share a number of common features identified within the respective 
computer and human element, it is virtually impossible to classify the cause of 
the threat to its origin. The important aspects that this classification does offer 
are the ability to further identify the types of attack as well as the consequences 
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arising from a compromise. The next two sections analyse these two subject 
areas. 
3.2 Consequences of compromise 
Having briefly seen the elements and sub-elements of system security in ad hoc 
networks, in this section we aim to provide the necessary motivation behind not 
allowing a compromise of the system to take place. The distinctions in this 
classification will help us to further categorise the different types of malicious 
behaviour we can experience on the network. 
As routing is a well studied phenomenon of wired network topologies, [92] 
presents four different types of compromise. Each one is measured with respect 
to the effect that it has on the users attempting to exchange information. Since in 
mobile ad hoc networking, every node on the network also acts as a router, we 
consider the consequences of compromise in the wireless to, at least comprise of 
those seen the wired. As the following points present, the consequences of 
adversarial routers in a network can be disastrous. An attacker in control of any 
devices responsible for controlling the flow of data can: 
e Disable the entire network 
Bringing an entire network to a standstill is easily achievable if there is 
control over the method of forwarding data on it. Furthermore, any 
network outage is far more significant in a MANET, because recovering 
from it would require access to all the individual nodes that constitute it. 
* Use routers to attack internal systems 
As oflen networks interoperate with other networks, a compromised 
system can act as a foothold for attacking another computer or machine. 
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In today's standards, to prevent against this, it is not by chance that a 
wireless network often carries its own separate firewall. 
0 Use routers to attack other locations 
Further to the point made above, an attacker can use one or more nodes 
to launch requests impersonating users from the currently compromised 
network. Thus, regardless of network interoperability, any external 
exchange of information confined within set protocol rules, can be done 
via impersonating other users. 
* Reroute all traffic entering and leaving the network 
The rerouting of traffic gives an attacker the ability to monitor, record, 
as well as modify any information exchange taking place. This raises a 
number of issues with respect to secrecy and data privacy. 
From the abovc, wc can sce why the sccurity of routing is vital to the cxistcncc 
of the network. Not only do all four of the above effects of compromise find 
common ground in the wireless but it also becomes apparent that recovering 
from such an attack is far more difficult in an environment of high mobility. 
3.3 Classification of malicious attack 
Following the classification of the security system which describes both 
computer and human elements within the MANET, this section provides a 
systematic description of the types of attacks that can be experienced in such a 
networking environment. The main objective of this section is to categorise an 
attack, depending on the actions that an adversary follows and regardless of the 
communication protocol in place. Having seen the different consequences from 
a compromise, this third and final section follows the security approach of 
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section 3.1, aiming to present the different adversarial models that can be 
witnessed within this system. For this purpose, we present every attack from a 
network perspective, taking into account the state of individual nodes, but not 
focusing solely on that. 
3.3.1 Attack definitions 
Prior to the categorisation, we proceed with defining the different types of 
attacks and the terminology accompanying them. This sub-section aims to 
provide the necessary tenninology for the classifications of adversarial 
behaviour presented next; thus the focus of each definition resides with the 
definition of the attack and not the categorisation of it. 
Wormhole attacks: Attacks which exploit the presence of a wormhole linking 
two or more nodes directly; a concept originally derived from the 'wormhole' 
singularities hypothesised in the general theory of relativity. In a wormhole 
attack [95 - 97] within a MANET, data packets are 'tunnelled' from one node 
on the network to another, thus disrupting the flow of information in time over 
the MNs of the network. 
Replay attack: The retransmission of data packets on the network, having as an 
objective to actively disrupt the routing process. Such packets could be re-sent 
to nodes that have already received them with the objective of confusing the 
routing algorithm, or to nodes that are simply outside a particular routing 
process so that they cause a further disruption to network traffic. The origin of 
this attack resides within cryptographic protocols [98 - 100] and ways of 
attacking them and is also commonly addressed in secure e-mail [101]. 
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Tunnelling attack: Similarly to a wormhole, a tunnelling attack exploits an 
existing tunnel between two or more nodes on the network. The difference 
between a tunnel and a wormhole [102] is that the wormhole can selectively 
tunnel any packets sent, but it does not have the capacity of exposing the origin 
of the tunnel, i. e. all packets from a wormhole come from its end node. This is 
not the case when a tunnelling attack occurs. 
Node impersonation: Representing or imitating the behaviour of another node 
on the network, to the extent that fellow MNs believe that any data traffic they 
receive originates from the node at question. Impersonating attacks directly 
target the aspect of authentication [103] in the security of the protocol and the 
techniques that it utilises. 
Libel attack: Incorporated within an attack taking place, the node(s) launching 
it aims to make other nodes believe that the origin of the attack does not point 
back to them, thus switching the blame to avoid any potential detection. These 
types of attacks present the justification for often adding non-repudiation to the 
list of attributes of data security in communications (table 1.2). Even though 
non-repudiation is useful for the detection and isolation of compromised nodes 
[10], it still remains a derivative of the three main attributes, and, as we shall see 
in chapter 5, is not required to be treated as a separate attribute. 
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Passive eavesdropping: The act of listening in to information being exchanged 
on the network, without modifying it in any way or form. For ad-hoe networks, 
passive eavesdropping does not necessarily imply a passive, receiving action 
from the node performing the eavesdrop; since every node acts also as a router, 
it could be the case that the node in question is required to forward the packets 
to another final destination. 
Active attack: Attempting to alter the protocol in question to the advantage of 
the attacker. Generally, active attacks require active intervention [104]. The 
concept of an active attack resides as a superset of other attack definitions such 
as replay and rushing attacks, as well as packet injections. 
Passive attack: Similarly to passive eavesdropping, an attack that does not 
involve the active interception and manipulation of data traffic on the network. 
Inversely to active attacks, passive cheaters follow the protocol, but attempt to 
obtain more information then the protocol intends them to [ 104]. 
Packet injection: A further description of the action taken by one or more 
nodes launching an active attack. This targets the consumption of resources on 
the network (such as power and bandwidth) requesting other nodes to handle 
data packets that do not form a part of the communication protocol being 
employed. It comes as a direct consequence to say that all active attacks use 
packet injections within the network. 
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Routing loop: A feature seen in DVR protocols within the classification of 
section 2.1 and the description of DSDV in sub-section 2.3.1. From a security 
perspective, a routing loop represents the manipulation of routing traffic from 
one or more nodes, having as an objective to cease the communication process. 
This is achieved by placing all communicating parties within a loop of sending 
and receiving information that does not assist them in establishing a route of 
communication. The occurrence of a routing loop is generally considered a 
weakness of the protocol being utilised. 
Routing table overflow: This type of attack involves the convincing of nodes 
that non existent routes actually exist, having as an objective overwhelm the 
tables that store the routing infonnation within each node. Such an attack can 
have a direct effect on both processing as well memory and bandwidth 
requirements. 
Black hole problem: An attack whereby a node convinces fellow MNs to route 
data packets via itself and goes further to disengage from the communication 
process by dropping any packets that it receives. The malicious node(s) are said 
to form a black hole [ 105 - 109] on the network and the problem caused by such 
behaviour is addressed as the black hole problem. 
Gray hole problem: A special type of black hole problem, in which the 
malicious node selectively drops incoming packets while forwarding others. 
This process confuses neighbouring nodes towards both identifying the node's 
malicious intent, as well as exchanging infort-nation on the network. 
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Denial of Service (DoS): An attack that targets the availability of infonnation 
on the network. A Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack occurs when a number of 
compromised systems attack a single target, therefore causing a DoS for users 
on the targeted system. The flood of incoming packets causes the system not to 
be able to handle legitimate users, resulting in data inaccessibility. The 
specialities of a DoS attack within a MANET are two [108]. Firstly, an attacker 
could force a node to replay packets having as an objective to exhaust its energy 
[6], and secondly an attack can take place on all the layers of the network 
protocol specification being utilised [10]. 
Rushing attack: An attack which exploits the routing discovery process within 
on-demand routing protocols. A malicious node [105] advertises itself as 
holding a fresh route to the target MN that is inclusive of it in the hop path. The 
malicious node rushes to reply to the route request with this information making 
certain that its route is selected instead of another one. Consequently, having 
guaranteed that any outgoing traffic will pass through it, this node can choose to 
launch a variety of either passive or active attacks towards the incoming 
packets, regardless of knowing the whereabouts of the target node. 
Byzantine behaviour: Any action by an authenticated node that results in 
disruption or degradation of the routing service [92]. This concept supersets 
most of the active attacks described above, involving the interception, 
modification and fabrication of data packets on the network. 
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As it can be seen, most of the definitions above carry overlapping terms and 
descriptions involving similar attacks. Most of the terms in this section, either 
encompass or form components of other attack definitions also seen here. For 
this reason, we consider the classification of malicious behaviour on the 
network and go further to question where each of the attacks presented above 
reside in this classification. The following section aims to provide the necessary 
clarity for categorising the definitions presented. 
3.3.2 Classifying adversarial behaviour 
From the literature, two main ways of classifying adversarial behaviour in an ad 
hoc network exist. The first [92], captures and ranks the number of dimensions 
that each of the adversaries have at their disposal, while the second [93,94], 
bases its approach on the classification of passive and active attacks. 
From the two classifications, the latter represents nothing more than a simple 
expansion of the distinction between passive and active attacks. Commenting on 
such a method of comparison, we have seen a similar categorisation in sub- 
section 2.9.2. The former uses a number of dimensions, in each of which a 
further ranking of the adversary is given based on the power and control that 
they have over the network. In deciding the dimensions, the authors of [92] 
argue that the different bounds on packet loss under each adversarial model are 
considered. Thus, the dimensions presented are: 
e Malignancy of the attacks 
An adversary is classified depending on their ability to passively or actively 
alter data packets across the network. Attacks within this dimension have a 
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wide range, from impersonation and libel (who to blame) attacks, to 
misrouting and topology distortion. 
* Collusion power of adversary 
Adversaries are classified depending on their joint knowledge, involvement 
and consent in a specific attack. The two limiting boundaries that specify the 
range of this dimension involve all malicious nodes acting on their own, to 
all adversaries conspiring as a team against healthy nodes on the network. 
Attacks within this dimension are mainly active; often wonnholes and 
tunnels are used for the exchange of infonnation between adversarial nodes. 
e Adaptivity / Intelligence of the adversary 
This dimension focuses on each node's ability to plan and adjust its 
behaviour within the network. The range of this dimension spans from 
completely static adversaries that attack the network in a premeditated way, 
to malicious nodes that will selectively attack MNs, depending on the traffic 
patterns they notice on the network. 
Following the brief description of each of the above dimensions, we present a 
further analysis of the ranking within each one, attempting to identify which 
attack definitions are more relevant in each case. 
For the dimension describing the malignancy of an attack, three main rankings 
(seen in table 3.1) exist. Starting from the weakest to the strongest, a benign 
adversary generally performs passive eavesdropping, having the option of 
operating as a black or a grey hole within the network. A static malicious 
adversary can launch a variety of active attacks, involving impersonation and 
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misrouting, as well as the attacks described above. Finally, a proactive 
malicious adversary carries the properties of both of the former, having the 
further ability to control the timing element of any active attack launched. 
Table 3.1: The rankings within the dimension involving the malignancy of an 
attack. graded from the least (tol2) to the most (bottom) effective with regards to 
the conseciuences from a comoromise. 
Ranking T -D-escription ----- T Attack types 
Benign Cannot introduce information within Passive attacks, DoS, 
adversary 
the network, but can deprive eavesdropping informationfrom other nodes within it 
Static Can inject as well as passively Packet injections, 
malicious observe the information flow on the replay attacks, node 
adversary network impersonation 
Proactive Can aý, namically select the most Dynamic Byzantine 
malicious appropriate 
time for injecting 
rushing attacks information on the network, as well as adversary .I ' 
, V attacks, 
perform all other attacks described 
For the dimension involving the collusion power of an adversary, two main 
distinct rankings are considered separate from the bound rankings of this 
dimension. In the simplest form, an attack coming from more than one node can 
involve no collusion from the MNs acting with malicious intent. Inversely, in 
the hardest possible case, it can be assumed that all adversarial nodes are fully 
cooperating with one another. The two rankings within these bounds represent 
the distinct cases of the number of nodes that are acting maliciously, as well as 
the level of cooperation that they might have between them. 
Sub-section 3.3.3 that follows goes further to define an active attack depending 
on the number of nodes involved from the total in the network. An important 
aspect that disables us from producing a linear order to this dimension is the 
level of cooperation that malicious nodes will have between them. To question 
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this, we have to examine the motivation from any malicious attempt and 
whether or not it targets the disruption at a node or a network level. If the latter 
is assumed, the contradicting scenano of adversarial nodes turning against one 
another will unavoidably occur in time. Figure 3.3 defines the characteristics of 
the rankings within this dimension. 
DiFrwsion of 
coMusion of power 
Level c 
cooper 
betwet 
No collusion 
Of 
; nodes 
Fip-ure 3.3: The cateporisation of rankings within the dimension involvinp, the 
collusion of power of adversaries. 
For the dimension involving the adaptivity and intelligence of an adversary, four 
rankings are presented. These are dependant on the keenness of a MN to 
become accustomed to the communication processes of the network, spending 
the necessary time collecting information prior to deploying at attack. These 
rankings are described in table 3.2 below. In brief, starting from the least 
effective in terms of adaptation, an adversary is described as completely static, 
if the attack it deploys has a static (including any coin flips) fault pattem with 
respect to the routing algorithm. Such an attack involves no change in time and 
thus excludes rushing as well as passive attacks. 
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Table 3.2: The rankings xvithin the dimension jnvolvim4 the adaptivity and 
intelligence of an adversa! j, graded from the least (top) to the most (bottoni) 
effective with regards to the consequences from a compromise. 
Ranking DescrilWon I Attack types 
L'SCS U l? l-C-(IeSiglled teChlliqlfe Of 
Completely attack, while being coinlVetel , 
I, Premeditated active 
static (111VIV Of the I-Olltil7g CllgOl'itlllll. attacks targeting specific 
adversary The tec-Imique qftimick does not traffic on the network 
ClIC117ge ill tillie 
Oblivious Uses a 171-c-tiesignetl lechnique cis Premeditated active attacks 11 1 
dN-namic t1bove, It'llich /Itis the tibilit ,v 
to uum-k that can change depending 
till tyl)es ofptickets //Ult tIVI7SVC1'NC on the data packets (e. g. adversary Oil the WtWork control or data) seen 
Ttikes i1710 th-CO1117t till il? 101'111(111017 Passive eavesdropping prior 
Adaptive tintl coinflil)s seen oil the iiem-ork. to creating a Dynamic 
adversarv prior 
to i1q)loYing the cultick, 11711.,; Byzantine attack, or a 11,10lig tllt' (lbilit. 1- 10 IMIXiMiSC itS nishing attack, etc. 
( lflecl I 
Can (A-17CIMiCC1111- SCIeCt the MOSt 
Adaptive c //)/Vo/Vit Itt! II/Ile JOI, il? ieclillg Any of the above, including 
selective ill1Ol-I? hltiOl7 Oil the l7elivoi-k, cis Grey holes, rushing attacks, 
adversary ivell tis pel. -Iorm till Other aitticks or selective DoS 
described above 
Following a linear model, the next two rankings, namely that of ail oblivious 
dynamic adversary and an adaptive adversary incorporate adaptivity within tile 
attacking fault pattern that they encompass. An oblivious dynarnic adversary 
designs a dynamic fault pattern that can be adjusted depending on MN node 
behaviour, still remaining unaware of aily non-detenninistic (coin flips) 
elements of the algorithm. Oil the other hand, an adaptive adversary can not 
only adapt to the fault pattern but can also take into account any coin flips in 
real tinle. thus optinusing an attack. 
The Ultimate ranking Nvithin this dimension, resides Nvith ail adaptive selective 
adversary, which further to the characteristics presented above, can also select 
the attacks depending on specific packet characteristics, such as origin, time- 
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stamps and so on. A specific and most effective attack in this case would be a 
grey hole, which despite of residing in the lowest ranking of the malignancy of 
attack dimension, can have the most damaging effects if performed in an 
adaptive manner. 
3.3.3 Active attacker hierarchy 
As shown in the previous two sub-sections, active attacks present a method of 
altering and manipulating traffic on the network, thus carrying a special weight 
in their effects. Consequently, a separate method for classifying them exists, 
which focuses solely on the proportion of malicious nodes that at any one time 
exist on the network. A point worth noting is that, in difference to the dimension 
involving the malignancy of an attack seen in table 3.1, the active attacker 
hierarchy presented in this section assumes that all actions originate from a 
single attacker, or at least from a group of adversarial nodes sharing common 
malicious interests on the network. It is this fact that makes this classification 
different to the dimension ranking presented above. 
We define an attacker as an active -n-m attacker, if they have compromised n 
nodes and own ni nodes within the network. From this definition, the following 
measure surfaces, being directly linked to the security offered by the routing 
protocol. Figure 3.4 presents the different attacker hierarchies within the active 
-n- ni model with regards to the affect that they can have to a potential 
compromise. 
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Active -y-x 
Active 1 
Ac: ', jve -0- 
Active 0-1 
Figure 3.4: 
-Attacker 
hierarchy using tile active -n- ni model, ý4raded from the 
least (holtolll) to tile Illost (top) effective with regards to the consequences from 
a Compromise. 
This description seen in [3 1] makes the following distinctions. Starting from the 
least effective, an attack could vary from active -0-I, thus assuming that no 
nodes have been compromised and that tile attacker owns a single node, to 
active -1-. v and active where a number, i-, of nodes has beeil 
compromised. In both cases, x represents that the attacker has a number of 
nodes under its control, different to the number of nodes that have been 
compromised. 
3.4 Protocol attacks 
Hm ing .. presented tile 
different classifications of a malicious attack, this section 
airns to put the above stated theoretical analysis to practical questioning, on 
existing protocols. Following tile descriptions that II tills chapter has presented so 
far. we analvse a NIANET as a systern of securitv, airnim, 1, to illustrate different 
techniques of attacking, known routing, algorithms. For this, the protocol 
descriptions as well as their respective categorisations seen in chapter 2 are 
utilised. Moreover, extending from singular attack techniques, this section 
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provides a general perspective into the actions that can disrupt the process of 
exchanging information. 
Starting from the classification of section 2.1, we place our focus on the first 
categorisation of link state vs. distance vector routing. As in both of these types 
of protocols a node is allowed to advertise information which they consider 
valid, a combination of replay and tunnelling attacks involving packet injection 
and perhaps the creation of routing loops could occur. Furthermore, black and 
grey holes could be created if one or more collaborating nodes advertise 
particular routes as optimal. In LSR, for such an attack to function correctly, a 
number of sequential updates promoting noticeable changes biased towards a 
single (malicious) route would have to flood the network. In the case of DVR 
for this type of an attack to function, there would have to be more than one MN 
collaborating with malicious intent, as there is a much slower convergence 
towards optimal routes. 
For the categorisation of table-driven vs. on demand routing, a variety of 
Byzantine and active attacks could be used to target control information on the 
network. In the case of table-driven routing protocols, particular attacks could 
target table overflow, establishing routing loops as well as libel attacks aiming 
to shift the blame on other nodes, once the scavenging for the malicious MN has 
begun. For the case of on-demand routing protocols, the most interesting type of 
attack involves the occurrence of a black hole on the network. Attacks involving 
black or grey holes exploit the dynamic nature in which on-demand protocols 
establish their route and target the asynchronous element of the duration in 
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which a route remains valid. Consequently, protocols of this type, should not 
only describe the technique of establishing a route but also methods of 
safeguarding it against such malicious intent. 
For protocols using periodical updates, active attacks by means of packet 
injections could lead to the temporary isolation of nodes, until the next 
scheduled update is due. This would be more difficult for event-driven updates, 
as an event (carrying data within the control packet information) is more likely 
to be noticed by more than one MN. Even though this might be the case, more 
complex packet injections, as well as DoS attacks could have twice the impact 
on the network, as they would impinge on not only the control but also the data 
infonnation being exchanged. 
In the category of protocols with a flat vs. a hierarchical structure, having a local 
central authority could prove quite resourceful in the event of an attack, as once 
that has been detected, it can be contained to the local cluster in which it 
occurred. On the other hand, an attack (either passive or active) launched by a 
cluster head would result in a complete standstill of all information being 
exchanged within that cluster. This would come as a direct result of the fact that 
the attacking MN would have all information available to manipulate, as it 
would be acting as a central authority. 
Protocols using a distributed approach into computing routes are more 
vulnerable to active attacks targeting control infonnation across the network. 
Even though this might be the case, decentralised computation of routes lowers 
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the level of awareness of neighbouring nodes, thus making it much more 
difficult for malicious users to be tracked down. Subsequently, neither of the 
two criteria within this classification secures the infrastructure as a standalone 
feature within a protocol description. 
On the packet level of source routing vs. hop-by-hop routing, allowing the 
packet to carry redundant information regarding its origin and previous hop, 
despite being a burden for bandwidth and power dissipation requirements, does 
safeguard nodes from attacks. Thus, a rushing attack involving an ill-defined 
route could be ignored, provided that other route requests carry redundant 
information involving theirjourney across the network. 
Finally, in the category of a single path vs. multiple paths, despite the 
redundancy that multiple path protocols might offer, having a single, but correct 
route does imply a smaller probability of a malicious MN interfering. 
Consequently, a trade-off exists between information passing through nodes that 
could have malicious intent, to obtaining a route from a single neighbouring 
node that could also be acting maliciously at that moment in time. 
To summarise, all of the categories seen above are vulnerable to a number of 
attacks, mainly focusing on active packet injections. Despite each criterion 
within a category providing certain features which are either more or less 
volatile from a security perspective, its counterpart, even though meeting the 
opposite requirements towards that criterion has its own vulnerabilities. Having 
presented a number of techniques for attacking different protocols in the 
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categories in which they reside, the following section aims to provide us with 
the necessary resources for safeguarding communications in the mobile ad hoc 
networking environment. 
3.5 Security mechanisms and defence techniques 
To secure the MANET we must take into consideration the system definition 
described in section 3.1. This comprises of the two main (human and computer) 
elements and their corresponding sub-elements. As a result, the security of the 
system must be safeguarded at two levels. Firstly, on the traditional level of 
communication (involving the misuse of control and data traffic on the channel) 
and secondly, on the dynamic wireless level, involving all the special 
characteristics (see section 1.4) that a MANET embraces. Despite these two 
levels being inescapably interlinked, this categorisation. provides the necessary 
clarity for identifying the defence techniques at our disposal. 
For issues arising on the first level described above, we embrace modem 
cryptography and the corresponding schemes that it makes available. This 
includes symmetric and asymmetric encryption, the use of digital signatures and 
message digests, as well as key management schemes. Section 3.5.1 provides 
the necessary descriptions for the above terminology, hinting on its usage in 
both wired and wireless communications. For the second, we question 
techniques of detecting the occurrence of malicious activity on the network 
from nodes that had originally been considered as healthy. Labelling this as 
intntsion detection, section 3.5.2 questions the ability of individual nodes to 
detect (through the use of a corresponding protocol) adversarial behaviour 
within a MANET. 
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3.5.1 Cryptography and authentication 
This section aims to provide a summary of concepts regarding cryptography and 
the ways in which they are used to secure communications. It does not present a 
complete view of all the aspects or sub-divides within the terms defined; for that 
we encourage the reader to view the references given. 
We define as a cryptosystem, a set of algorithms responsible for disguising 
information so that only certain users of the system can see through the disguise. 
Cryptography is the science of creating, deploying and using a cryptosystem. 
Cryptanalysis is the science of breaking cryptosysterns and thus being able to 
see through the disguise even when you are not supposed to. Finally, cryptology 
is the study of both cryptography and cryptanalysis. 
One of the cornerstones of modem cryptology is a set of principles presented in 
1883 by Kerckhoffs [110]. Most importantly, within this work the general 
principle that the security of a system should reside in the secrecy of the key and 
not of the algorithm, is presented. This is contrasted with the sometimes 
deplorable practice of "security by obscurity" [111], where the secrecy of the 
algorithm is assumed. Any work presented within this section takes for granted 
the principles presented by Kerckhoffs, avoiding the concept of information 
hiding and steganography 7- 
7 An excellent introduction on the subject matter, with references to all modem applications and 
theory can be found in [112]. 
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3.5.1.1 Basic terminology 
Following the definitions and terininology used in [ 113], we provide a list of 
basic tenns that will be used throughout this section. These are presented in two 
categories, involving domains of operation and their respective transformations. 
Encryption domains 
oA denotes a finite set called the alphabet of definition. The most common 
alphabet definition is that of the binary alphabet, where A= 10,1} . Note that 
any alphabet can be encoded in tenns of the binary alphabet. 
0M denotes the set referred to as the message space, consisting of strings of 
symbols from the corresponding alphabet definition. An element of M is 
called a plaintext inessage or simply plaintext. 
0C denotes the set referred to as the ciphertext space, also consisting of 
strings of symbols of an alphabet definition. The alphabet definition of 
Cmay differ from that ofAf. An element of Cis called a ciphertext 
message or simply ciphertext. 
Encryption and decryption transformations 
*K denotes a set called the key space. An element of K is called a key. 
9 Each element eeK uniquely determines a bijection. from M to C, denoted 
by E, - E, is called an encr)ptionfiinction or an encryption transformation. 
9 For each d Ez- K, Dddenotes a bijection from Cto M(i. e. Dd: C -ý M). 
Ddis called a decr)ptionfitnction or dectyption transformation. 
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9 The process of applying the function E, to a message m r= M is usually 
referred to as encrjpting m. 
* The process of applying the function Dd to a ciphertext cis usually referred 
to as decrypting c or the decr)ption of c. 
e An encryption scheme consists of a set {E, :eE K) of encryption 
transfonnations and a corresponding set JDd :dE K) of decryption 
transformation with the property that for each eEK there is a unique key 
dEK such that Dd= E, -; that is Dd(E, (m)) =m for all MEM. An 
encryption scheme is sometimes referred to as a cipher. 
9 The keys eEK and d (: - K in the preceding definition are referred to as a key 
pair and sometimes denoted as(e, d). Note that eEKcould be equal 
to dE K. 
o For the construction of an encryption scheme, we are required to select a 
message spaceM, a ciphertext spaceC, a key spaceK, a set of encryption 
transfonnations JE, :ee K) and a corresponding set of decryption 
transformations JDd : deK). 
Following Kerckhoffs' principle, the sets M, C, K, JE, :eE K), IDj :d(: - K) are 
considered to be public knowledge. For two parties wanting to communicate 
securely using an encryption scheme, the only required thing that they must 
keep secret is the corresponding key pair (e, d) . 
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3.5.1.2 Symmetric key cryptography 
The fundamental motivation underlying the applicability of a symmetric key 
algoritlim, describes two parties, say, A and B, (a. k. a. Alice and Bob) wanting to 
communicate in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, say, E (a. k. a. Eve). To 
prevent Eve from understanding the conversation that Alice and Bob are having 
they use encryption, in a symmetric fashion, as shown in figure 3.5. 
Eve 
C 
Alice 
m, c: =E(K,, m) 
Bob 
c, m: =D(K., c) 
Figure 3.5: The principle of symmetric key gyptography and how it overcomes 
issues of passive eavesdropping. 
When Alice wants to send a message m, she first encrypts it using the 
encryption function E(K,,, m) of the pre-selected cipher that her and Bob have 
agreed on. Agreeing on the cipher is something that can be done over the public 
channel that Eve is listening into. What cannot be exchanged over the public 
channel is the secret key K, , which both parties need to be sharing. For this, a 
separate communication channel that Eve cannot eavesdrop on must be used. As 
Alice transmits the ciphertextc: =E(K,,, m), Bob receives cand recovers the 
original plaintext in by using the decryption function D(K,,, c) , as that is 
defined 
by the cipher. Eve, not knowing the secret key K, is incapable of applying the 
decryption function on the ciphertext that she also receives. 
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Within symmetric key encryption schemes, two further classes are 
distinguished; block ciphers and stream ciphers [ 114,115]. Block ciphers break 
up the plaintext message into a number of strings (called blocks) of a fixed 
length I, over an alphabet A, encrypting one block at a time. Stream ciphers on 
the other hand, operate by generating a sequence of keys (referred to as a 
keystream) and applying encryption on each plaintext string with the respective 
key from the keystrearn generated. A comparison of the two classes and the 
advantages that each one has to offer can be seen in [ 134]. 
Today, there are hundreds of block ciphers as well as numerous block cipher 
modes of operation available [ 116]. The first established, yet cracked, modem 
standard was the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [117], still partially in use 
today. The main upgrade after DES was 3DES [118], which performed three 
DES encryptions in a sequence. Ciphers designed within the last five years 
include the robust Serpent [ 119], Twofish [ 120], as well as the newly accredited 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [121]. 
Similarly, a number of stream ciphers exist. As an example, we consider the 
RC4 stream cipher used in current wireless standards. The second 
implementation of the IEEE 802.11, namely 802.11b, describes a security 
protocol that utilises a form of encryption called Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP). This protocol, despite of aiming to provide confidentiality, user 
authentication and data integrity in the wireless channel [122], fails to enforce 
all three of these requirements [123], due to the misinterpretation of some 
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cryptographic primitives [ 124], in the design. Weaknesses identified within RC4 
[125] help increase further the vulnerabilities of 802.1 1b. 
Utilising block ciphers within a MANET offers a unique way of safeguarding 
information against passive eavesdropping. The main disadvantage, apart from 
the obvious delay related to the encryption and decryption process, has to do 
with the fact that a key must exist for every pair of nodes wanting to exchange 
information. For n nodes this yields n(n- key pairs. Adding to this, not only 2 
must a key be exchanged outside the conventional communication channel (in 
order to prevent eavesdropping), but also, the dynamic configuration of a 
MANET must be taken into account, where information is necessarily routed 
through other nodes in order to reach the specified target MN. Consequently, 
conventional problems with the exchange of the secret key [126] become far 
more difficult to tackle in an ad hoc networking environment. 
3.5.1.3 Public key cryptography 
One of the biggest problems that symmetric key cryptography is confronted 
with relates to the exchange of the secret key between Alice and Bob. Relying 
on the difficulty in solving certain mathematical problems (such as factoring), 
public key cryptography overcomes the limitation of having to share a secret 
key between two parties. Building on figure 3.6, Bob generates a pair of keys 
(SB, PB) one of which is private and one which is public. As a next step, he 
publishes his public key P., making certain to keep his private key SB secret. 
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When Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she looks up the public key P., 
which Bob has published. With the help of the corresponding encryption 
function E(K,,,,,,,,, , m) that is part of the asymmetric cipher being utilised, 
Alice 
encrypts the message in using P, . This yields the ciphertextc, which in tum 
is 
transmitted over the public channel. On the receiving side, Bob uses the 
corresponding asymmetric decryption function D(K,,,.,,,,,,,, c)to obtain the 
original message transmitted by Alice. Eve (as well as Alice and generally 
anyone apart from Bob) cannot decrypt the corresponding ciphertextc, as she is 
not in possession of the secret key S. that Bob has. 
Eve 
C 
Alice 
m, c: =E(PB, m) 
Bob 
c, m: =D(S, 3, c) 
Figure 3.6: The principle of public key cKyptography and how it overcomes 
issues of exchanging a secret key. 
In order for asymmetric cryptography to function correctly, the key pair 
generation algorithm, encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm must 
ensure that the original message can be recovered. In mathematical terms, 
D(S,,, E(P., in)) = in must hold for all messages ni that the selected alphabet 
.4 can produce. 
Two of the most popular asymmetric ciphers in use today are the Diffie- 
Hellman protocol [127 - 131] and the more widely used RSA public key 
cryptosystem [132,133]. Public key cryptography was really started by 
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Whitfield Diffie and Martin Martin Hellman, with their 1976 publication of 
"New Directions in Cryptography" [127]. It describes a process for two parties 
so that they can agree on a secret key in such a way that both of them receive 
the same key without revealing it to someone that is listening to their 
conversation. RSA, on the other hand bases its operation on a one way function. 
Invented in 1978 [132] by Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman, it 
builds on the infonnation required to invert the function used for the encryption 
process. As we shall see in sub-section 3.5.1.5, RSA can also be used for the 
generation of digital signatures. 
Public key cryptography makes the problem of distributing keys a lot more 
simple. The total number of keys is far less than the arithmetic sum n(n - 
1) for 
2 
n nodes on a network. In spite of this, public key cryptography is much less 
efficient by several orders of magnitude, requiring a greater capacity in memory 
as well as processing time. For this reason public key cryptography is often used 
in conjunction with symmetric key cryptography ensuring the secure exchange 
of a key between the communicating parties. 
3.5.1.4 Digital Signature Algorithms 
Digital signatures provide a way of claiming the authenticity and integrity of 
any message, through the use of public key cryptography. In the generic setting, 
Alice creates a corresponding key pair (SA, PA) and publishes her public key PA . 
Upon wanting to transmit a signed message m to Bob, she computes a 
signatures: = a(SA, m), through the use of the corresponding signature function 
of the cipher. Following this, Alice transmits m and s over the public channel to 
92 
Bob. This is illustrated in figure 3.7. On the receiving side, Bob uses the 
corresponding verification algorithm ii(Pm, s) of the cipher to compute the 
signature of the message m. For this, he uses Alice' public key the message 
m, as well as the signature s that he received. Provided the two signatures (the 
one computed with P, and the one received) match8, the authenticity and 
integrity of the message are verified. If this is not the case, Eve is potentially 
attempting to impersonate Alice, or has tampered with the message that Alice 
has attempted to transmit to Bob. 
Eve 
M, s 
Alice 
M, S: =CY(SA, M) 
Bob 
M, U(PA, M, S) 
Figure 3.7: The principle of digital signatures through the use of public key 
gaptography. 
The two main methods of authentication that satisfy the requirements to be used 
as a digital signature are RSA [132] and the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) 
[135] as it was published by the American National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) in 1994 [1361. The fundamental difference between the two 
is that even though they both safeguard message authentication and integrity, 
" By match we do not necessarily imply that they are equal. It could be that the cipher utilised 
specifies aI-I mapping between the signature generated using the secret key S, and the one 
computed using the public key P, . 
" Even though the publication, entitled the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), is mostly about 
DSA. it also approves RSA as a signature method. 
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DSA, unlike RSA cannot be used directly to provide message confidentiality. 
As Bob receives the incoming message with the corresponding signature, in 
RSA he recovers the original (signed) plaintext. On the other hand, in DSA he 
simply verifies if the message received is from the originating party (Alice) and 
has not being tampered with. Typically if DSA verification is successful, Bob 
accepts the incoming message, while rejecting it if that is not the case. 
Digital signatures provide an excellent way of establishing the origin and 
integrity of a message within the dynamic environment of a MANET. Despite 
of this, having the ability to authenticate users is of little use if they become 
malicious at any time after the nodes have been deployed or once a 
communication exchange has commenced. Still, they remain a fundamental 
tool, which with further constrains can safeguard, from a security systems 
perspective, the elements that it was designed to. 
3.5.1.5 Hash functions and Message Authentication Codes 
Hash finictions [137 - 140] often referred to as message digests, have as an 
objective to safeguard the integrity of the information being exchanged. A hash 
function takes as input an arbitrary long string of bits, generating a fixed-size 
result (typically measured in bits). The output of the function, referred to as the 
hash, is a shorter representation of the message. Hash functions find particular 
application in areas where perfonning an operation on the plaintext in its 
entirety is a costly option in terms of time and computation. 
Given a message m, we can sign the message using one (or more) public key 
algorithms seen in the previous section. However, public key operations tend to 
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be fairly expensive in computational terms. Thus, instead of signing m itself, we 
apply the hash function h and sign the result h(m). 
In order to have the ability to represent a full message through its hash, two 
main properties must hold. Firstly, the function should be a one way function 
[ 141 ], this implies that from the hash h(m) it should be impossible to recover m. 
Secondly, the function must be resistant towards both strong and weak 
collisions [142,143]. By weak collisions we imply that for a given hash of a 
message in, , it should be 
difficult (and ideally impossible) to find another 
message in- for which h(ni) = h(m, ). By strong collisions we imply a one to 
one mapping, it should be difficult (and again ideally impossible) for two 
messages m, and ni, to hash to same value, yielding again h(ml) = h(m, ) - The 
above three requirements summarise the criteria that hash functions must meet. 
I Message Integrity Functions I 
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Figure 3.8: The categorisation of message integrity functions into hash 
functions and message authentication codes, depending on the use of a secret 
key. 
Hash functions do not take any input in generating the corresponding output. 
Similarly to hash functions, there exist Message Authentication Codes (MACs) 
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for which the hash is computed dependant on a secret key. Consequently, for 
two parties to check the integrity of a message, a pre-agreement on a secret key 
must exist. This categorisation is illustrated in figure 3.8. 
Today, the most popular hash functions in wide use include the 128-bit hash 
function MD5, developed by Ron Rivest [144], as well as the Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA) in its revisited form, namely SHA-1 [145]. They both base 
their operation on the predecessor of MD5, which was MD4 [146]. SHA-1 is a 
160-bit hash function, with recent draft standards for three new versions [147], 
namely SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512, having the respective number of bits 
as output. 
In deploying a hash function or a MAC for use within an ad hoc network, an 
immediate trade-off is established. Safeguarding the integrity of any packet sent 
is something achievable; now carrying a cost in terms of bandwidth. Using 
SHA-5 12 which is the most secure (because of hash length) from the above 
functions would certainly guarantee message integrity, but it would imply that 
for every packet sent an overload of 512 bits would have to be considered, 
affecting the available throughput on the network. 
3.5.2 Intrusion detection 
No matter what the level of cryptography within the MANET might be, if a MN 
that is part of the network decides to turn malicious towards neighbouring 
nodes, the authentication techniques described above are of little use. Due to 
this fact, designing a secure protocol for a MANET is a task that could often 
carry problems which may be impossible to solve [148]. The main issue arises 
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from our inability to distinguish between a compromised node and a healthy but 
slow one. As the topology is constantly changing, nodes are always left to deal 
with out of date routing infonnation, which in turn they must update in order to 
succeed in any data exchange. Consequently, identifying malicious intention is 
something that needs to be achieved while holding partial and potentially out of 
date routing information about the state of the network. 
In order to be able to safeguard from a potential attack, the behaviour of the 
attacker must be noticeably different from that of a normally behaving router 
[149]. This forms the basis for the deployment of Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs) [150,151], which aim to detect traffic anomalies, as well as misuse 
patterns within a networking environment. 
3.5.2.1 Solution tangents 
This section aims to present a number of approaches that have been presented in 
the literature regarding the problem of secure routing with direct applicability in 
the ad hoc networking environment. 
To protect against external attacks, Siroir and Kent [152] propose the use of 
keyed one-way hash function with a windowed sequence number for securing 
end to end communications and the use of digital signatures for messages sent 
to multiple destinations. 
In the context of Byzantine robustness, Perlman [153] questions how to protect 
routing information, analysing the feasibility of maintaining theoretical 
connectivity in a dynamically malicious environment. Kumar [154] recognises 
97 
the problem of compromised routers as a hard problem, providing no direct 
solution. Based on an approach of detecting inconsistency using redundant 
information to isolate malicious routers, other works [152,155,156] offer 
partial solutions to the problem at hand. Finally, an authentication architecture 
for use within a MANET is presented in [ 157]. 
For distributing the trust within nodes of the MANET a popular technique is 
threshold cryptography [ 158,159]. A (n, t+ 1) threshold cryptographic scheme 
allows it parties to share the ability to perform a primitive cryptographic 
operation (such as creating a digital signature) provided that t+I parties 
perforin this operation jointly. Even if t parties collude to the same operation, 
the cryptographic operation selected cannot be perfon-ned. 
Message m 
offl 
«b mm glib mý»ý8 
MN2 MN3 MN4 
S, S2 S4 
a(si, m) 
Combiner c 
U(S4-M) 
U(S, M) 
Figure 3.9: A (4,2) threshold clyptographic scheme incorporating digital 
signatures; MNs I and 4 sign the message m with their partial key, thus 
allowing for the corresponding signature to be generated. 
An example of this is illustrated in figure 3.9, where in order for the message m 
to be signed using the key S, at least two nodes have to contribute their partial 
keys (in this case S, and S4), regardless of the behaviour of the remaining nodes. 
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Threshold cryptography offers the ability of partial agreement within 
cooperating nodes, which (provided t has been selected accordingly with 
respect to the total number of nodes n in their environment of operation) 
bypasses any potential occurrence of malicious intent. The applicability of this 
type of cryptography in MANETs and how it can protect against any 
compromised nodes can be seen in [ 160 - 162]. 
3.5.2.2 Protocol correctness 
For presenting a formal analysis of a protocol and making sure that the stated 
design goals are achieved, the methodology seen in [163], following the 
inference rules presented in [164] a description of which follows. From these, 
our objective is to question the capability of one or more nodes, based on a 
number of premeditated conditions. The remainder of this sub-section presents 
the notation as that is stated in [ 164]. 
We consider the following fundamental entities. X and Y are given formulas 
representing algorithmic behaviour towards specific actions; as an example 
consider the ability of a node to reply to a specific RREQ packet while ignoring 
another. It would be a formula X that would state such behaviour. P and Q are 
principals, much like MN entities within the network. K is a secret shared key 
that P and Q share and Cis a statement originating from one of the principals 
involved. 
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Within the above, the following notation is considered. 
e (X, Y) represents the conjunction of the two formulas, which is treated 
as a set where commutative and associative properties hold 
* *X represents a not-originated-here formula property. If Pis told X 
(see basic statements), it can distinguish it did not previously convey 
X in the current run 
o H(X) represents a one-way hash function of X 
From this, a number of basic statements, using particular notation are 
considered: 
9 X: P is told formula X 
*P3X: P has or is capable of possessing formula X 
0 PI-X: Ponce conveyed fonnula X 
9 Pja #(X): P believes or is entitled to believe that formula X is fresh 
* Pl=-(p(X): P believes or is entitled to believe that formula Xis 
recognisable; that is P has certain expectations regarding the contents of 
X before actually receiving it 
0 pl=p4 K4Q: P believes or is entitled to believe that K is a suitable 
secret between P and 
* Cl, C2 : The conjunction of two statements, where commutative and 
associative properties hold 
P Im C: P believes or is entitled to believe that statement C holds 
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P .4 (X, Y) :A horizontal line separating two statements or conjunction P4X 
of statements signifies that the upper statement implies the lower one. In 
this case, P being told formula set (X, Y) implies P knowing each of 
the formula's components and therefore X as well. 
The above notation, as used for the protocol definition seen in sub-section 3.6.1, 
provides a method of authenticating protocol behaviour under a number of 
given assumptions and conditions. Consequently, the use of correctness proofs 
for wireless routing protocols acts as an initial benchmark towards testing the 
ability of the protocol to tackle the security problem under question. 
3.6 Protocols incorporating security 
Following the descriptions of the above techniques for securing wireless routing 
protocols, this section reviews two of the most popular secure protocol designs 
for MANETs. For each of the protocols, reference to the initial protocol 
characteristics that it encompasses is presented, followed by a description of the 
security mechanisms and defence techniques utilised by the specific design. 
3.6.1 The Secure Routing Protocol 
The Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) as presented in [165] can be applied in a 
multitude of existing routing protocol implementations. In particular, the 
designers of SRP suggest ZRP (section 2.6) and DSR (section 2.2) as two 
designs which can be extended in a natural way and with minimum 
modifications towards the packet structures travelling across the network. 
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The direct contribution of this protocol implementation is that it guarantees the 
ability for a querying MN to obtain correct topological information, despite the 
presence of malicious nodes. The one assumption that is made is that adversarial 
nodes are non-colluding, acting separately from one another. 
For the SRP to function correctly, a Security Association (SA) in tenns of a 
secret key is assumed between the source and destination node. For the 
exchange of this secret key, a number of methods (incorporating public key 
cryptography are available) [166]. Ultimately, we can assume that the secret key 
had been exchanged prior to the deployment of the MNs. 
The source nodeS, initiates the route discovery process by constructing a 
RREQ packet containing a unique sequence number and a random query 
identifier. Along with the secret keyKs, Tý the addresses of the source and 
destination nodes as well as the query identifier, act as an input to the MAC of 
the SRP. In addition, the addresses of the traversed intermediate nodes are 
padded onto the RREQ packet upon a new hop. 
Provided that the data has not being tampered with, the request reaches the 
destination node T, which in turn constructs a route reply. It calculates the MAC 
of the route reply contents and returns the packet to S in a reverse hop fashion. 
In order to offer redundant information, the destination responds to one or more 
RREQ packets of the same query so that it can provide the source with as much 
information regarding the current network topology. Consequently, intermediate 
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(and potentially malicious) nodes do not have the ability to tamper with "hop 
data" as the MAC safeguards the contents of the reply from the destination. 
As stated in [167,168], the implementation of this protocol shows how 
impersonation and reply attacks can be prevented for on demand routing, by 
disabling route caching and providing end to end authentication through the use 
of a MAC cryptographic primitive. Thus, fabricated, compromised, or relayed 
route replies either never reach the route requester, or simply get dropped. An 
important note from this is that intermediate nodes do not need to be 
authenticated in order for them to have the ability to handle incoming traffic. 
3.6.2 Ariadne 
Another on-demand secure routing protocol that builds on the features of DSR 
(section 2.2) is Ariadne [94]. This protocol prevents attackers and compromised 
nodes from tampering with uncompromised routes, further inhibiting a number 
of DoS attacks. Additionally, Ariadne places a lot of weight on communication 
efficiency, burdening the implementation only with (less costly in terms of 
computation) symmetric cryptographic primitives. 
The method deployed for authenticating routing messages utilises one of the 
following three schemes; shared secrets between each node pair, shared secrets 
between each communicating pair with broadcast authentication, or digital 
signatures. The designers of Ariadne place TESLA [169,170] an efficient 
broadcast authentication scheme requiring loose time synchronisation, at the 
heart of their protocol. TESLA differs from traditional asymmetric 
cryptographic primitives, such as RSA, in that it achieves this asymmetry from 
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clock synchronisation and key disclosure instead of computationally expensive 
one-way trapdoor functions. 
To use TESLA for authentication, each sender chooses a random initial key KN 
and generates a one-way key chain by repeatedly computing the hash of the 
resulting value. Thence, KN-1 = H(KN), KN-2 = H(KN-, ),... etc. Each sender 
predetermines the time at which it publishes each key of its one-way key chain. 
This is done in the reverse order from that the keys were generated; in time, 
keys are revealed in the form of the sequence KOK,,..., KN,... etc. As a result 
the authenticity of a message relates to the freshness of the key used in the 
computation and the ability to see which keys a sender may have already 
published. 
Through this process Ariadne sets a number of design goals which provide 
resilience against active -I-x as well as a number of active -y-x attacks. 
Considering A and B to be principal MNs on the network, KA,, and K,,, to be 
the secret MAC keys between A and B, the AMC(m) to be the MAC of the 
message m, using K,,,,, the goals of Ariadne are as follows: 
0A and B can authenticate the contents of both route requests as well as 
route replies 
0B to have the ability of authenticating A and vice versa 
o Any intermediate MN cannot remove an already present entry within a 
request or reply 
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In order to detect misbehaving nodes, Ariadne relies on a feedback reputation 
scheme, which notes the packets that have actually been delivered. Furthermore, 
this protocol incorporates malicious node avoidance in the route discovery 
process by including a list of malicious MNs and a corresponding MAC so that 
the list cannot be tampered with. Despite still having a number of weaknesses, 
this protocol represents a protocol design that bases its operation on an already 
established routing protocol, which is further expanded for the purpose of 
security. 
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the subject of wireless routing security from a 
number of different perspectives. Firstly, we examined the MANET as system 
from a security perspective, incorporating a number of entangling elements and 
sub-elements. From this, and bearing in mind the consequences of a potential 
compromise on the routing level, we presented the different types of attacks, 
classifying adversarial behaviour on the network. The final aspect within the 
opening sections of this chapter questioned the applicability of a number of 
attacks that had already been defined on existing routing protocol designs. 
Having identified the potential of a malicious MN (either alone or in a group) 
the second part of this chapter focused on methods for countering such 
malicious intention within an ad hoc networking environment. Despite the 
capabilities (in terms of exploitable vulnerabilities) that adversaries can have, 
we presented two protocol designs that incorporate a number of cryptographic 
primitives, thus managing to safeguard fundamental routing operations. 
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From the methods of attack and counter attack studied, we can see that 
MANETs are not in complete isolation from protection when it comes to 
securing the interoperability with which they function. Provided that the right 
tools are used in the design of a routing protocol, there is a tremendous space 
that remains unexplored towards the combination of fundamental cryptographic 
primitives in the rules for exchanging information. 
Shifting away from wireless routing and more towards the contributing elements 
of this thesis, the chapter that follows examines the topics of emergence and 
adaptation in greater depth, having as an objective to utilise such concepts in the 
exploration of the design of secure protocol structures. Our motivation behind 
this comes as a direct consequence of the potential seen in the combining tools 
within cryptography for the security of an ad hoc network. 
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Chapter 4 
Emergence 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Self-Organisation 
4.1.2 Randomness, Complexity and Chaos 
4.1.3 Swarm Intelligence and Stigmergy 
4.2 Defining emergent behaviour 
4.3 A novel system: Pandemonium 
4.4 Adaptive systems modelling 
4.5 Limitations of operation 
4.6 Design pitfalls 
4.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter the concept of emergence is introduced, entailing the description 
of adaptive systems facilitating such behaviour. Firstly, a definition of 
emergence is presented; for this, the concept of self-organisation, as well as its 
relation to randomness, complexity and chaos is presented. Further to this, 
Swarm Intelligence and Stigmergy are reviewed as subject areas. As a next step, 
the Pandemonium system developed by Oliver Selfridge is presented. From this, 
we proceed into the description of the entities involved within adaptive systems 
modelling, identifying the limitations of operation as well as the design pitfalls 
that can be encountered in this modelling technique. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Any formal discussion on the subject of emergence requires the active 
involvement of a number of areas. This section provides an introduction to 
these. Emergent properties are generally observed in highly complex systems 
that appear to hold an internal (non-linear) level of organisation. Within these, 
each element has a number of freedoms in their interactions, experiencing a 
degree of randomness that relates to chaotic effects. Such properties give rise to 
a holistic approach for the system that has states which cannot be premeditated. 
The terminology for each of the above is a science within itself; the sub-sections 
that follow offer the background required to study emergence, avoiding going 
into greater detail in each one. As notions such as complexity hold a number of 
definitions that could span into one or more chapters of this thesis, we settle for 
the corresponding references in each area and focus on their relationship with 
the field of emergence. 
4.1.1 Self-Organisation 
Commencing from our observation of the natural world [171], come a number 
of seemingly unrelated phenomena sharing several common behavioural 
characteristics that go beyond non-linear dynamics. These include, inter alia, 
Raup's data on the extinction of species [172,173], Mandelbrot's analYsis of 
commo ity prices [174], as well as Gutenberg-Richter's analysis on earthquake 
magnitu es [175]. As suggested by the Bak-Sneppen model of evolution [176, 
177], systems of such complexity are typically composed of a number of locally 
interacting components that operate at a critical state between chaos and order, 
which is known as Self-Organised Criticality (SOC) [178,171]. 
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The essence of self-organization lies within obtaining a system structure without 
explicit tampering or involvement external to the system. Elements of it have 
the ability to interact with other neighbouring elements. From these local 
interactions, a number of global characteristics for the system surface; in turn, 
these global features influence the rules between local interactions for all 
elements of the system. A popular example of this [ 17 1] is the image of a sand 
pile retaining its conical shape as more sand is added to it. As change comes 
through discrete events, each individual grain exercises a number of forces in its 
local neighbourhood that influence the dynamics of the system. Thus, as grains 
of sand drop into a sand pile, regardless of the speed or height of the drop, a 
conical mass of grains representing the whole system will be observed. 
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Figure 4.1: An instance in the simulation of a 2D sand pile model, the height o 
the sand pile in 
- 
different locations (left) of the plane is represented by different 
colours. The rijzht square shows the locations that toppled after the addition of 
the last vrain of sand. 
An example of a sand pile simulation is illustrated in figure 4.1 [179]. In this 
model, the sand pile is represented by a square lattice, where if there are 4 or 
more grains on any one location, the location topples. Toppling occurs by 
transporting the top grain to one of the 4 neighbouring locations, occurring 
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simultaneously throughout the whole lattice. The boundaries of the lattice are 
considered open. 
Expanding on the above model, a number of theories of self-organisation in the 
context of physics and chemistry have been developed [180,181]. Despite 
originally aiming to describe the emergence of macroscopic patterns out of 
processes and interactions defined at the microscopic level, these have proven 
useful towards understanding social insectslo. From observation and as 
discussed in [182], self-organisation is indeed a major component in a vast 
range of collective phenomena within social insects. As a governing conclusion, 
it appears that complex collective behaviour may emerge from interactions 
among individuals that exhibit simple behaviour. 
Self-organization appears to depend on some minimum number of entities, 
many (but not necessarily all) of whom are operating in parallel (i. e., following 
the same rules under the same conditions). As Flake [183] states: "Complex 
systems with emergent properties are often highly parallel collections ofsimilar 
units. Ant colonies owe much of their sophistication to thefact that they consist 
of many ants ... A parallel system is inherently more efficient ... 
Parallel systems 
that are redundant have fault tolerance ... some ants die .. similar ants can 
substitute ... and subtle variation among the units of a parallel system allows 
for 
multiple problem solutions to be attempted simultaneously " 
10 As social insects we refer to insects living in colonies, such as ants, bees, termites and wasps , 
which are not solitary. 
110 
4.1.2 Randomness, Complexity and Chaos 
Despite lacking a formal and complete definition, in the last 15 years the study 
of complex systems [184 - 189] has emerged as a recognised field in its own 
right. Perhaps the major drawback that deprives this field of a faster and more 
spread recognition lies in the inability of any definition of complexity [190] to 
quantify meaningful comparisons. Thus, statements of the form "A is niore 
complex than B" are rendered trivial with respect to complexity. 
An example of this is seen in Kolmogorov complexity [191 - 193] focusing on 
the shortest bit descriptions for any given Universal Turing Machine (UTM). In 
spite of the fact that, as stated in the Invariance Theorem [1941, any two UTMS 
will agree on the complexity of a bit-string, say, x, there will always be two 
UTMs disagreeing on the complexity of two respective bit-string descriptions, 
say, x and y. As a direct consequence, even though in nature we have a number 
of species that are well defined through their genetic codes, any estimation of 
the complexity of different species will produce conflicting results. 
Experienced within complex systems, emergence claims to be the key 
ingredient that makes complex systems complex [195). As a concept, emergence 
outlines the occurrence of a new phenomenon that originally (in equilibrium) 
was not within the constituents of the system. How this occurs and whether or 
not emergence can truly take place within a formal agent-based system [196, 
197] is a subject which at the moment is open to debate. Even though such 
questions are fairly new for artificial systems, the engineering of emergence has 
proven successful in a number of areas, such as the optimisation of the 
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performance of helical antennas [198], delivering promising results. The formal 
framework, linking emergence and complexity remains to be established. 
Related work on the subject matter cites the following. Resnick [199] claims 
that: "the study of self-organizing systems is, in some ways, the 'related 
opposite' of the study of chaos: in sey'lorganizing systems, orderly patterns 
emerge out of lower-order randomness; in chaotic systems, unpredictable 
behaviour emerges out of lower-level deterministic ndes ". Holland [200], on 
the other hand, argues that complex systems are neither random nor chaotic, i. e., 
they are characterized by "recognizable features and patterns ". Finally, for 
Bak [171], complex systems are to be distinguished from both equilibrium 
systems and chaotic systems in which there is uniformity of behaviour (either 
very ordered or very disordered) throughout the system. "Crystals and gases 
and orbiting planets, " he suggests, "are not complex, but landscapes are". 
Complexity for Bak is defined in terms of "large variability" indexed by scale- 
free phenomena in time and space (e. g., "avalanches of all sizes ", fractal 
structures) and that complexity so defined is an emergent characteristic of open 
systems that have self-organized to a state of "criticality". 
Emergence involves aggregate phenomena that cannot be intuited from the rules 
obeyed by singular entities. This too is a common refrain in the literature [171, 
199,200]. Again, citing Bak on the indicators of criticality: "Zipj's law as well 
as the other three phenomena (the power law, Iff noise, and fractals) are 
emergent in the sense that they are not obvious consequences of the underlying 
dynamical ntles ". Hence, without the presence of a ghost in the machine [20 11, 
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emergence appears to unfold properties that would otherwise remain unnoticed, 
or considered to be of little importance, in some occasions treated as noise, 
small errors and the like. 
4.1.3 Swarm Intelligence and stigmergy 
Realising the great interest in designing systems with the ability to self-organise 
and even though the theory behind the subject matter is still evolving, has 
yielded the field of Swann Intelligence (SI). The term SI was first used to 
describe cellular robotic systems [202-205], in which many simple agents 
occupy an environment and self-organise through nearest-neighbour 
interactions. Their objective was to generate patterns that typically relate to a 
specified task or design. In [206], this definition of SI was seen as "unnecessary 
restrictive " and was thus extended to "any attempt to design algorithms or 
distributed problem-solving devices inspired by the collective behaviour of 
social insect colonies and other animal societies ". Hence an area of practical 
interest within which emergence can exist as a documented phenomenon was 
established. 
Within SI, emergence represents the ability of the system as a whole to be more 
than the sum of its corresponding parts (sub-section 1.5.2). As properties of 
elements within a complex system allow for more than one outcome when these 
elements interact, the behaviour of the whole cannot in principle be understood 
solely in terms of the properties of individual elements. In order though for the 
system to experience any behaviour at this level, the communication ability of 
neighbouring elements needs to be established. 
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This leads to the notion of stigmergy, first recognised and named by the French 
biologist P. P. Grass6 (1959) during his studies of nest building in termites [2071. 
It describes the indirect communication in decentralised systems, in which the 
individual parts of the system communicate with one another by modifying their 
local environment. As this was first observed in nature, systems such as ant 
colonies are also referred to as stigmergic systems. A common example is nest- 
building in termites, which (like ants) also use pheromones to build very 
complex structures. For their interactions, termites like other social insects [208] 
rely on indirect communication mediated by modifications in their environment. 
To summarise, SI represents the science of extracting design algorithms from 
natural systems, capable of tackling problems in a decentralised way and 
stemming from the collective behaviour of individual elements. These elements 
typically interact between one another via means of an indirect communication 
method. The process of indirect communication where elements modify their 
surrounding environment to achieve the exchange of information is referred to 
as stigmergy. As SI puts stigmergy to use, properties of individual elements that 
surface from the dynamics of interactions and which are new, are the result of 
emergence. 
4.2 Defining emergent behaviour 
Having presented the emergence from natural to artificial systems and the 
attempts to establish a formal theoretical background on the subject, this section 
defines the notion. The motivation behind a more fon-nal framework comes 
from having the ability to be more precise concerning whether something is 
emergent or not. The definition presented within this section comes from Baas 
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[209]. Despite the criticism and expansions offered for this definition [210, 
211], it yields a basis for understanding the occurrence of emergence in a 
system undergoing adaptation. Expanding on a theoretical perspective to avoid 
loss of generality is beyond the scope of this thesis. Our hypothesis is that in the 
process of problem solving for a given system, emergent properties surface that 
can be used by the system in the solution path. Thus the system can be seen as 
undergoing adaptation to achieve a desirable and improved solution state. 
We begin by a system description of dynamically interacting elements. These 
elements we refer to as structures. Each structure is considered capable of 
carrying a number of properties. The only way to observe these properties is 
through an observer P of the system. The presence of an observer is central to 
the existence of emergence; to register that something new has surfaced, we 
need at least one mechanism for observing the corresponding structures. 
Consequently, we assume that emergent properties must be observable; but they 
appear because of the system of interactions among the structures, not because 
of our observation". This system description is presented in figure 4.2. 
" Quantum effects between the observer and the system of structures, as well as the ability of 
the system to present more or fewer emergent properties depending on the level of observation 
are ideas that remain in the context of this footnote. 
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Figure 4.2: A system of finite interacting structur s, under the observation of an 
observer P. Interactions are represented as links between structures. 
The process of the emergence of properties on several levels may be considered 
as a result of a series of abstract construction processes, similar to mathematical 
constructions. Given a set, I of first order structures, one can, by some kind of 
observational mechanism, ohs, (1), obtain a 'measure' of the properties of the 
structures at this level. The set I can then be subjected to a family of 
interactions, using the properties registered under this observation. 
Assuming that the set of structures can dynamically change in time, we define 
the first instance in the observation as I, . Thence, the set of structures 
1, can 
carry a number of properties as those are defined by a function of observation 
obs, (1, ). From the interaction of these structures (involving an alteration in 
their property values through another function) a set of second order structures, 
I, 
, surfaces also carrying an observation function, obs, (Y-, ). At this point, a 
property E is defined as an emergent property of a structure in Y., if and only if 
E is an element of obs, (Y-, ) but not an element of obs, (Y-, ). Consequently, E 
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emerges as a new, non-trivial, property in Y., that could not be observed in Z, - 
The resulting structures carrying that property are described as emergent 
structures. 
This definition presented by Baas gives us the ability to identify emergent 
properties within a system of interacting structures. Based on the above, the 
distinction and further categorisation between weak and strong emergence has 
also been made [212,213]. Having presented ways of identifying it, the 
remainder of this chapter focuses on methods and techniques for the generation 
of emergence within a system. For this, we first look at Oliver Selfridge's 
Pandemonium model and then generalise that approach by presenting the 
techniques followed in adaptive systems modelling. 
4.3 A novel system: Pandemonium 
As presented so far, emergent phenomena are not just academic curiosities 
[214]. Given the definition of emergence, a way of designing and modelling 
such systems needs to be established. The earliest model to be developed taking 
into account such behaviour was "Pandernoniuný', a pattern recognition learning 
program developed by Oliver Selfridge that was (initially) used for detecting 
Morse code patterns. Selfridge in his 1959 paper [215] describes a decision 
making system involving four entities (he refers to them as demons), which 
upon receiving an input, through continuous interaction, are able to reach a 
verdict regarding what the input value actually is. 
Even though the above description is no more than a basic neural network 
increasing its entropy in a way that is dependant on the input, the difference in 
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Selfridge's approach lies in the fact that dedicated dernons monitor the progress 
made. Demons decide, by a process of elimination, not only to keep specific 
candidate ýalues but also how to improve successful candidates based on the 
findings of all the others. As a result, this second feedback loop leads to an 
adaptive system that, In spite of being governed by a set of very simple rules. 
has the ability to corne to complicated (and correct) decisions. I 
Pandemonium consists of four distinct layers (figure 4.3 and figure 4.4), with 
each Llroup of demons speciallsing in specific tasks. The bottom layer 
constitutes the storage area and hosts demons that store and pass on data. The 
second laver is composed of demons that filter and weigh the evidence from the 
third layer: This is Miere the infomiation processing is taking place, 
computational denions process the data of the first layer into information and 
pass it oil to tile next level. Finally, at the top layer lies a single decision demon 
that decides what information was actually presented to the systern. At first 
sight, this model appears to be linear; each layer processes information and 
passes it on to the next layer, but there is a lot more taking place. 
Figure 4.3: Selfridge's Pandemonium model, as depicted in [2161. The 
interacting layers can be seen in boxes (excluding the iniatze demon) attemptl1W) 
to make a decision on the character which they are identifying. 
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HIC 1.111KILIeneSS of Pandemonium lies in the second layer, which (as illustrated 
in figure 4.4) is made LIP from cognitive demons. These denions weigh tile 
evidence produced by layer three and 'shriek' [2 17] tile amount of evidence 
they have (or think they have) up to the top layer. The more evidence that Is 
gathered. the louder the shriekiiiiz. At the top layer. infomiation from layer three 
gets passed on, the decision derrion also listens out for the loudest 'shriek' from 
laver mo. This doesn't imply that the decision demon is biased towards the 
IOUdest shriek. it simply listens to what other demons claim to have found of 
importance and then conies to its own conclusion reg-arding the output of the 
s\ "tem. 
Layer 4 
.. 
L ayer 3 
c 
.1 
4'.. " 
4-1 
m E 
ol Layer 
ll. ol-. Decision 
------------ 
Layer 1 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 4.4: The abstract lavered hierarchy within Selfridge's Pandemonium 
model, exemplifying the inteEactions between layer 2 and layer 3. In order to be 
uniquely identifiable, denions of each layer carry a unique tag, sho-wil as Dat67, 
Inf7 I. 
-DesO8., etc. 
From tills, if we imagine a pool of decision demons tackling the same problem, 
each backed by a self-governing Pandemonium, then, depending on the success 
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rate of specific ones, we can choose to disregard demons that have produced 
unsatisfactory results. Furthermore, by examining the inner workings of demons 
that have produced sufficient output, we can provide successful candidates with 
more knowledge regarding the solution of the problem, thus creating an ever 
expanding Pandemonium. 
Hitherto, we have examined the detailed structure of an adaptive system that, 
given a problem definition, obeys a survival of the fit (and not fittest) scenario. 
That is to say, learn how to solve the problem, through a number of attempts, or 
die trying. The process of learning entails the occurrence of a number of 
emergent properties within the system model. In creating these demons, it is not 
enough to simply identify the four layer categorisation of Pandemonium; we 
have to also provide an outline of the behaviour that governs their 
communication. For this, not before taking a more in depth look in adaptive 
systems modelling, section 4.6 and section 4.7 present the limitations of 
operation, as well as the design pitfalls to be avoided when this modelling 
approach is followed. 
4.4 Adaptive systems modelling 
As seen from the description of Pandemonium, pioneering a model that can 
exhibit emergent behaviour goes beyond the conventional methods of analytical 
and simulation modelling. The system designed, would have to have the 
capability to generate new behaviour in an attempt to adapt to the problem 
definition at hand. Thus, a more useful way of categorising models, according to 
their purpose and amount of real-world complexity that they carry is used. This 
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classification scheme, proposed by Roughgarden. [219], defines three categories 
of models, as described below: 
9 Minimal models for an idea 
Aiming to capture the entire idea behind the system, minimal models 
encapsulate only the most fundamental parts, without incorporating a 
high level of detail. This is very useful in illustrating a general principle 
and stripping away extraneous information. Such models achieve a focus 
on the most relevant parts of the system, without neglecting others. 
* Minimal models for a system 
Without incorporating the finest level of detail and building on minimal 
models for an idea, these systems carry a greater amount of information. 
By representing generalised systems, they carry enough specificity to 
narrow the applicability of the model, defining it to greater detail than 
that of minimal models for an idea. 
o System models 
System models simulate actual systems carrying all the details and the 
descriptions that they can have. Typically, the first attempt in 
constructing system models involves the syntbesis of different details 
into a global description. From that point onwards it is a matter of (often 
painstakingly) defining all the different attributes that the system carries. 
The above three categories of models provide three different ways for emergent 
phenomena within artificial systems to surface. This categorisation is based on 
the level of complexity that the model carries. Despite each of the above 
categories defining a respective involvement with the system undergoing 
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adaptation, there are a number of mutual characteristics that all systems 
exhibiting this behaviour have. 
Having defined the types of models that can be created, as a next step the 
fundamental entities that will surface within each model need to be established. 
As defined by Holland [220], the process of undergoing adaptation requires the 
definition of a minimum of three fundamental entities for the modelling course 
to take place. These establish the centre for a formal framework, providing a 
fixed way of decomposing adaptive systems and are: 
e The environment E undergoing adaptation 
e The adaptive plan r detennining the changes within structures of the 
environment 
*A measure of performance p for the resulting structures in the 
environment 
From the above, the environment represents the selection space for a solution to 
the problem under question. This does not imply that every point in this space 
needs to be premeditated beforehand but that every point in E can be uniquely 
identified in relation to others. Having defined this space, the adaptive system 
employing r has as an objective to provide a selection mechanism within E for 
the mutation of the resulting structures. In order to achieve this, a measure of 
performance, p, is necessary to distinguish between the performances of 
individual structures. 
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Pursuing further the logic of [220] to expand on the relationship between the 
environment E and the adaptive plan, the adaptive system is specified by the 
set of objects I a, where: 
0a= JAI, A, AP ... ý represents the set of attainable structures within 
E 
0=), 1-0" 0ý,, represents the set of operators for selecting structures 
in 
I is the set of inputs to the system from the environment 
0 r: Ixa -> Q is the adaptive plan, which depending on I and a 
determines the operator to be applied to the system 
Consequently, depending on the inputs, the system undergoing adaptation 
consists of a number of structures posing as solutions to the problem under 
question. Between these structures (illustrated in figure 4.5), a number of 
operators exist that allow for the selection of one structure through an adaptive 
plan and always depending on the measure of performance for each one. 
A3 
p(A-) p(A3) 
Figure 4.5: An abstract descfiption of an adaptive system selecting iterative 
structures from an environment E, with an adaptive plan r 
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The generalised model above for an adaptive framework, presents a direct 
operational guide for the deployment of such a system. From this, provided that 
we question the limitations of the operation, as well as take into account any 
design pitfalls that might come into view, we have the ability to design a system 
that can host emergent behaviour. The remainder of this chapter focuses on 
factors relating to the operability of adaptive systems, both during the design, as 
well as the operational phases. 
4.5 Limitations of operation 
Deploying a system that has the ability to experience emergent behaviour, does 
not necessary imply that it will produce a viable and non-trivial solution to the 
problem at hand. For this, a set of requirements that guarantee ftinctionality 
have to be put forward. From the development of related work, three 
fundamental requirements are presented below: 
9 The problem should be well defined 
An ill defined problem can lead to too great a generalisation. This would 
result in a universal adaptive plan that would be too vast to manage. If we 
look at Pandemonium as a systems example, the exhaustive creation, testing 
and destruction of demons would be overwhelming, compared to any 
relative success. The better well defined a problem is, the easier an adaptive 
system can yield emergent properties that relate to the solution of it. 
* Unbiased decision making is necessary 
The process of selecting operators for hopping between structures within the 
environment E (figure 4.5) should be unbiased encouraging random 
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encounters [22 1] within the set of structures a A, A, A It . 
Thus, the 3" * *0 
adaptive plan r: Ixa --> K2 should carry a certain degree of uncertainty as a 
function for selecting structures from a. In terms of a Pandemonium, both 
the cognitive and processing demons of the respective layers two and three, 
as well as for the decision demon, should not make their decision solely 
based on the evidence that they have. For this, they might have a partial, as 
well as a completely negative view from the infonnation that they have 
obtained. Furthermore, regardless of what partial states might yield, judging 
individual demons, as well as the entire Pandemonium should only take 
place after the necessary computations have been finalised, at every level 
within the system. 
9A currency should be introduced 
The measure of performance p should be treated as a currency within the 
system, remaining unbiased from tampering from individual structures 
within E. Similarly, for a successful Pandemonium to operate correctly, a 
single tamperproof way of labelling the behaviour of demons should exist. If 
this were not the case, the four layer structure would fall apart, with demons 
claiming to have produced outputs that they would pass the decision demon, 
but yet fail to tackle the problem at hand. 
As a conclusion, the above three points form an outline of the limitations that an 
adaptive system has. It needs to have a certain degree of freedom in the decision 
making process, enough to be able to iterate through potential solutions in an 
unbiased manner. At the same time it should also possess a well defined field of 
view. This leaves it capable of tackling the specified problem at hand and not 
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generallsations of it. Finally, an unbiased way of determining individual 
contributions at every level should exist. This, sharing many similarities with 
currency, should allow for the unprejudiced categorisation of demons within a 
Pandemonium. 
4.6 Design pitfalls 
Putting together the above limitations with the complexity that emergent 
systems can host, raises a number of pitfalls that should be avoided in the design 
process. This section documents these, circumventing the locallsation to specific 
cases, in order to avoid loss of generality. 
Firstly, as it is difficult to predict collective behaviour from individual rules, 
interrogating individual elements of the system will not yield in any useful 
information regarding the function of the group. The task of having a global 
view becomes inherently more difficult, as small changes in simple rules can 
totally alter the entire behaviour of the system. Consequently, a design pitfall to 
be avoided comes from establishing the correct feedback from the system and 
enabling the observer to have a global view of its behaviour. 
This task is intuitively stated in the presence of a decision demon in every 
Pandemonium, as well as in the process of a well defined problem within the 
limitations of operation. Despite every layer in a Pandemonium having a 
number of demons, the top most layer (in an attempt to reside a level of control) 
hosts one demon responsible for making a decision within the system. Similarly, 
upon defining a problem, not only must the actual definition be taken into 
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account, but also ways of verifying the feedback of the system (not from 
individual entities) should be present. 
Secondly, the division of labour (a concept surfacing from ants [15]) within the 
entities of the system should be inherent to the system. The trade-off that is 
established in this case presents the awareness of individual elements on the task 
at hand, versus the optimisation towards problem solving. Similarly to stronger 
ants carrying bigger loads, but not for the entirety of a journey, entities within 
an artificial system better at particular tasks should be given priority in 
performing them. Thus, the design pitfall of individual entities carrying the 
work load of the majority of the task that the system is attempting to perform 
should be avoided. 
Finally, a rule that should always be noted is that simple commands are not 
always necessarily good. An example of this is the circular mill in army ants 
illustrated in figure 4.6. Despite the stigmergy present in the system with each 
ant following the pheromone trails in the environment, the entire colony appears 
to be stuck in an infinite circle of un-achievement'2 . 
12 Beebe (192 1) observed [222] a mill in Guyana that measured 1200 feet in circumference with 
a circuit time for each ant of about 2V2 hours. The mill persisted for two days, with ever 
increasing numbers of dead bodies littering the route, but eventually a few workers straggled 
from the trail thus breaking the cycle, and the raid marched off into the forest. . 
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Figure 4.6: A circular mill of anny ants, stuck in an infinite loop circle, trailing 
on the pheromone patterns of other ants. 
As a result, simple rules are required within the system, but their operation 
should be monitored in great detail to make certain that trivial or recursive states 
are not reached. 
The dangers described within this section, even in their generality, forrn a 
boundary that further assists in a firmer definition of a system undergoing 
adaptation. Adding each one of these design pitfalls to an already well defined 
description allows us to deploy models that consent to the occurrence of 
emergence (through the surfacing of new properties) within the system. 
4.7 Conclusions 
The field of emergence does not carry a complete definition. The main reason 
for this fact is its relation to other areas that are still maturing within their 
domain. An example of this is the subject of complexity. Still, within SI, 
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emergent behaviour is an inherent characteristic, defining the observation of 
new properties in te problem solving process. 
Baas offers a definition for emergence in terms of a system of observable 
structures, each carrying a number of different properties. In brief, a property 
that can be observed within a particular state, which (in the process of 
continuous change and adaptation) was not there before, is labelled as an 
emergent property for that particular structure. 
Having given a definition for emergence, we are further motivated by the ability 
to design systems that can host such behaviour. For this, the design of Oliver 
Selfridge's Pandemonium is presented. Expanding on this, an introduction to 
adaptive system's modelling based on the work of Holland is given. This 
outlines the different characteristics that a system should have. The fundamental 
are: the environment E undergoing adaptation, the adaptive plan r determining 
the changes within structures of the environment and a measure of performance 
p for the resulting structures in the environment. 
As deploying a system with the ability to experience emergent behaviour does 
not necessary imply that it will produce viable and non-trivial solutions, a 
number of limitations of operation are considered. Combining these limitations 
with the complexity that emergent systems can host gives rise to a number of 
pitfalls that should be avoided in the design process. 
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Hitherto, this chapter has presented in detail the field of emergence, how that 
can be defined and also how systems hosting such behaviour can be designed. 
Processes described here within, will be used as tools in the description of the 
system that was fabricated for the making of secure routing protocols for 
MANETs. 
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Chapter 5 
The design of the Swarm simulator system 
5.1 Implementation decisions 
5.2 Requirements specification: Problem description 
5.2.1 Describing the MANET 
5.2.2 Describing the adaptive pandemonium 
5.2.3 Describing user interactions 
5.3 Requirements analysis: Use case model 
5.4 Static modelling of the problem domain 
5.4.1 Modelling the network 
5.4.2 Modelling the scenario 
5.4.3 Modelling the protocol 
5.5 Object structuring of sub-systems 
5.6 Dynamic modelling 
5.7 Swarm: An adaptive protocol selection system. 
5.8 A Summary 
This chapter presents the design methodology behind the software development 
of a discrete event simulation environment, capable of assessing wireless 
protocol designs. For this, the different sections of the system are identified and 
carefully described. Our modelling approach initially lays out the necessary 
characteristics for the static model and then proceeds into identifying the 
dynamic aspects that are required for the system to operate within the adaptive 
procedures identified in the previous chapter. 
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5.1 Implementation decisions 
In proposing a wireless protocol for the security of routing in a MANET, the 
simulation of the protocol behaviour under one or more worst case scenarios 
offers a benchmark of performance for the resulting implementation. The 
protocol definition acts as an input to the simulator, which in turn provides a 
number of performance results, by offering a comparison for measures such as 
throughput, latency and so on. This process defines the functionality of a 
simulator in the development of a routing protocol stack. The first question that 
surfaces in the development of a new network simulator, relates to the reasoning 
for not using an existing event based simulator. 
Although there is a number of simulation environments available for network 
research (e. g. QualNet, GloMoSim, SSFNet) the two dominant simulators for ad 
hoc networks are OPNET [223) and ns2 [224]. In OPNET, there exist three 
protocol definitions for MANETs, namely, DSR, AODV and ZRP, whilst ns2 
after the completion of the MONARCH project [225], carries a more complete 
protocol package. 
It is extremely difficult to expand the functionality of currently available event- 
driven, component based network simulators to facilitate adaptive behaviour. 
There are two main causes for this. Firstly, establishing a measure of 
performance for the protocol specification that can be fed-back as input to the 
system is a tedious process, dependant on a set protocol implementation. Even if 
we had the patience to extract the output data, redefining the protocol stack in 
real time would simply go beyond the capabilities of existing simulators. To 
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illustrate this, we choose the network simulator ns2. In this, the protocol stack is 
defined as a source file in C++, which is treated as a set usable entity by ns2. 
Altering this file automatically involves the recompilation of the source so that 
it can be used in the simulation process. Despite the advantages that ns2 has to 
offer, this process deprives us of the ability to dynamically alter a protocol 
implementation, thus limiting any operation within our adaptive environment. 
Secondly, existing simulators require a full specification of every layer in order 
to simulate the communication process. This fact, as much as offering realistic 
results for existing standards, takes away from the generality of emergence 
whereby a set of simple rules generate the solution to a complex problem. 
Again, implementing this in ns2 would involve a full layer to layer specification 
which would grossly overcomplicate the problem definition within our 
environment. 
Finally, similarly to network simulators, there exist simulation environments for 
emergent phenomena. Starlogo [226] is the prime example of such an 
environment, designed primarily to facilitate the construction of simulation 
models, rather than illustrative or analytical models. From the three categories 
of adaptive systems modelling (presented in section 4.4) simulation 
environments such as Starlogo focus primarily on minimal models for an idea, 
which can be later expanded [227]. Even though they can be applied to minimal 
models for a system, as well as system models, the required build-up in the 
design does not allow for a complete simulation of an entity as complex as a 
secure routing protocol within a MANET. 
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5.2 Requirements specification: Problem description 
Following the decisions regarding the simulation environment, this section 
focuses on the system implementation. For this, the corresponding sections of 
the system are identified and a description of each one is provided. Further to 
this, the link with the remaining sections of the system is considered. 
5.2.1 Describing the MANET 
Commencing with the description of a MANET (section 1.3) we consider the 
network to operate in a two dimensional space. A network is ultimately a 
collection of communicating nodes. Each node, as an entity, has the ability to 
move unreservedly in the ad hoc networking environment present. The mobility 
of each node is deten-nined by the corresponding mobility model [228 - 234] 
that it utilises. On the communication level, each node has a broadcasting radius 
of transmission, which is considered to be uniform and isotropic in time. 
schematic of such a network description is illustrated in figure 5.1, below. 
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Figure 5.1: A two dimensional network schematic with 15 nodes, illustrating 
their corre; 12ondinv, links between them, as well as the broadcasting radius of 
each MN. 
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Nodes lying within the broadcasting radius of others yield the ad hoc network. 
A fundamental assumption is that every MN has knowledge of the existence of 
every other MN on the network, with each one being uniquely identifiable. 
Moreover, the communication actions of a mobile node are quite limited: 
Provided a link between other nodes exists, a MN can send, receive, drop or 
forward any packets that they receive. These actions come directly from the 
specification of ns2 [224]. 
As a typical scenario, a 50 node network topology as seen in [235] and [2361 
can be considered. Within this, and similarly to [94], a random waypoint 
mobility model [33] allowing pauses between the movement of individual MNs 
can be deployed. The maximum velocity for each node is generally in the range 
of [0 - 201 ms"' for a space of l500x3OOm' and assuming a bi-directional 
communication channel with a range of 200m. From the assumption of the bi- 
directional channel, we say that a link between two nodes exists if one is within 
the broadcasting radius of the other. 
For all links, the attributes seen in [23,24,55] of a delay (measured in ms) and a 
transmission bandwidth (measured in Mbs-) are also assumed. The delay 
represents an internal attribute for each MN, affecting the amount of time that a 
node would have to wait prior to commencing transmission. In the process of 
two nodes communicating, a link is created between them. When establishing a 
link between two nodes, the minimum bandwidth of the two is set as the 
bandwidth of the link. Prior to commencing each simulation, the bandwidth as 
well as the delay for each node will have to be selected at random. A range 
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often used offering realistic results in simulations is that of [0.5 - 1.51 Mbs-1 
and [0 - 500] ms respectively. 
In order to communicate, each MN deploys the available protocol specification 
for the given simulation. This, similarly to other network simulators, defines the 
steps that a node must follow in order to exchange information with any other 
node. Furthermore, the protocol specification also defines the node behaviour 
for each of three out of the four actions stated above; namely sending, receiving 
and forwarding packets. To handle packets, every node has an incoming and an 
outgoing buffer, ordered through a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) structure. This 
guarantees (in tenns of processing) priority of older packets to newer packets 
with respect to time. 
The action of packet dropping is considered as an attribute of malicious nodes, 
launching a passive attack on the network. Despite the fact that each node has 
the ability to become malicious, it can only act in a malicious manner if the 
specified scenario allows it to. Consequently, the two elements within the 
MANET section description that link to the adaptive section of the system are 
the ability for a MN to become malicious and the definition of the protocol 
specification being utilised during the simulation. 
5.2.2 Describing the adaptive pandemonium 
Following the requirement of an adaptive protocol design, the compartmental 
model description (illustrated in figure 1.2) is deployed. For this we identify the 
corresponding three layers of operation on which the system operates. 
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Starting from the bottom, layer 3 operates as the data processing layer, similarly 
to the data processing layer in Selfridge's Pandemonium (section 4.3). Within 
this layer we distinguish the following three sub-systems, each with their 
corresponding attributes, illustrated in figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Layer 3 within the adaptive model, containinv, the sub-systems 
relating to the protocol description, the communication scenario and the oq! pu--t-., 
each with their correspon ing, attributes. 
The sub-system for the protocol generally holds the attrIbutes seen in the 
classification of routing protocols (described in section 11). Extending on these, 
it also incorporates a number of security features focusing on the security 
mechanisms and defence techniques (described in section 3.5) available to each 
node. In particular, a number of cryptographic primitives are incorporated as 
features (described in sub-section 3.5.1) and also techniques for detecting the 
occurrence of an intrusion (described in sub-section 3.5.2) are embedded into 
the protocol description. We will examine each of these in greater detail in 
section 5.4, dealing with the static modelling of the problem domain. 
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The sub-system for the scenario deals with the communication scenario at hand. 
In general terms it has the ability of describing two or more nodes wanting to 
exchange information at a specific instance during the simulation and in the 
presence of nodes acting in a malicious manner. Despite of the nodes not having 
any knowledge of which node(s) are acting in a malicious way, the scenario is 
where the information regarding the specific simulation is held. This 
information can be altered by the user at any time. 
The sub-system for the output is responsible for holding and updating the events 
that have occurred during the simulation of a specific scenario. In a similar way 
to the use of trace files in ns2, output entities have to provide the correct 
information for layer 2 above. Due to this, not only must they contain details of 
packets that transverse across the network but also information about the 
progress of individual MNs in realising the occurrence of malicious behaviour 
by means of the protocol deployed. 
Layer 2 of the system describes the adaptive attributes that are responsible for 
the occurrence of emergent phenomena. Building on the entities identified in 
adaptive systems modelling (section 4.4) this layer incorporates two sub- 
systems, namely the adaptive plan and the measure of performance. 
According to the description of adaptive models, further to the two above sub- 
sections there should also be a sub-section for the enviromnent undergoing 
adaptation. The main reason why the environment is not elevated to a sub- 
section within this layer is as follows. In layer 3 one of the three sub-sections is 
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the protocol descfiption, this covers every potential aspect of a full environment 
description remaining a layer below and thus attached to the communication 
scenano at hand. The spread of the fundamental entities of an adaptive system 
within the sub-sections of the system description in ordered layers can be seen 
in figure 5.3, below. 
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Figure 5.3: The labelling of the three fundamental entities, namely the 
environment the adaptive plan and the measure of perfon-nance within the 
compartmental model description in its constituent layers, 
Consequently, the adaptive plan feeds as a sub-system from information 
received by the protocol sub-system and the communication scenario 
undergoing simulation. Within the adaptive plan lies a description for 
identifying the different protocols that can be implemented yielding an abstract 
reference to the environment that is undergoing adaptation. 
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The sub-system for the measure of performance is responsible for providing the 
necessary feedback for emergence to take place. Unlike the environment which 
is described through the protocol and as the level of feedback that the system 
receives is vital to any decisions made regarding the protocol, a further sub- 
section is required to filter the output received. This filtering process makes the 
measure of performance sub-section act as a proxy between the active layer of 
the simulation (layer 3) and the decision layer towards the results obtained. 
As a final sub-section on the top layer, the decision daemon is responsible for 
evaluating the success or failure of the protocol design with regards to the 
specific communication scenario at hand. Feeding from input solely from the 
two sub-sections of layer 2, the decision daemon passes its feedback back to that 
layer, which in turn alters the entities of the protocol and/or the simulation 
scenario. The objective behind this process Oustifying the separate sub-section 
for the decision daemon) is to find a better solution to the problem at hand. 
5.2.3 Describing user interaction 
As much as this system operates independently in evaluating protocol designs, 
there is a necessary element of user interaction to indicate the settings regarding 
the initial communication scenario, as well as the levels of malicious intent. As 
a result, the user of the system should not only have the ability to evaluate the 
results obtained by the system but also to specify the scenario at hand and 
monitor its progress. 
For this reason, the system is required to have a Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
that simulates specific network scenarios in discrete time intervals. Further to 
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this, a number of parameters Involving the simulation, as well as the adaptive 
model being utilised would have to be able to be specified through the GUL 
Unlike most simulators, this interface should not focus on the diaoraniniatic 
form of the network, yielding results on the events taking place, but on the 
results obtained from the process of adaptation upon protocol structures. Also. 
bearing in mind the way in which a protocol interacts xvith the sVsteIII (fi"LII-C t, It, 
5.3), the process of how the information regarding the protocol is excharij;, ed 
xvithin the system should be clearly displayed. A proposed GUI for the system is 
depicted in figure 5.4 belm\. 
Figure 5.4: A schematic \ iew of the GU I control and display panel, allo\\ m,,,, 
the necessaLy use. r interactions, 
Within the above figure. four distinct parts of the system are identified. 
Similarly to the net-work animator, nam, that operates Nvithin ns2 [2241, the first 
component of the GUI is a pane on which the specific scenario, under which the 
protocol undergoing is being applied on, can be displayed. For this pane, we 
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consider two available views; a graphical animation view capable of illustrating 
the network topology in a similar way as that of figure 5.1 and also a simulation 
statistics view that can show at any one time instance the events taking place 
within the simulation. 
The second component of the GUI that should be available for the user relates to 
the information of the communication scenario being deployed. This includes 
infonnation about links in-between nodes, as well as all events due to occur at 
slotted time instances. 
The third component of the GUI holding information about the system focuses 
on the output received from a particular simulation, offering the simulation 
results that show the success or failure of one or more protocols towards the 
simulation scenario at hand. All of the three components mentioned so far 
expand on the attributes illustrated on figure 5.2 for the protocol, 
communication scenario and output respectively. 
The final component of the GUI deals with the control of the simulation. Within 
this, a user will have the ability to stop, reset, as well as re-trace particular 
events that have occurred in the component depicting the graphical animation of 
the system. This will also offer indirect control over the output and scenario 
component, as any action that might alter the simulation, will also affect the 
output and scenario of the system. To expand on this further, the following 
section looks at the model from an interacting user perspective, clarifying in 
greater detail the inputs and outputs that the system will have. 
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5.3 Requirements analysis: Use case model 
Choosing to formally model the system in the Unified Modelling Language 
(UML) [237 - 239], we follow the modelling process described in the latest 
language specification [243]. UML is a family of graphical notations, backed by 
a single meta-model [241,242] that assists in the design of Object-Oriented 
(00) soffivare systems. The specification of the language comes from the Open 
Management Group (OMG), which represents an open consortium of companies 
aiming to support and standardise the interoperability of 00 systems. Currently, 
the latest specification release of the language is described in version 2.0 [243]. 
We commence our analysis by identifying the use case model of the system. 
Use case models [240], are a valuable tool to help comprehend the functional 
requirements of the system. Ultimately, their purpose is to clearly define the 
interaction that a user can have with the system implemented. Thus, the actions 
that the system is expected to perform, can be directly derived from the use 
cases, describing what exactly the system is attempting to accomplish. 
The system description can provide the necessary information about the number 
of different uses that the designed system will have. From these, the number of 
individual actors, as well as their separate role can be identified. As seen in the 
previous section, there is no further necessity than a single actor of the system. 
We label that actor as the operator. 
Further to this, the operator through the GUI should have the ability to perform 
the following actions, which correspond to the use cases of the system. 
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0 CreateScenario: Specify tile communication scenano of the system 
0 Createllrotocol: Speciýv the protocol utilised within the scenario 
0U ormatoutput: Specify the output forniat t'()r the sý stem 
0 ControlSimulatiow Control and monitor the progress ofthe simulation 
QIICI-% ( )Iitl)tit. QUel-V the output recen. ed from the stem 
I lie modcl dcrlýcd from the above use cases is illustrated in figure 5.5. 
System 
CreateSconario 
FonnatOti1put 
Queryoutput 
Operatm 
ControlSimulabw 
Figure 5.5ý Adapti\ e Protocol Design System Use Case Model. 
ý ollo\ý ing the order in which these are presented, tables 5.1 to 5.5 examine each 
ofthe abo\ e Use cases in greater detail. 
Table 5.1 -. Detailed descriotion ofthe CreateScenano use case. 
Field Description 
Use Case Name: CreateScenario 
create a valid communication scenario within a two- 
(IiIII01siollal enviromnent, involving (I number of nodes that Summam 
an, attempting to communicate through the ittilisation qI a 
(Fiven protocol. 
. -ketor: Operator 
Dependencý: Createprolocol 
Precondition: Svstcm is idle. not undergoing anY simulation 
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Description: 1. spe(-ý6, file envil-ollmoll 
a specilv tile two dinlensionalspace 
h. Specill. file maximum broadcast raill"lls 
c. spccýlv Me node mobilit. l. model 
J SPecill. tile totalsimillation time 
tile Iletivol-A 
(I. sPe(W. I. tile number (4, notles 
b. Spec-0. tile Illaxinlum node (1cla. l. 
c. specIA. tile maximum nodc, bandivitith 
3. Speci/Y tile nodes 
ti. Select tile broadcast radius 
b. Select tile i/c/a I, 
4. Speci/v tile .,; (, enjrjo 
a. The malicious nodes 
b. The communicatimi requests in time 
C. The existing links betiveen nodes 
If olle 0/ the above low. specifications is incomplete, the Alternath es: 
ý 
communication scellariolfilds to load Ivithin tilt, sYsIelyl. 
Postcondition: 1 .4 simithition is reatýv io hcWin within thesystem. 
This use case carries four fundamental specifications, each one of which is 
correlated to the performance of the system. Furtherniore, it is dependant on the 
use case responsible for creating a \alId protocol specification. The use case 
detalling the creation of a protocol can be seen in table 5.2 belo\ý. 
Table 5.2-. Detailed description of the CreateProtocol use case. 
Field 
L se Case Na 1 11 e crealeprotocol 
Speci6- the illitial ti-Pe o0rotocol that is to be used ill 
Summar%: the communication scenario. Within the specifictition, 
the runge ol'characteristics which a protocol can obtaill 
has to a/so be specýfied. 
Actor: Operator 
Dependency: None 
Precondition: ývstcnl is idle, not 1111del-going allY simulatiOll 
Description: 1. Define the characteristic pal . rs 
41. LSR vs. DI'R 
b. Table ih-iven vs. on-demaml 
c. Perioclic vs. event-tiriven 
el. Flat vs. hierarchical 
e. Decentralise(I vs. Distributed 
J., Source vs. hop-by-hop 
g. Single I. S. mullilVe paths 
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2. Dtline whit'll till V 
b. Public kcY ci: Vptog1*ap1'Y 
c. Digital signatures 
J Hash Ilinctions and . 
11 -1 Cs 
3. Delint, the intrusion detectioll WC11"it/lICI 
a. Malicious classOcations 
b. Protocolftedback 
khernati-, es: I 
None. The characteristics dc., lint, the broadest possible 
1.4inge that a prolot -0/ coil/d have. 
1,00collditioll: I prolocol b; readl. to he litilised b. IT-thescellairio. 
From the three fundamental specifications that this Lise case has. partial 
characteristics can be specified \\Ithm each one. This yields that a protocol 
could only comprise of certain characteristic pairs, without hming to utillse 
cr\ ptographic primiti\ es or intrusion detection techniques in its specification. 
Table 53: Detailed description oftlie FonliatOtitl2ut use case. 
Field Description 
t se Case Name: FormwOutput 
- 
Specify the format, as well as the amount of inforniatioll 
Summam ill Mlich any output generated from the system \\Ill be 
returried to tile operator. 
Actor: Opertitor 
Dcpendencý: NOW 
Precondition: ýVSICIYI iS OC, Ilot 1111CIel-gOilig C117.1- SiMlIhItiOll 
Description: 1. Events on each AN 
ci. Ptickets recelved 
h. Ptickets sent 
c. Packets th-opl)ecl 
d. Ptickets. /brit-tirtlecl 
Pticket itifin-nuition 
ti. Control jwckets 
h. Routing1mckets 
c. Dato Imckets 
J Packet si--e 
3. ALVaii-m-eness 
a. No(les believed to he 1114111ciolls 
h. Level ol'imilicious intent 
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AI tern at h es: 
None. The characterb 
, 
mcs dcline the broadest possible 
ram! v that /he outpilt 101*11111t coll/d /ItIve. 
Postcondition: Thefin-mat in which ii simidation ivi/I report is dcýfilled. 
Similarly to the Create Protocol use case, an operator has the ability to define 
partial characteristics from the whole output format stated above. This use case 
carries three fundamental specifications. all of which are time dependant. 
Table 5.4. Detailed description of the ControlSillILIkItIOll use case. 
Field Descriptioll 
t %v Caw Name: Controlsintillation 
Ha%e the ability to start, stop. pause. as well as query a SurnmarN: 
particular simulation for results that It has prodLICed. 
Actor: Operator 
Dependencý: Qilelý-Ouqmt 
Precondition: Createprotocol, Createscellario have -on1l)leted 
Description: I Start. stol) (is it-ell as Imilse the simillation 
View a gral4lical animation 
3.1'iew Simillation statistics 
4. Quel?. the simulation results 
Alternatives: None, 
The state of the sYstem undergoing simulation can 
Postcondition: change accordingýv, ifthe operator selects to start, stol), 
orpause the simulation. 
From this Lise case. the operator has complete control of the undergoing 
s111111lation. as \ý ell as' the output that he can receive from it. In order to have the 
abilm to control the svstem in its entirety. this use case utilises the 
QuervOutput use case, described in table 5.5. below. 
Uable 5.5. Detailed description of the Quea, Qutput use case. 
Field DeS(Tiptl . oil 
Use Case Name: Quelý'Oiltpllt 
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lime the ability to query the system. for the output that Summarý :-. 
, it 
has generated in a particular simulation. 
ctor: ()pcrator 
DepelidelICN: FOrmatoutput 
Precondition: ThesYstent is undergoing a simulation. 
Dewription: I /. Quei-v the system output relating to the simulation 
AlternatiN es: 1 None. 
The output ofthe system I. s i-etin-ned to the o1wi-wor in 
Postcondition: the. /oi-incit thtit htis been specýfied in the Foi-inwOutInit 
Ilse Case 
Tile abo% e use cases clearly identitý, tile actions of an operator \%ithin tile 
system. Each use case has a number of fundamental specifications that outline 
tile expected sýstem belimlour. The section that follows details specific 
attributes of these actions focusing on tile static modelling of the system. This 
comprises of the problem domain embracing the protocol descriptions, as well 
as the scenario ofthe simulation. 
5.4 Static modelling of the problem domain 
I ollo\ý III, -, tile 
COM ClItIoll, 11 Illodell Ing approach to tile "tatic de--'CI-11111oll of the 
model domain [239 - 241]. NNe categonse the resulting classes of the 00 
analysis into mo groups. The first group comprises of physical classes 
corresponding to physical structures within the system. while the second 
compriseN ofentm classes corresponding to entities that have to be fabricated as 
oýjects in order for the systern to function cohesively. The joint set of the t,, \, o 
1ý,., roups together. details the static model for the system. 
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5.4.1 Modelling the network 
The network corresponds to the group of physical classes that can model a 
NIANET. In order to achieve this, we introduce the following classes: 
NI e etwork class: Is the group of nodes, holding information about the 
physical maxima, as well as the maxima relating to the exchange of 
infonnation. 
o Only one instance of the Network class evrists: Each simulation 
considers a single network 
o One-to-many relationship with the Node class: A network 
consists of a number of nodes 
o One-to-nzany relationship with the Link class: Within the 
network, a number of links between nodes can exist 
o One-to-many relationship with the MobilityModel class: A 
number of different mobility models can be utilised in a network 
* Node class: Represents the individual MN attempting to communicate 
with other nodes which are part of the network 
Alan -to-many relationship with the Link class: A node can have 5 
a number of links 
o One-to-one relationship with the AfobilhýMfodel class: Every 
node has a single mobility model 
e Link class: Represents the presence of a link between two nodes, once 
they are both within the broadcasting radius of each other 
o Many-to-many relationship with the Node class: A link is a 
connection between two nodes 
-0 AlobilityModel class: Describes the mobility model used by each node 
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11.. * 
Network Node 
rex: im -nodeID: " 
reY: Int -posltionX: int 
: decinul ýposltionY , Int 
ilay, double -InBuffer, objed 
im1wkith, doub le -outsuffer: object 
, acketBuffer: object 
Unk 
im MobilltyModlel 
-firs,, Node - irt -moWID: int 
, secoridNode : Int -mobikyArray, W 
barx1wk:! th: double 
Figure 5.6: Conceptual static model for the network, corresponding to the 
physical classes that constitute a MANET. 
For the above four classes, we identify the following class attributes, illustrated 
in figure 5.6 with the corresponding class relationships. 
* Network: maxSizeX, maxSizeY, radius, maxDelay, maxBandwidth, 
etherPacketBuffer 
A network has a two-dimensional region of operation (maxSizeX, 
maxSizeY) and also specifies the broadcasting radius of each MN. The 
maximum delay that each NIN can have, as well as the maximum bandwidth 
that a link can experience are defined. Further to this, it holds a buffer on 
which the packets that need to be exchanged between nodes are temporarily 
stored; this buffer acts like an ether on the network. 
o Node: nodelD, positionX, positionY, inBuffer, outBuffer, delay 
A node is identified through a unique node ID on the network. At any one 
time instance every node holds a physical position within the network. 
Furthennore, every node experiences a transmission delay and also has an 
incoming and an outgoing buffer for receiving and transmitting packets. 
o Link: linkID, firstNode, secondNode, bandwidth 
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A link is a communication link between two nodes, allowing them to 
exchange information. It carries a unique ID and also has a bandwidth that 
represents the rate in which the two nodes can send and receive data. 
9 MobilityNtodel: modelID, mobilityArray 
Each mobility model represents the possible way in which a single or a 
group of MNs can change position within the network topology. Further to a 
unique ID for each model, an array of values is specified within each one, 
corresponding to particular characteristics in the movement. 
5.4.2 Modelling the Scenario 
The scenario corresponds to the group of entity classes that can recreate a 
communication scenario taking place within the network. In order to achieve 
this, we introduce the following four classes: 
Scermvio 
-roModos , int 
. rriaxSizeX: irt 
-maxSizeY: kt 
-radius: clacbmi 
rnaxBan: Wdth: double 
maxDalay, double 
[WWTiaie: 
obiect 
I IL I.. * 
Tlm*Packet 
-sourceNode : li 
int 
clouble 
TimcConnwAicn 
stNods., ird 
xmrxiNode : irt 
zftngTffm : double 
ndinarrm: double 
Tifflemaliclous 
-mode: Int 
. stvdngTkna, double 
-endingTime: double 
-n-alkiousLevel : int 
Figure 5.7: Conceptual static model for the scenario, corresponding to any 
communication scenario occurring within a MANET. 
e Scenario class: This class groups together the necessary attributes that 
can describe a communication scenario taking place within a MANET. It 
is correlated to the time interval on which specific events occur on the 
network aiming to disrupt the communications between MNs- 
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o Only one instance of the Scenario class exists: Each simulation 
considers a single communication scenario 
o One-to-many relationship with the TimeConnection class: A 
number of connections between nodes can occur during the 
simulation of a single scenario 
o One-to-many relationship ivith the TimeAfalicious class: A 
number of malicious nodes can exist during the simulation of a 
single scenario 
o One-to-many relationship with the TimePacket class: A number 
of communication requests between two nodes on the network 
can occur during a single simulation. 
41 TimeConnection class: A TimeConnection represents the link between 
the two communicating nodes, including the start and end time of 
existence of this link. Time is represented in relative terms as a ratio 
between 0.0 and 1.0 of the total simulation time. 
o It has to be stated that no relationship between this class and the 
TimeAfalicious class, as well as the PmePacket class exists 
* TimeMaliclous class: A TimeMalicious represents the time duration 
that a particular MN remains malicious and level of malicious intent that 
it has towards the network. Similarly to the TimeConnection class, time 
is represented as a ratio between 0.0 and 1.0 of the total simulation time. 
o This class is independent of any TimeConnection instances or 
TinzePack-et instances that might e-cist in the scenario 
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o TimePacket class: A TimePacket represents the request made from one 
node to another to communicate. Againjime is represented as a ratio 
between 0.0 and 1.0 of the total simulation time. 
o 7bis class is independent of any TimeConnection instances or 
TimeAfalicious instances that might exist in the scenario 
Similarly to the previous sub-section, we identify the following class attributes, 
illustrated in figure 5.7 with the corresponding class relationships. 
e Scenario: noOfNodes, maxSizeX, maxSizeY, radius totalTime, 
maxDelay, maxBandwidth 
As a scenario embraces all the required characteristics for the exchange of 
information to take place, it carries all the attributes of the Network class, as 
well as the total time for which a simulation is going to occur (totalTime) 
and the total number of nodes (noOfNodes) that constitute the network. In a 
way, the scenario class is the back end to the front end of the network class. 
TimeConnection: firstNode, sccondNode, startingTime, endingTime 
Corresponding to the physical links that exist within the network, a 
TimeConnection details which nodes form the link and also the starting and 
end time for which the link exists. Note that time is considered as a ratio of 
the total simulation time always being within the range of 0.0 and 1.0. 
* TimeMalicious: node, startingTime, endingTime, maliciousLevel 
A MN (node) can act in a malicious manner, not obeying the rules set out by 
the protocol for exchanging information in the network. The duration for 
which the node remains malicious is specified through a starting and an end 
time. Based on the descriptions of section 3.3 classifying a malicious attack, 
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each TimeMalicious instance has a level of ad\ersarial intent, set b-v the 
maliciousLevel attribute. Table -5.6 
details the values that this variable can 
obtain %% ith re-spect to the malicIOUs ability experienced within the nem ork. 
I imel'acket: sourceNode. dcstNode. time 
I-ach liode Call attempt to Communicate \\ltll any other node that is part of 
the nemork at any instance during the simulation. The TiniePacket class 
specifies this, having as attributes the source MN (sourceNode). the 
destination MN (destNode) and the time that this takes place. Once again. 
linic is considered in relaw. e terms. as a ratio bem een 0.0 and 1.0. 
, l'ahle f,. 6: Hie definition of tlie nialicious lc\ ei attribLite, as a five d12it number 
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Within the abo\ e table, further clarification is needed to understand how the two 
dimensions relating to collusion of po\\er have been categorised. For the 
number ofcolluding. nodes. we consider the percentage of the total nodes within 
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the network that are participating in a malicious collusion. Similarly to this 
classification, for the level of cooperation in-between MNs, we consider the 
amount of information (in percentage of the total) that each node discloses to 
other nodes within the MANET. Furthcmiore, we consider this scale to be 
linear, as a result, a value of 5, on digit 4 of the maliciousLevel, would imply 
that the specific node would only disclose half of the known infonnation that it 
considers valid, to other nodes. Specific content would include hop-count, 
routing tables, hash values, etc. 
Even though the characteristic of a maliciousLevel is an individual attribute for 
each node that is part of the network, some digits of this number have to remain 
identical for every node, as they represent group behaviour in the maliciousness 
of an attack. These are digit I and digit 3, representing the active -n-m 
attacker hierarchy and the number of colluding nodes within the network. As an 
example of how the value of the MaliciousLevel relates to the behaviour of an 
individual MN, consider that, say, AfaliciousLevel = 00003. This would imply 
that we are modelling a scenario involving an active -0-I attack of a 
completely static adversary, colluding with no other nodes and classified as a 
benign adversary; in brief, the NIN is a passive eavesdropper on the network. 
5.4.3 Modelling the protocol 
The protocol corresponds to the physical class that represents the wide range of 
operation that a protocol of communication for a MANET can carry. For this, 
we proceed into defining how the characteristics of section 2.1, as well as those 
relating to intrusion detection and cryptographic primitives identified in sub- 
section 5.2.. I (and grouped in figure 5.2) can be fitted into a class description. 
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In order to be able to safeguard from a potential attack, the behaviour of the 
attacker must be noticeably different from that of a normally behaving router 
[244]. This forms the basis for the deployment of Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs) [245,246], which aim to detect traffic anomalies, as well as misuse 
patterns within a networking environment. Detecting misbehaving routers has 
also been studied on the protocol level, in tenns of routing as seen in [247,248]. 
Even though malicious behaviour such as the black holc problem facilitates only 
a single, passive state from an attacker's perspective, offering only the choice of 
dropping packets, there is still a number of detection states that can act as a 
measure of performance with respect to the routing protocol under question. 
Thus, with the occuffence of a malicious event, neighbouring MNs can: 
o Not realise the occurrence of the malicious event 
Assume the exchange of information has taken place successfully and in 
cases continue to send packets along the same route. This is by far the 
worst case scenario, where the routing protocol fails in all aspects to deal 
with the occurrence of a malicious event. 
o Realise a inalicious event is occurring within the network 
Understand that data traffic is being manipulated somewhere along the 
route without having the ability to narrow down which node is behaving 
in a malicious manner. 
e Realise which A17V(s) is causing the malicious event 
Not only have the ability to realise the occurrence of a malicious event, 
but also be able to identify which MN(s) is causing it. 
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* Avoidinformation originatingfrom aknown malicious node 
Having rcalised that a malicious event is present along a specified route, 
perform any necessary action that allows for the re-routing of information 
ignoring incoming traffic from particular malicious nodes. 
* Isolate information originatingfrom any malicious node 
Having realised which MN(s) is performing the attack and exploited 
different paths into rerouting data, attempt to move to an offensive state 
towards specific MN(s) with the objective of isolating them through 
typically advertising its existence on the network. 
The above five cases act as a measure of performance for the occurrence of 
adversarial behaviour within the MANET. In an attempt to take into 
consideration redundant routing information (thus simplifying any detection 
taking place), we assume that there exists a valid solution to achieve any of the 
above states and thus at least one alternative route to the destination exists 
within the resulting topology at any moment in time. 
Having presented the characteristics that define a wireless routing protocol 
(section 2.1), a way of representing individual criteria, as well as hybrid 
protocol designs for each pair is required. This would provide the necessary 
environment undergoing adaptation where the resulting protocol structures 
would attempt to tackle the malicious scenario at hand. 
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Taking a probabilistic approach into this classification, we define the level I for 
each characteristic pair, as a real value within the range of [0,10]. This 
dimensionless number yields the bias of the protocol between the two criteria of 
each characteristic. We consider the level 1, to be dcpcndant on a partial 
attribute h, measured in proportion to a total attribute n, and the probability p, 
of a particular event to occur. Thus, the level I is defined in (5.1) as follows: 
I= 
1", ", I 
Where: 
IE (X E El 0: 5 x: 5 10) represents the level for the characteristic pair. 
E Ix e0', x< n) is the partial attribute representing a value directly 
related to the network. 
nE Ix E0 ') is the total attribute in the dimensions of h. 
p is the probability of a given event regarding a specific state of either 
attribute horn. Note that for 1=0 and 1=10, we also assume that p=O. 
By inspection, we can see that each characteristic is related to, time (periodic vs. 
event driven updates), the number of nodes participating in a particular action 
(LSR vs. DVR) or the number of routes present (single path vs. multiple paths). 
Consequently, we proceed into defining each of the above attributes h and n as 
well as the probability p for every pair. 
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e LSR(1=0.0)vs. DVR(1=10.0) 
The level I within this characteristic represents the distance in hop counts, 
within which an originating MN will take into consideration (for routing) 
the reply information received. Also, within the partial distance vector 
received, information only up to I hops away will be taken into account. 
Thus, the attribute h represents the hop distance for which information will 
not be neglected. On the other hand, the attribute n is the maximum hop 
distance excluding any routing loops present on the network. The 
probability p in this case is the probability that a MN will take into 
consideration (either in the distance vector or in the RREQ packet) 
information which is (h + 1) nodes away. 
* On-demand routing (1=0.0) vs. table-driven routing (1=10.0) 
The level I within this characteristic represents the distance in hop counts 
for which a routing table will be held and thus a route request will not be 
launched. Hcnce, the attribute h represents the hop distance for which a 
routing table will be stored, while the attribute n, again, is the maximum 
hop distance, excluding any routing loops present on the network. The 
probability p in this case is the probability that a MN will store (and not 
request) infonnation which is (h + 1) nodes away. 
e Event-driven update (1=0.0) vs. periodical update (I =10.0) 
The level I within this characteristic represents the proportion of updates 
that are received in slotted time intervals, compared to the ones which are 
received in the occurrence of an event. As time is the contributing factor of 
this characteristic, the attribute h represents the number of updates (per unit 
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time) exchanged on the network on a periodic basis, while the attribute n 
represents the total number of updates (per unit time) received by each 
node. The probability p in this case is the probability of accepting (h + 1) 
periodic updates in unit time. 
om Flat structure (1=0.0) vs. hierarchical structure (1=10.0) 
The level I within this characteristic represents the ideal number of 
partitions relative to the total number of nodes, which the protocol would 
(depending on the available links) separate the network, for optimum 
I 
protocol performance. Hence, the attribute h represents the number of nodes 
that belong to the various clusters, with the attribute n representing the total 
number of nodes on the network. The probability p in this case represents 
the probability of attaching a single extra "flat node" to an existing cluster 
group during the total time of the simulation. 
* Decentralised computation (1=0.0) vs. distributed computation 
(I = 10.0) 
The level I within this characteristic represents the average number 
(compared to the whole) number of nodes that engage in the distributed 
computation of a route across the network. Thus, the attribute h represents 
the number of nodes that will actively engage with others to help them 
define a route to a specified node. The attribute n represents the total 
number of nodes on the network. In this case, the probability p represents 
the probability of a single extra MN to request the assistance of others 
during the total time of the simulation. 
e Hop-by-hop routing (1=0.0) vs. source routing (1=10.0) 
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Similarly to LSR vs. DVR, the level I within this characteristic represents 
the number of slots available within a packet that could be occupied with 
the route followed. This list would have to be ordered, with either a FILO 
or a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) structure. In this case, the attribute h 
represents the number of additional slots available within the packet, while 
the attribute n represents the maximum number of slots that could be made 
available through a specific route. Once more, the probability p represents 
the probability of adding a single extra slot within each packet during the 
total time of the simulation. 
* Single path (1=0.0) vs. multiple paths (1=10.0) 
Finally, the level I within this characteristic represents the number of routes 
that will be made available for a single request made on the network. In this 
case, the attribute h represents the number of extra routes that the 
originating MN could take into account, with the attribute n is representing 
the total number of available routes at that moment in time. Once again, the 
probability p in this case is the probability of considering a single extra 
route for a particular route request. 
To understand the meaning of this range, in the case of table driven routing 
versus on-demand routing, the value of I=0.0 would represent a protocol 
which is solely on demand initiated, while a value of 1=10.0, one that is 
exclusively table driven. A value of I=3.7 would give rise to a hybrid protocol 
that despite of holding a routing table for some nodes, would initiate a route 
request procedure for the vast majority of routes needed on the network. 
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The decision for the range of the level I is influenced by three contributing 
factors. Firstly, in most cases, the attributes h and n relate to the total number of 
nodes, present on the network. In order to be able to describe resulting level 
values in a meaningful way we would favour the attribute n to always be greater 
than the maximum level value. Even though this is not a requirement and 
despite the use of just 6 nodes in [6] to describe a black hole scenario, standard 
Ad Hoc routing scenarios for MANETs [77], seen in [235] and [236] typically 
involve a larger number of MNs. 
Secondly as a probability measure is present to signify small decision making, 
there is a definite need for a measure that is one order of magnitude greater than 
that. A last contributing factor relates to computation and the fact that all values 
(to one decimal place) within the specified range can be represented well within 
half the size of the smallest primitive data type in Java [249], that of a byte. 
As we shall see in chapter 6, depending on the results obtained in each 
simulation scenario, the range of each level can be quantised accordingly. We 
consider each characteristic independent of one another; knowing the value for 
the table driven versus on demand initiated does not yield any information with 
respect to the protocol being, say, a single path versus a multiple path design. 
From the above, we define the protocol class having the following attributes. 
Furthermore, giving the protocol class the ability to secure each protocol 
structure, for each cryptographic primitive we define a corresponding class with 
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the respective attributes. Hence, the protocol class can utilise each of the 
cryptographic classes defined, provided it takes on the burden of defining and 
appropriately disclosing specific attributes. 
* Protocol class: Defines the protocol behaviour through the above stated 
numeric attributes involving intrusion detection states, as well as all the 
above described protocol characteristic pairs. Each protocol can use a 
number of the following cryptographic instances in its definition. 
o Has a one-to-many relationship with the Sym ci _ pher, 
Asm-Cipher, Digjignature and Hash_mac class: Each protocol 
can utilise these primitives for control data on the network 
o Sym_cipher class: Represents the ability to encrypt and decrypt data 
symmetrically that are part of the communication protocol, through a 
secret and shared key. 
e Asm-cipher class: Represents the ability to encrypt and decrypt data in 
an asymmetric way, through a public and private key pair. 
9 Dig_signature class: Represents the ability to digitally sign data, as well 
as verify data that has being signed, using a private and public key pair. 
0 Hash_rnac class: Represents the ability to create as well as authenticate 
a message digest or MAC on control data being exchanged. 
Similarly to the previous sub-section, we identify the following class attributes, 
illustrated in figure 5.8 with the corresponding class relationships. 
Protocol: intrusionDetectionLevel, linkStateVsDistanceVector, 
tableVsOnDemand, periodicVsEventDriven, flatVsHierarchical, 
decentralisedVsDistributed, sourceVsHopbyHop, singleVsMultiplePaths 
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A protocol is categorised in ternis of each of the attributes specified in the 
class, corresponding to the seven characteristic pairs as a decimal number 
between the range [0.0,10.0], as well as the intrusion detection level, which 
corresponds to an integer between [1,5]. Further to this, the protocol class 
can utilise a number of instances of any of the cryptographic primitive 
classes that follow. 
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Fi2tire 5.8: Concentual static model for the protocol, illustrating the use of the 
corresponding cWtographic classes. 
* Sym__. ýipher: cipherNo, cipherlD, key 
The symmetric cipher class (sub-section 3.5.1.2) has a unique number 
(cipherNo) corresponding to the particular instance, a cipher ID 
corresponding to the block cipher that it uses, as well as a key used for the 
encryption and decryption process. 
9 Asm_cipher: cipherNo, cipherlD, publicKey, privateKey 
The asymmetric cipher class (sub-section 3.5.1.3) has a unique number 
(cipherNo) corresponding to the particular instance, a cipher ID 
corresponding to the asymmetric cipher that it uses, as well as a public and a 
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private key pair, used for the encryption and decryption process 
respectively. 
* Dig_signature: signatureNo, signaturelD, publicKey, privateKey 
The digital signature class (sub-section 3.5.1.4) has a unique number 
(signatureNo) corresponding to the particular instance, a signature ID 
corresponding to the signing scheme used, as well as a private and a public 
key pair, used for the creation and authentication of the signed message. 
0 Hash_mac: macNo, macID, key 
The class for the creation of hashes and authentication codes (sub-section 
3.5.1.5) has a unique number (macNo) corresponding to the particular 
instance, a MAC ID corresponding to the particular scheme used, as well as 
a key used for MACs and otherwise set to a default value. 
5.5 Object structuring of sub-systems 
Having presented the static model for the system and identified the 
corresponding physical, as well as entity classes, a way of ordering them within 
the system is required. This section presents the sub-systems identified and also 
yields the structure of each one in terms of their containing objects. For this, an 
overview of the classes seen in the previous section together with the objects 
required for the dynamic modelling of the system are grouped together giving a 
systems' overview. 
We begin by labelling the entirety of the system as Swarm, stemming from SI. 
This system is required to have a GUI, showing the topological movement of 
nodes under a specific mobility model in a communication scenario. As the 
unique element within Swann is the adaptive side of the simulation, the system 
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will have to embrace the layered approach illustrated in figure 5.3 and within 
this, incorporate remaining physical classes relating to the dimensions of our 
protocol analysis. Grouping relevant classes into packages, the package 
dependencies of the system can be seen in figure 5.9 below. 
rm 
Gui 
Scenario I 
r------------- -- PL 
-ýpaceý Daemon 
Figure 5.9: A system overview in UML of the package dependencies within 
Swarm. 
Swarm contains a core network component which is utilised by the simulation 
scenario. This scenario carries the necessary descriptions of the communication 
phases that represent the occurrence of one or more malicious events on the 
network. Further to this, the system reports to the daemon package, representing 
the layer I of figure 5.3. In turn this layer propagates the information to the 
protocol specification (through the layers of the model) which is then modified 
accordingly for the scenario. Once a protocol has been selected from the initial 
environment and attached to a specific scenario, a decision daemon is 
responsible for applying the adaptive plan, depending on the success or failure 
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of the protocol in question. The entire process of the communication scenario 
deployed, as well as the protocol used within it is reported back to the GUI for 
the user. 
The above model definition has as an objective to construct an environment that 
has the capability of offering a solution protocol to the malicious scenario 
through an adaptive implementation. By defining the range of the protocols that 
can be selected for the solution of the problem, our objective is to illustrate that 
the fittest solution can be derived by a machine through a set of very simple 
rules that obey the principles of emergence. 
Finally, the package relating to the communication scenario introduces two 
more packages responsible for the physical dimensions. 
* Time package 
o Time class: Defines how time is measured within a 
communication scenario. The standard time format used is 
hh: nini: ss: csc, where hh is the number of hours in the range [00 
- 99]; mm is the number of minutes in the range [00 - 59]; ss is 
the number of seconds in the range [00 - 59]; csc is the number 
of cent-seconds in the range [000 - 999]. 
o Clock class: Defines a clock that can measure Time in the above 
specified way, within a given range. The range of a Clock 
identical to that of Time [00: 00: 00: 000 - 99: 59: 59: 999]. 
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9 Space package 
o Position class: Defines the entity of position in two dimensions 
within which a Node is present, corresponding to a pair of 
positive Cartesian coordinates. 
o Space class: Defines the region (in terms of a maximum 
Position) within which all nodes that are part of a network can 
change Position in. 
Through the definition of the above two packages, the MNs of the network in 
which the scenario is deployed, obtain the ability of movement in time. This 
places the emphasis of communication to the unique attributes of a MANET, in 
which the communication links between nodes vary dynamically depending on 
their position. Thence, we proceed to the modelling description of the system as 
that operates dynamically in real-time, attempting to simulate and categorise the 
performance of protocols within the communication scenario. 
5.6 Dynamic modelling 
The dynamic modelling of the system in UML entails determining the sequence 
of events in the complex use cases within the system [238,239]. For this, the 
use of sequence diagrams is required. Sequence diagrams enable us to view the 
behaviour (in real-time) of several objects and their interactions within the 
system. Thus, in this section we present the sequence of object interactions in 
the creation of a communication scenario as well as the way in which a protocol 
is assessed once a simulation has begun. The former, expands on the interaction 
of the static entities that encompass the simulation, while the latter presents the 
way in which adaptation is applied to the selection process. 
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We begin by reviewing the sequence of events for the creation of a 
communication scenario. As illustrated in figure 5.10, the operator selects the 
creation of a new scenario from the Gui. This triggers the creation of a Space 
and a Clock object, with the Space requiring the specification of the maximum 
2-D coordinates and the broadcast radius and the Clock requiring the 
specification of the maximum time. Once this process is complete the operator 
has to provide the specification of the communication scenario. This involves 
the number of nodes, as well as the number of malicious nodes present on the 
network. 
InputScenario 
11.11: ScenaHo Input Data 
1.2: Get Sp 
12: Space Prompt 
2: SIiace Input 
3, Get Clock 
3.1.: Clock maxTlme, Prompt_ 
3.2., Clock lnpýt 
4: Create the Scenaýo 
4.1, Scenario Proffo 
41.11: Scorkarlo, Input 
5: Create ttw Netw6rk 
5.1: Create the Node(s) 
5.2: Net" Complete 
6: Create to Protc6l 
6.1: Gýt PfutOW Characteristics 
62 Pro=Dl lnpýA 
6.2ý PmAocol Com%lte 
T., Scenario Corrviets, 
Figure 5.10: The UML sequence diagram detailiniz the creation of a 
communication scenario within Swann. 
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Once these have been specified, the network with the respective nodes is 
created. For each node, the mobility model used is also defined. As a final step, 
the Protocol of communication is specified in terms of its respective attributes. 
The second sequence diagram focuses on the assessment of a routing protocol 
within a specific communication scenario through layer 2 and layer I (figure 
5.3) of the adaptive component of the system. This is illustrated in figure 5.11. 
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7a1: Run ft sknJabon 
Figure 5.11: The UML sequence diagram detailing the adaptive selection 
process of a communication protocol. 
For the purpose of assessing the Protocol under question, a Simulation of the 
communication scenario is performed. This simulation produces the 
corresponding output data, which are held in an Output object. Combing the 
output data with the communication scenario yields a measure of performance. 
This Measure triggers the creation of an adaptive plan, which in turn takes into 
consideration the characteristics that the protocol utilises. The two entities (i. e. 
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the measure of performance labelled as Measure and the adaptive plan labelled 
as Plan) trigger the decision demon to make a selection in a similar way to that 
of a Pandemonium reviewed in section 4.3. Once this process has completed, 
the assessment of the Demon on the decision level is propagated back to the 
Plan, which in turn modifies the characteristics of the Protocol accordingly. The 
attribute values selected are reported back to the Gui and the simulation is 
executed again, this time under a different protocol specification. 
The three classes, namely Demon, Plan and Measure aim to recreate the process 
of a Pandemonium within the adaptive system. Going back to figure 5.3, each of 
them inherits two object instances from the layer below it and each has a 
compute operation for the corresponding characteristic role which they have. 
Plan 
-Protocol: object 
-Scenario: object 
-planLevel: strirg 
4setProtocol(): void 
+setScenafioo : void 
ý tPlan :s ng 
a djustProtocol(): string 'djmputeRano 
* void 
Figure 5.12: The UML class diagrams for the three adaptive classes, namely 
Demon, Measure and Plan. 
Thus, as illustrated in figure 5.12, the decision demon is represented by a 
decisionLevel integer value in the Demon class, in which the final computation 
is performed (similar to that of level 4 of a pandemonium). The verdict on the 
fitness of the protocol for the specified scenario is returned through the 
Demon 
ýure : object 
: object 
ionLevel : Int 
lano, void 
leasureo: void 
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getDecision operation. This computation takes into account the difficulty of the 
malicious attack for the specific scenario and counter-balances this on the 
adaptive plan. The adjustPlan operator works on the principle that the easier a 
scenario is, the harder for a protocol to qualify as a candidate. Generally, where 
success is encountered, small increments are applied to the adaptive plan, while 
when the success is minor, bigger increments are enforced. The reason why the 
adjustPlan operator works with strings instead of integers is so that to cover the 
number of dimensions which characterise a routing protocol, as defined by the 
attributes of the Protocol class. 
Similarly, the Plan class computes the planLevel (again in String format) by 
taking into account the Protocol as well as the Scenario deployed. A Protocol 
can be modified accordingly with the adjustProtocol operator, which aims to 
apply the String representation of the planLevel to the attributes of the Protocol 
in a similar way to that of the Demon class. 
Finally, the Measure class acts as a measure of performance on the Scenario 
based on the output received through the Output class. For this, the 
characteristics of an intrusion in an Intrusion Detection System are used, 
yielding the computation of the measureLevel attribute through the 
computeMeasure operator. Thus, depending on the difficulty of the attack, the 
output generated for the simulation illustrates the success or failure of the 
protocol to handle the threat(s) present within the network. 
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With the completion of the adaptive descriptions for the respective objects in the 
dynamic modelling of the system, the next section depicts an overview of the 
system developed, stating its known advantages and disadvantages from the 
design that was carried through. 
5.7 Swarm: An adaptive protocol selection system 
Swarrn goes beyond the conventional capabilities of network simulators. Not 
only does it have the ability to simulate specific MANET communication 
scenarios in two dimensions, but also it attempts to optimise protocol operation 
for the given scenario. Coded solely in the Java programming language, a 
screenshot of the GUI can be seen in figure 5.13 below. 
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Figure 5.13: The GUI of Swarm consisting of four separate panels. 
The user interface of the system is divided into four panels; the first panel, 
labelled Animation, carries the animation of the simulation scenario, along with 
the statistics in trace format in a different tab. The second panel, labelled 
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Scenario, yields all the scenano characteristics of the simulation currently 
loaded into the system. The Status panel shows the results obtained for each 
protocol specification, as the adaptive sub-system attempts to find the fittest 
protocol for the specific case 
Finally, the Control panel gives the 
user the ability to start, pause and 
stop the simulation. Further 
options for loading simulation 
scenanos, as well as adjusting the 
format in which output is presented 
in the Status panel can be found 
under the File and Simulation 
menus at the top of the window. 
The final class hierarchy within the 
corresponding packages of Swarm 
that is responsible, for among other 
things, the GUI can be seen in 
figure 5.14. In this, all the 
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Figure 5.14: The complete class and 
throughout this chapter, as well as package hierarchy within Swann, 
entities identified for the communication scenario can be seen. A point worth 
noting is that the packages network, space and time with their respective sub- 
packages and classes all fall under the scenario package within layer 3. This 
illustrates the potential that the Swann simulator has, to model and attempt to 
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provide solutions to problem definitions well outside those of malicious intent 
within ad-hoc networks. 
In spite of this, one of the key features that the simulator does not give any 
control to the user over is the adaptive characteristics of the Demon, Measure 
and Plan classes. The reason for this lies in the trade-off between having the 
ability to adjust parameters relating to adaptation and the design pitfalls that 
such systems (section 4.6) have to offer. Thus, even though on occasion the 
protocol specification received from the system will reflect local optimum 
values 13 , any user of the system can focus on specifying a communication 
scenario through the design process for which the system, through emergence 
will attempt to find a solution to. This fact justifies the conservative approach 
towards the compute operations in the adaptive objects of Demon, Measure and 
Plan, seen in dynamic model description of the system. 
5.8 A Summary 
This chapter has focused upon the design process for an adaptive discrete event 
simulator, capable of selecting routing protocols for MANETs. Treating the 
network as a collection of communicating nodes in a two-dimensional space, 
our objective has been to allow for the selection of a protocol in an attempt to 
match the adversarial behaviour present within the network. The sub-system for 
the protocol generally holds the attributes seen in the classification of routing 
protocols (described in section 2.1). The sub-system for the scenario deals with 
13 This can lead to loops in the design process which must be avoided for the system to behave 
outside the pitfalls and limitations seen in section 4.6. 
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the communication scenario at hand. Building on the entities identified in 
adaptive systems modelling (section 4.4) this layer incorporates two sub- 
systems, namely the adaptive plan and the measure of performance. 
Consequently, the adaptive plan feeds as a sub-system from information 
received by the protocol sub-system and the communication scenario 
undergoing simulation. 
Furthermore, we have presented the use case model in the requirement analysis 
for the system, as well as the way in which the network, scenario and protocol 
have been modelled. This analysis has embraced both the static and also the 
dynamic aspects of the modelling process. Finally, the way in which the entities 
of the system have been ordered, resulting to a number of different classes was 
put forward. 
Building on the system developed, the penultimate chapter puts Swann to the 
test, offering a number of results as well as a discussion on the values obtained 
for specific communication scenarios where one or more nodes have been 
acting in a malicious manner towards other nodes that are part of the MANET. 
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Chapter 6 
Secure protocol designs 
6.1 Solutions to the black hole problem 
6.1.1 Network and scenario configurations 
6.1.2 Results obtained for packet drops 
6.1.3 Feasibility analysis and discussion 
6.2 Utilising cryptographic primitives within a protocol 
6.2.1 Network and scenario configurations 
6.2.2 Results obtained 
6.2.3 Feasibility analysis and discussion 
6.3 Combining protocol characteristics with cryptography 
6.3.1 Network and scenario configurations 
6.3.2 Results obtained 
6.3.3 Feasibility analysis and discussion 
6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter presents the results obtained in the simulation scenarios tackled by 
Swarm. Divided into three parts, the first section presents and discusses the 
results obtained for the security of a protocol as described through its 
corresponding characteristic pairs. The second focuses on the results obtained in 
the utilisation of basic cryptographic primitives in the communication process, 
mainly towards active attacks. The third combines the two, illustrating by 
example a number of potential protocol designs and their corresponding 
attributes. To conclude, the last section of this chapter discusses the feasibility 
of the protocols presented and feasible ways for their implementation. 
177 
6.1 Solutions to the black hole problem 
One of the fundamental scenarios examined in the communication process of 
MANETs relates to the ability of nodes to drop incoming packets, carrying a 
destination address different to that of the node where they are dropped. Despite 
this being a passive attack, it addresses one of the key attributes of ad-boc 
networking; routing information, on demand, via other nodes. As this is a well- 
studied type of attack, with known solutions on the protocol level [105,107, 
109], we will use it to examine the integrity of the Swarm system. This provides 
a simple technique for questioning the feasibility of the system, as well as 
providing a way of calibrating it towards protocol specifications for more 
complex scenarios. 
Section 3.3 defines the attack resulting from a black hole. Such a node always 
responds to route requests regardless of whether or not it has a valid route to the 
destination node. Once data packets routed by the source node reach the black 
hole node, they are dropped. This adversarial model assumes non-cooperating 
malicious nodes that do not permit partial packet drops that result in "grey" 
holes. The section that follows describes such an attack in terms of a network 
and a corresponding communication scenario that can be deployed within 
Swann. 
6.1.1 Network and scenario configurations 
To configure the scenario of communication within the network, we revisit the 
specification of a typical scenario, as taken into account in sub-section 5.2.1 
while designing Swann. Thus, similarly to other research models [235,236], we 
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define a network consisting of 50 nodes, wherein each node utilises the random 
waypoint mobility model. The maximum available bandwidth on the network is 
in the range of [0.5 - 2.01 Ms-1, selected randomly within this range for each of 
the 50 nodes. Similarly, the maximum delay that a node can experience on the 
network is set to be within the range of [0 - 500] ms, again with each node 
experiencing a delay selected randomly from this range. Furthermore, the 
maximum allowed timeout t (measured in ms), which would be acceptable for 
each protocol request was set to tj =2s for nodes which were a single hop away 
and = 50 s for the maximum route request timeout. 
The 2-D space was considered to be of dimensions 1500 x 300 M2 and each 
node's velocity tangent was selected randomly from the range of [0 - 20] nis']. 
Each node's broadcasting radius was specified to be 200m. The total simulation 
time was defined to be 120 seconds; well above twice the maximum route 
request timeout. Also the sample interval on which events could occur and be 
monitored on the network was set to be 0.001 seconds. 
Within the communication scenario, 10% of the nodes present (i. e. 5 nodes) 
where considered to be malicious towards the remaining nodes (including each 
other) throughout the simulation. Their level of maliciousness was def med 
through their malicious level (table 5.6) and was set for each one to be equal to 
AlaliciousLevel = 00003. Thus, their behaviour on the network was defined on 
the protocol level as to drop incoming packets, pending any request from other 
MNs. 
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As a data communication pattern, like much previous work in evaluating routing 
protocols [94,32], we use 20 source-destination pairs, each transmitting at a 
Constant Bit Rate (CBR) a flow of 4 data packets per second. Each data packet 
is set to be 512 bytes in size. Thus, having set the source data rate for each node 
at 4 packets per second, we can say that the application data payload size is 512 
bytes per packet. 
Finally, available to the protocol specification were only the attributes defined 
through each characteristic pair. The protocol description could not carry any 
cryptographic primitives such as symmetric encryption, hashing and so on. In 
order to allow for the system to emerge with the correct protocol values for the 
scenario at hand, the simulation was carried out 100 consecutive times, whereby 
the results on the adaptive entities of the system, were feedback as a starting 
point for the next simulation. 
6.1.2 Results obtained for packet drops 
Based on the above setup, the following results were obtained for each of the 
seven characteristic pairs. Starting from figure 6.1 representing the pair of LSR 
vs. DVR to figure 6.7 representing the pair of single path vs. multiple paths, the 
values obtained for each simulation characterise the protocol specification. The 
system, having selected the initial random value within the specified range, as 
defined by equation 5.1, progresses to optimise that value based on the 
simulation scenario at hand. Building on the results of previous simulations, 
layers 2 and 1, attempt to optimise each characteristic pair over the total number 
of the simulations undertaken. 
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The results above have as an objective to identify a protocol specification, 
which we can further model, capable of tackling the black hole problem as 
defined through Swarm. For this, we proceed to obtain the mean for the total 
number of simulations, over a certain number of runs. Thus, results over 50 runs 
are shown in figure 6.8 below. The error bars seen represent a 95% confidence 
interval of the mean for each characteristic pair. This interval is typical [32,941 
for results regarding the analysis of wireless routing protocols. This figure 
enables us to further narrow down the specification from the general seven 
dimensional plane seen above, to a single design that we can proceed into 
evaluating using conventional techniques. In effect, emergence has enables us to 
provide the necessary reasoning in the design process, for selecting specific 
cfiteria for each protocol design. 
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pairs. ha% ing being identified as the fittest candidate to tackle the black hole 
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From this figure and by using equation 5.1, we can reverse engineer a complete 
protocol specification (using the specification provided in sub-section 5.4.3) and 
proceed into obtaining a set of more complete benchmark results. 
Recalling the standard methods of comparison, presented in section 2.9 and 
keeping the two dimensional space, broadcast radius and mobility model 
utilised the same, we proceed as follows. Each node in our simulation moves 
according to the random way-point mobility model: a node starts at a random 
position, waits for a duration called the pause time and then chooses a new 
random velocity vector of magnitude [0 - 201 ms-'. Running the protocol 
evaluation on identical movement and communication scenarios. we measure 
the perfonnance along four metrics: 
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Charactenslic pail 
* Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): The total number of application-level 
packets received for all nodes on the network, over the total number of 
application-level packets originated. 
9 Byle Overhead. The total number of overhead bytes transmitted, over all 
hops as each packet transverses across the network. 
Packet Overhead. The total number of overhead packets transmitted, 
over all hops as each packet transverses across the network. 
Median latency: The median packet delivery latency, where latency is 
calculated as the average time elapsed between when a data packet is 
sent, to when it is first received at its destination. 
The perfonnance results presented for each of the above four metrics, take into 
consideration the standard on-demand routing protocol DSR and are based on 
simulations over 50 runs this time with the same protocol specification. The 
error bars presented in each graph within the figure represent the 95% 
confidence interval of the mean for each of the above metrics. 
Figure 6.9 depicts the PDR for the protocol which has the characteristics 
specified in figure 6.8. We label this as Protocol X and proceed to fully define it 
through equation 5.1 and each of the descriptions for the protocol characteristics 
seen in sub-section 5.4.3. As an expectation, we can predict that since Protocol 
X does not represent a pure on demand implementation, the loss of packets will 
be greater than that of DSR, as table driven implementations require time for 
table updates to reach nodes. 
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Figure 6.10 above details the packet overhead for Protocol X and also DSR- As 
an expectation, since our protocol design does use multiple paths, has a 
clustered element and is partially table driven, we forecast a greater overhead 
than that of a purely on demand protocol that DSR is. Similarly, the byte 
overhead is also expected to be significantly larger than that of DSR in identical 
communication and environment conditions. Figure 6.11 illustrates the packet 
overhead for Protocol X, contrasting that of DSR. 
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Figure 6.11: The byte overhead for Protocol X and also DSR versus the pause 
time. 
Finally, figure 6.12 depicts the median latency for the elapsed time between 
sending and receiving packets. Having experienced a higher value in both byte 
and packet overheads, we do expect Protocol X to also exhibit higher latency 
than DSR, due to the increased overheads from control information, as specified 
for each protocol characteristic. 
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The above section surnmarises the design of a routing protocol capable of 
handling nodes acting as black holes within the network. As illustrated above, 
this ability comes at the trade-off of conventional measures of performance for 
routing protocols. We will examine this in greater detail in the section that 
follows. 
6.1.3 Feasibility analysis and discussion 
Security against passive eavesdropping on the protocol level comes at a cost. 
This cost can be seen in the decrease of perfon-nance with respect to the PDR, 
overhead and latency at any pause time. Despite of this being the case, Protocol 
X does manage to safeguard against the black holes present on the network, 
continuing to deliver packets via other routes. 
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Even though the results presented in figures 6.1 to 6.7 do not correspond to a 
full specification, they offer a prototype definition outlining the features of 
successful protocol candidates. This enables us to calibrate the range defined 
with respect to the interpretation of level data values. 
Based on simulation results obtained, we choose to quantise the descriptive 
range of [0.0,10.0] for each pair into 5 regions as seen in figure 6.13. To justify 
this, we assume two extreme regions representing each characteristic pair, a 
mean range representing a hybrid solution and also 2 domains with a fair bias 
towards one or another protocol characteristic. A value of either 0.0 or 10.0 with 
an error of up to 2.0 yields a strong bias towards that characteristic. A value 
close to the mean with an error of up to 1.0 yields a necessary hybrid approach 
for that characteristic pair. Finally, for the range of [2.0,4.0] and [6.0,8.0] we 
consider a bias towards the characteristic closer to that range, without 
eliminating the rare occurrence of the opposite behaviour. For this we consider 
that the closer the value is to 2.0 and 8.0 respectively, the smaller the probability 
for that occurrence to take place. 
0.0 2.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 
Figure 6.13: The selection range used for each charactefistic pair. 
Thence, we first review characteristics within the limit values of [0-0,2-0] and 
[8.0,10.01. From the results obtained for the characteristic pair of a flat versus a 
clustered structure seen in figure 6.4, we select a protocol that has a flat 
structure where every node has the same rights across the network. As seen in 
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the figure, despite selecting a random value close to the mean of the range as an 
initial condition, our adaptive system closely decreases that value to the range 
between [0.0,2.0] providing a mean of 1.1 after the total number of simulations 
has been performed. 
With similar results for another two characteristics and based on the definition 
of our measure of performance, we also prefer a protocol that takes into account 
multiple paths acting on as much feedback as possible. Figure 6.7 illustrates the 
average level obtained from 20 simulation sets for all the characteristic pairs for 
which individual simulation results have not been presented. Using multiple 
paths is particularly useful for the re-routing of packets knowing that a black 
hole is present within the MANET. Finally, with respect to source routing, we 
treat a packet as a stand alone entity carrying all the necessary information in 
order to reach its destination. This justifies the average value of 8.7 (figure 6.6) 
computed for 20 simulation sets regarding this particular characteristic pair. 
With respect to characteristics that appear to be more hybrid in choosing 
between LSR and DVR, our bias is towards the presence of a distance vector 
that can on occasion be flooded on to the network. As a justification, we present 
the results seen in figure 6.8, yielding a mean level of 7.4. Even though the 
initial condition in this case is closer to the definite range of link state routing, 
during the course of the simulation of the same scenario the value shifts towards 
DVR recommending an update of routing tables within the network. As a result, 
we conclude that the protocol candidate should not flood the network upon a 
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noticeable change in topology, but should instead encourage random updates of 
the routing table between neighbouring nodes. 
The remaining three characteristic pairs (figure 6.8) also follow a hybrid form. 
For the case of table-driven versus on-demand routing, our results encourage 
each MN to hold a local view of the network (by not neglecting any 
neighbouring infonnation that passes through them) and enquire further about 
routes to more distant nodes using an on demand approach. Furthermore, for the 
periodical versus event driven updates of routing information, our results 
promote a more weighted exchange, where both periodic as well as event driven 
updates are utilised. Finally, for the pair of decentralised versus distributed route 
computation, our results show a preference towards the distributed approach, 
stating that the entire route should not be computed within a single node. 
Using section 5.4.3, we further simulate this time the identical protocol 
scenario, with respect to the four metrics selected. Namely, the delivery ratio, 
the overhead and the average latency; furthermore we take into account the 
performance of another routing protocol (in this case DSR) for comparison. This 
approach for evaluating Protocol X, can also be seen for the Ariadne protocol 
specifications in [94]. 
From this, we reach the conclusion, that despite having a protocol capable of 
tackling the black hole problem, as defined in the communication scenario 
above, its performance with respect to conventional metrics appears to be far 
worse than that of a well known on-demand protocol. This is completely 
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justifiable; in order to tackle a security threat on the network, the protocol is 
required to have available and also circulate more information regarding the 
routing process. Through emergence, we have the opportunity to optimise the 
amount of information that is further circulated by not over-specifying particular 
attributes within the given characteristic pairs. As a result, we can see from 
figures 6.9 to 6.12 that despite Protocol X being outperformed by DSR in all 
four metrics, the results for Protocol X are of the same order of magnitude for 
the metrics observed. This leads us to conclude that the above protocol can be 
implemented to tackle the black hole problem within NLANETs. 
The above process for selecting a protocol candidate stems from attempting to 
solve the black hole problem in the presence of a passive malicious node within 
the network. As we can see from the results, our adaptive system does not 
attempt to provide a single solution based on a local property [6], such as 
limiting the reply packets that can be sent between nodes. Instead, it looks for 
the global characteristics within a protocol specification and attempts to 
eliminate ones that do not assist in the problem solving technique. 
6.2 Utilising cryptographic primitives within a protocol 
Having seen the ability of Swarm to provide protocol designs that can safeguard 
against passive malicious intent on the network, we proceed into expanding this 
functionality to incorporate cryptographic primitives. As detailed in section 3.3, 
there exist a number of active attacks where the malicious node attempts to 
manipulate or actively inject network traffic with the objective of compromising 
the flow of information between nodes. We examine a variety of these attacks in 
the section that follows, defining them as scenarios in Swarm. 
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6.2.1 Network and scenario configurations 
To configure the scenario of communication on the network, we specify a setup 
containing the same 2D space, nodes and physical properties as that in section 
6.1.1. Again, 10% of the nodes were considered to be malicious towards the 
remaining nodes (including each other) throughout the simulation. Their level of 
maliciousness (table 5.6) is elevated from that of passive eavesdropping but 
does not take into consideration any collusion of power between them. Thus 
each malicious MN is set to have a MaliciousLevel within the range of [00004 - 
000091, selected at random. 
Similarly to the previous section, we use 20 source-destination pairs, each 
transmitting at a Constant Bit Rate (CBR) a flow of 4 data packets per second. 
Each data packet is set to be 512 bytes in size. Thus, having set the source data 
rate for each node at 4 packets per second, we can say that the application data 
payload size is 512 bytes per packet. These are also the setting for the 5 
adversarial nodes present. 
Building on an existing protocol, we choose DSDV (section 2.3), which despite 
being considered to be simple resolving any issue of routing loops, has well 
documented vulnerabilities [154,250]. Using the secure protocol package 
(figure 5.14 & sub-section 5.4.3) we will attempt to safeguard the performance 
of DSDV in the presence of active, non-colluding attackers. 
In terms of security, we make the following assumptions. Each node has a 
private and public key pair, with every node, having knowledge of every other 
194 
node's public key. Any hash algorithms used (figure 3.8) are non-keyed and 
operate on the message or in this case packet alone. The signing of any message 
on the packet level, takes place using the node's private key, which is kept 
secret. Furthermore, the existence of a symmetric key between every node pair 
is also postulated. As seen in [ 166] this is not an unrealistic requirement. 
Finally, in order to target operations of active adversarial behaviour, from the 
four methods of communication that a node has on the packet level, namely, 
sending, receiving, dropping and forwarding packets, we allow Swarm to 
redefine two. Thence, for both the send and receive methods that involve 
routing table dumps being transmitted and applied between nodes as control 
infonnation, each node has the ability to apply any of the four security classes 
available. Thus, (4x3x2)x2 pairs surface, each giving different abilities to the 
receiving packet information, as described by the four classes within the secure 
package. 
The success of each of the candidates was measured with respect to the level of 
intrusion detection achieved within the protocol. This, as defined in sub-section 
5.4.3, allowed for 5 different levels of intrusion detection, with not realising the 
occurrence of a malicious event being the lowest and isolating any information 
originating froni a malicious node being the highest. To allow Swarm to 
improve on stated results and avoid local maxima, it was always assumed that a 
malicious event was taking place within the network. As the protocol used does 
not incorporate any intrusion detection techniques, the ability to ignore routing 
information, provided it was though to be invalid was implemented within 
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DSDV. This gave the system, the ability to notice and achieve 4 out of 5 
intrusion detection states, while always aiming for the fifth, namely, isolating 
ii? O-mation originating fi-om a malicious node, despite not being able to 
achle%. e it. 
6.2.2 Results obtained 
The results obtained for DSDV focused on partial and full routing table dumps, 
which represent the way in which this protocol exchanges control information 
between nodes. We selected to perform the simulation for 100 runs; each of 
which returned a secure alteration to the protocol. From this, the decision 
daemon in layer 1, returned the following preferences, as depicted in figure 
6.14. This was denved for the sending process and reversed for the receiving 
process. 
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transmission of control packets within DSDV. 
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From this, we can derive that the preferred technique for transmitting control 
data using DSDV is that of symmetrically encrypting each routing table update, 
obtaining and attaching a hash to it and then sending it across the network. 
Second comes the process of encrypting it asymmetrically and then sending it, 
while third comes the process of digitally signing the data, obtaining and 
attaching a hash and then transmitting them across the network. The final 
process depicted in the figure is that of obtaining the hash value, attaching it to 
the data and transmitting it across the network. Following the above results, we 
proceed into defining each of the four classes on which the above results are 
based, in order to be able to further simulate the characteristics seen here within. 
For each of the above four processes, we proceed into obtaining a comparison 
with respect to DSDV and each other, based on the four metrics defined in 
section 6.1.2, namely the delivery ratio, the byte overhead, the packet overhead 
and the median latency. 
Prior to this, we first define the attributes for each of the secure characteristics, 
which will affect the network metrics used. Thus, we set the Hash_mac class to 
return a hash of 128 bits, the Syrný_cipher class to encrypt using a 256 bit key, 
the Asm-Cipher class to use a public and private key pair of respective length 
2048 and 1024 bits and the Digjignature class to use a public and private key 
pair of 768 and 512 bits respectively. These parameters are necessary in order to 
pinpoint the exact effect that the use of the classes within the secure protocol 
package will have on the derived protocol specification. 
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The perforinance results presented are based on simulations over 50 runs this 
time with the same DSDV protocol specification. The error bars presented in 
each graph within the figure (as in section 6.1.2) represent the 95% confidence 
interval of the mean for each of the above metrics. 
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Figure 6.15: The packet delive! y ratio for the original DSDV protocol, as well 
as the 4 different secure versions of it versus the pause time. 
Figure 6.15 above depicts the packet delivery ratio of the original protocol 
specification of DSDV, labelled as DSDV-0 and also the four secure 
implementations of it, using the index of figure 6.14. Thus, DSDV- I represents 
the protocol that transmits the hash of the routing table update and DSDV-2 the 
protocol that transmits the routing table, encrypted using symmetric encryption 
and also hashes the result. DSDV-3 is the protocol that encrypts through a 
public key the routing table update, while DSDV-4 the protocol that signs and 
hashes the routing table update transmitted. 
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Figures 6.16 and 6.17 illustrate the packet and byte overhead respectively, for 
each of the above secure designs of DSDV. As an expectation, both metrics 
should be much higher, as more data are being exchanged due to cryptography. 
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Figure 6.16: The packet overhead for the original DSDV protocol, as well as 
the 4 different secure versions of it, versus the pause time. 
The figure above, as well as the one that follows, reflect the addition of extra 
data as part of securing DSDV. In the final metric, figure 6.18 depicts the 
median latency for the elapsed time between sending and receiving packets. 
Having experienced a higher value in both byte and packet overheads, we do 
expect the different secure versions of DSDV to exhibit a higher latency mainly 
due to network congestion, as the ranking for the overhead for each protocol 
presents. 
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The above section surnmarises the alterations of the DSDV routing protocol 
capable of handling active attacks within the network. Once again, the ability of 
securing a well known protocol comes at the trade-off of conventional measures 
of performance. We will examine this in greater detail in the section that 
follows. 
6.2.3 Feasibility analysis and discussion 
Overall, the four protocol candidates presented appear to be outperformed with 
respect to conventional metrics from the original protocol design. Even though 
this might be the case, by incorporating cryptographic primitives in the 
implementation of sending and receiving control data for DSDV, a variety of 
active attacks could be prevented. 
A valid assumption at this stage that serves as a prerequisite to this analysis is 
that there is an acceptable trade-off between performance and security, which 
provided that (from the results of the previous section) it occupies a 15-20% 
margin from traditional protocol implementations, earns the right to reduce 
static performance measures to thus add security to the protocol design at hand. 
Assuming the existence of one or more malicious MNs allows for the distinct 
case in which the chosen solution protocol has a much deteriorated performance 
to that of insecure protocols, but is still considered acceptable. The catch is to 
avoid dedicating control traffic to the network, which as seen from the results 
presented is not the case. 
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As we can see, the packet delivery ratio is higher than that of the original 
protocol specification for all four secure implementations of DSDV. This is 
mainly due to the fact that as all four protocols provide the means for 
authenticating any incoming routing table update, fewer packet drops to 
destinations which are unknown occur. Furthermore, the four protocols can be 
split into a further two groups; the two which actively change the contents of the 
infonnation being exchanged by encrypting it (DSDV-2 and DSDV-3) 
guarantee a higher delivery ratio, while the two which simply provide means of 
authenticating the addressee and/or the content (DSDV- I and DSDV-4) perform 
less well. 
This is justified as follows. Any malicious node with maliciousLevel above 
00006 has the ability to generate its own hashes for any message that it 
forwards. Further to this and despite giving away its identity, a malicious node 
can alter any signed and hashed information that it obtains from the network, by 
altering them accordingly and attaching its own signature to the data. Without 
the knowledge of the system, this makes an adversarial node harder to detect on 
the network. Meanwhile, such infonnation is not available when it is encrypted 
(either symmetrically or asymmetrically) to target a particular node. 
In terms of byte and packet overhead, the results obtained match the 
performance expectation of a larger overhead due to the utilisation of 
cryptographic primitives. Commencing from DSDV-3, we can see a similar 
overhead to that of DSDV-0. This is because during asymmetric encryption, no 
further data is added to the information, apart from occasional padding to match 
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the length of the public key. Next in performance are DSDV-1 and DSDV-2; 
both these protocols transmit a hash of the message being exchanged as means 
of verifying the integrity of it. This justifies the virtually identical performance 
in terms of overhead that they both have. Finally, the worst performance comes 
from DSDV-4 which further to providing a hash for the message transmitted, 
also carries the signature of the originating node. As more data needs to be 
exchanged, the overhead increases by a further amount, compared to those 
previously depicted in the figures. 
Also, as reflected in the median latency, there is a rise in latency at higher pause 
times due to the non-uniform distribution of node motion in the random 
waypoint mobility model. However, due to an increased overhead, secure 
protocols exhibit a higher latency than that of DSDV. This is because of higher 
congestion in the network while control data is being exchanged and also 
because the available network capacity is decreased by the increased overhead. 
A further contributing factor which in this case has not being considered is also 
the time taken to encrypt, sign and/or hash the data. Incorporating this into 
future simulations would yield a clearer difference between symmetric and 
asymmetric ciphers, as the latter of the two require more processing capacity 
and processing time to perform the enciphering and deciphering process than 
the former. 
The feasibility of such a protocol, despite only changing one fundamental aspect 
in a well known design, unfolds well beyond the protocols already reviewed 
within this thesis. This is mainly due to the layout protocol architecture that we 
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have incorporated within Swarm, in which the task of deriving a secure design 
to meet a set of premeditated malicious standards, targets only the necessary 
elements of the system. Each MN utilises encryption to target control 
infonnation towards particular nodes on the network. In a situation of high 
mobility, often a node finds itself completely unaware of its surrounding nodes 
that it can communicate with. Thus, despite achieving a better performance in 
tenns of PDR, at the cost of a higher packet and byte overhead, realistically, any 
such implementation of DSDV such as the four seen in this section would cause 
a much lengthier time of convergence for routes on the network than that of the 
original protocol specification. 
From the analysis and results presented in this section, what remains is to 
combine the protocol design characteristics derived for passive eavesdropping 
with the techniques seen within this section in an attempt to safeguard from both 
passive as well as active attacks. The section that follows addresses this. 
6.3 Combining protocol characteristics with cryptography 
Using the characteristics that assisted us in the specification of a protocol having 
as an objective to tackle the black hole problem, this section aims to 
incorporate, through Swarm, a number of cryptographic primitives that will help 
prevent active as well as passive attacks. 
For this, we will examine the ways in which Protocol X (sub-section 6.1.2) 
dictates the exchange of routing control information on the network and attempt 
to extend its operation by incorporating cryptography within its operations. 
Again, for this we will use the technique described in the previous section, as it 
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was simulated upon DSDV. Namely, we will attempt to incorporate any of the 
classes contained within the secure package (sub-section 5.4.3) in Protocol X. 
6.3.1 Network and scenario configurations 
For the setup of this simulation we combine the two configurations already 
presented in sub-sections 6.1.1 and 6.2.1, allowing the MaliciousLevel of each 
node to vary so that to represent both passive, as well as active attacks. The 
number of nodes their properties, the transmission rate and the 2D space remain 
the same. There are still 10% of nodes considered malicious but their level of 
maliciousness (table 5.6) can vary from passive eavesdropping to active attacks, 
without taking into consideration any collusion of power. Thus each malicious 
MN is set to have a MaliciousLevel within the range of [00003 - 000091, 
selected at random. 
Building on our protocol, we will attempt to safeguard the performance of 
Protocol X in the presence of active as well as passive, non-colluding attackers. 
In terms of security, we follow the assumptions of sub-section 6.2.1. Each node 
has a private and public key pair, with every node, having knowledge of every 
other node's public key. Any hash algorithms used (figure 3.8) are non-keyed 
and operate on the message or in this case packet alone. The signing of any 
message on the packet level, takes place using the node's private key, which is 
kept secret. Furthermore, the existence of a symmetric key between every node 
pair is also postulated. 
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In this case, from the four methods of communication that a node has on the 
packet level, namely, sending, receiving, dropping and forwarding packets, we 
allow Swarm to redefine three. Thence, for sending, receiving and forwarding 
control packets as specified by Protocol X, each node has the ability to apply 
any of the four security classes available. Thus, (4 x3x 2) x3 pairs surface, each 
giving different abilities to the receiving, transmitted and forwarded packet 
infonnation, as described by the four classes within the secure package. 
The success for each of the candidates was measured with respect to the level of 
intrusion detection achieved within the protocol. This, as defined in sub-section 
5.4.3, allowed for 5 different levels of intrusion detection, with not realising the 
occurrence of a malicious event being the lowest and isolating any information 
originalingfrom a malicious node being the highest. 
6.3.2 Results obtained 
The results obtained for Protocol X focused on the ways in which control 
information was relayed across the network. Once again, we selected to perform 
the simulation for 100 runs; each of which returned a secure alteration to the 
protocol. From this, the decision daemon in layer 1, returned the following 
preferences, as depicted in figure 6.19. This was derived for the two sending 
processes, namely sending and forwarding and reversed for the receiving 
process. 
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From this, we can derive that unlike the results obtained for DSDV, there is a 
single candidate protocol based on Protocol X, which gives it the ability of 
tackling active attacks. 
This is the process of symmetrically encrypting any message and then 
proceeding to obtaining and attaching the hash of that message to the data. 
Following this result, we advance by defining each of the two classes which in 
this case are required to further simulate the characteristics seen here within. 
Our objective is to obtain a comparison with respect to the initial specification 
of Protocol X based on the four metrics defined in section 6.1.2. An aspect 
worth noting is that Protocol X is now being simulated in an environment in 
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which active attacks do exist and for which Protocol X has no defence against. 
Thus, for the conventional metrics seen in this section, the perfonnance of 
Protocol X is expected to be worse than that seen for similar metrics in sub- 
section 6.1.2 as the communication scenario is innevitabely different. 
Prior to this, we define the attributes for each of the secure characteristics, 
which will affect the network metrics used. Thus, we set the Hash_mac class to 
return a hash of 128 bits, the Sym_cipher class to encrypt using a 256 bit key. 
As our simulation will focus on the single best candidate process seen above, we 
do not proceed into defining either the Asm-cipher class, nor the Dig_signature 
class attributes. 
The performance results presented are based on simulations over 50 runs with 
the Protocol X specification and the secure Protocol X specification, which we 
choose to label as Protocol Y. Once more, the error bars presented in each graph 
within the figures (as in section 6.1.2) represent the 95% confidence interval of 
the mean for each of the above metrics. 
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Figure 6.20 above details the packet overhead for Protocol X and Protocol Y. 
As an expectation, since Protocol Y still uses multiple paths, has a clustered 
element and is partially table driven, with all those elements needing to be 
secured, we forecast a greater overhead than that of a Protocol X. Similarly, the 
byte overhead is also expected to be significantly larger than that of Protocol X. 
Figures 6.21 and 6.22 illustrate the respective packet and byte overhead for 
Protocol Y, contrasting that of Protocol X. 
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Figure 6.22: The byte overhead for Protocol X and also Protocol Y versus the 
pause time. 
Finally, figure 6.23 depicts the median latency for the elapsed time between 
sending and receiving packets. Having experienced a higher value in both byte 
and packet overheads, we do expect Protocol Y to also exhibit higher latency 
than Protocol X, due to the increased overheads from control information, as 
specified through the secure sending, receiving and forwarding processes. 
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Figure 6.23: The median latency for Protocol X and also Protocol Y versus the 
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The above section complements the design methodologies of the previous two 
sections in an attempt to deliver a protocol specification capable of handling 
both passive and active non-colluding attacks. Once again, such a protocol 
carries the trade-off of conventional measures of performance for routing 
protocols. These are examined in greater detail in the section that follows. 
6.3.3 Feasibility analysis and discussion 
The design alterations that Swarrn suggests in order to secure Protocol X focus 
on a single process, namely that of symmetrically encrypting any message and 
hashing and attaching that hash to it prior to transmission. Instead, in the case of 
securing DSDV four candidate protocols surfaced each of which had to be 
modelled separately. 
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Protocol X perfonns a number of additional tasks in terms of control data than 
just transmitting routing table updates to neighbouring nodes; this is seen in 
figure 6.8 through the way in which the characteristic pairs are selected for this 
protocol design. Consequently, in attempting to secure the sending, receiving 
and forwarding processes, the control data that transverses the network comes 
(as defined by equation 5.1) in more than one flavour of transmitting routing 
table updates. Thus, Swarm in order to allow for the security of the data and 
also cover all the different types of processes focuses on a particular process 
that seems to match all of the above. That is the reasoning behind one dominant 
process in figure 6.19. 
From the metrics obtained, we can immediately notice that Protocol X is not in 
any way fit of handling active attacks on the network. The delivery ratio drops 
to approximately half of that observed in figure 6.9 where the simulation 
involved only passive attacks. As a result and since Protocol X is generating a 
variety of control data due to the seven characteristic pairs involved in its 
design, we can see that a fit protocol candidate for a particular type of an attack 
does not have the capacity of handling further malicious attacks that supersede 
its design. 
In spite of this, it appears that the cryptographic primitives deployed for active 
attacks, also improve the performance from passive attacks. Again, when 
comparing figure 6.9 to figure 6.20, we can see that while for small pause times 
Protocol X is in the region of 0.85, Protocol Y improves on that metric at 
similar pause times by approximately 5-7%. 
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In terms of byte and packet overhead, if we were to compare the results 
obtained in figures 6.21 and figures 6.22 to the byte and packet overheads 
generated for the secure DSDV protocol designs, we would notice an order of 
proportionality. Even though the packet overheads generated for the secure 
versions of DSDV vary from 44000 to 46000, we can see that the packet 
overhead for Protocol Y is approximately 30000 packets higher than that of 
Protocol X. 
This is justifiable in the following way. For securing DSDV we focus on a 
single alteration in a way in which routing table updates are transmitted across 
the network. Reviewing the design of Protocol X (figure 6.8) we can see that it 
incorporates four hybrid characteristic pairs, each of which need to be secured 
against active attacks. Thus, the amount of control data and packets generated 
increased by a vast amount compared to DSDV. This is also reflected in the 
byte overhead (figure 6.22) where compared to that of the secure DSDV 
versions (figure 6.17) there is a difference of 100 Mbytes in the former and a 
maximum difference of 30 Mbytes in the latter. This creates a rough estimate 
for a figure of proportionality between the byte and packet overhead, with a 
difference in I packet as an overhead corresponding to a byte overhead of 250 
bytes. As we have set each data packet to be 512 bytes in size, we can see that in 
order to secure against both passive and active attacks, approximately half the 
contents of a packet have to be loaded with control data in order to protect 
against both. 
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Again for the median latency, there is a rise in latency at higher pause times 
which is attributed to the non-uniform distribution of node motion in the 
random waypoint mobility model. Despite of the increase in the byte and packet 
overhead, the median latency does not follow a linear pattern of increase 
compared to those two. Thence, even though a higher congestion on the network 
while control data is being exchanged exists, as this infonnation targets specific 
situations of communication defined by equation 5.1, an upper bound on the 
median latency experienced is present. In effect, the control data is only used 
when required and therefore contributes to a much lesser extend to the network 
congestion. 
Protocol Y represents a design that has been build and improved to handle 
malicious behaviour across the network. Even though it achieves a much higher 
PDR at the cost of an increased byte and packet overhead, it improves on the 
median latency by illustrating that control traffic is only being used where 
necessary, with a maximum overhead of half the contents in a data packet. 
Again, the factors of processing capacity and time for utilising encryption have 
not being taken into account, nor has the issue of exchanging a unique 
symmetric key with every node been treated any differently than just a 
postulate. As much as these requirements might bring doubt to the design of this 
protocol, we must be prepared to utilise cryptographic primitives and also 
assume the existence of security associations between nodes (such as a 
symmetric key) if we are to handle attacks and disruptions in the unique routing 
capabilities of MANETs. Protocol Y delivers this capability. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated the applicability of emergence within the design 
process of wireless routing protocols for MANETs. Prior to simulating a 
particular design we have put it to the test within the Swann system. This has 
enabled us to further optimise each protocol and request that the system selects 
the characteristics that would be best capable of tackling the malicious 
communication scenario present within the network. 
Despite of not having exhausted all the possible adversarial models, we have 
focused on the malignancy of an attack and looked at passive as well as active 
attacks. This divided the design process into three stages. In the first, we 
modelled through conventional characteristic pairs the ability of a protocol 
design to safeguard against black hole nodes. This process returned a number of 
values for each characteristic pair which allowed us to further simulate 
conventional metrics, such as the delivery ratio and the byte overhead. 
By introducing cryptographic primitives and the secure protocol package within 
the protocol description of Swarm (sub-section 5.4.3) we went further in an 
attempt to secure the DSDV protocol specification. This lead to four candidate 
alterations in the transmission of routing table updates that were being 
exchanged. Once more, each one of the four implementations was simulated 
using conventional metrics so that to derive a performance comparison with 
respect to the original DSDV protocol. 
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As a final step, we attempted to apply the design of secure protocols upon the 
protocol candidate that was originally developed to deal with the presence of 
black holes on the network. In that process a dominant secure candidate was 
incorporated to the original design and a set of further results were obtained 
involving conventional metrics. 
In each of the above cases, the security of a protocol always yielded a 
deterioration of performance with regards to the amount of information that was 
being exchanged between nodes. Inversely and again for all, a higher packet 
delivery ratio was obtained in the presence of the malicious communication 
scenano. 
Finally, one of the most important aspects throughout this design process was 
the necessary justification of a particular design. The perforinance of each 
protocol was brought forward before an adaptive system capable of judging to a 
certain extent based on a number of parameters what the particular design 
should be. Thus, the way in which decisions were made in order to deliver a 
secure protocol have been presented and carefully put to the test by an adaptive 
event driven simulator. This has ultimately provided a further degree of freedom 
to the human element of the design process, giving us the chance to further 
focus on fundamental aspects of a protocol, while leaving issues specific to 
individual designs as parameters that can be modified and improved upon on the 
machine level. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and future directions 
7.1 Overview 
7.2 The applicability of Protocol Y 
7.3 Future directions 
7.3.1 Improvements. on the secure protocol package 
7.3.2 A second generation pandemonium 
This chapter summarises the research work presented. An overview of the 
framework of operation used for the development of secure protocols is 
presented, followed by an insight on the applicability of the one of the proposed 
protocol implementations, namely Protocol Y. Finally, work tangents for further 
development are presented, having as an objective the enhancement of the 
capabilities and usage of the system presented. 
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7.1 Overview 
In this thesis we have addressed a host of issues pertaining to the design of 
secure wireless routing protocols for MANETs, using emergence. All issues, 
from existing protocol specifications to the design of secure implementations 
have been addressed. Although most of the performance analysis and simulation 
experiments have been performed considering non-colluding adversarial 
behaviour, a classification of malicious intent, as well as a short form of 
describing it (through a level definition) has been provided. 
First we studied the nature of existing wireless routing protocols and provided a 
review of the available approaches to their categorisation. We then proceeded 
further into documenting the security aspects of communication within ad hoc 
networks; having done this we looked at ways and techniques that can help us 
prevent the occurrence of malicious behaviour within the network. 
At that point, we proceeded into the design of an event driven simulation 
platform that can, with the assistance of emergence and adaptive modelling, 
select and implement secure protocols. Having labelled the software system 
developed as Swarm, we proceeded into the justification of particular 
characteristics that a protocol has based on an emergent selection process. This 
process, utilising adaptation is dependant on a number of worst case scenarios 
that can be experienced in a MANET, which represent the input of the Swarm 
system. 
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The output obtained focused on successftil protocol candidates that have the 
ability to withstand by design particular types of adversarial behaviour. As a 
result, conventional metrics of perfonnance, such as the delivery ratio, the 
overhead, as well as the average latency were calculated for standard simulation 
configurations. Further analysis and comments for each type of protocol 
selected, designed and simulated have been presented in the previous chapter. 
This thesis gives a deeper insight into the problems that could be expected from 
next generations of secure wireless routing protocols. It is expected that future 
designs would be highly more versatile and complex. Such characteristics will 
entail a further focus on the mechanisms and processes that protocol 
architectures can obtain and also techniques for providing a justification in the 
selection and utilisation of particular attributes. 
Instead of developing another formal specification for a selection process tied to 
particular parameters, we put together a system that can process resulting 
protocol architectures through emergence, in a way that allows for the mixing of 
particular attributes. From this, we used a selection process to match particular 
adversarial scenarios to candidate protocol architectures. As this process took 
place at the machine level, via the technique presented in this work, we had the 
ability to focus more easily on much more complex malicious behaviour and 
request from our adaptive system the fittest protocol description outside known 
solutions. Thus we have introduced a powerful design tool to carry forward 
research in MANET security. 
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7.2 The applicability of Protocol Y 
From the resulting protocol architectures and by following a three-stage design 
process we developed a protocol specification capable of withstanding both 
passive as well as active attacks of non-colluding adversaries. The first step in 
this design process involved the identification of characteristic pair values in a 
way that would map the best possible candidate for withstanding passive attacks 
and the occurrence of black holes. 
The specification of the candidate protocol developed by Swarm, which we 
labelled as. Protocol X, was summarised in figure 6.8, offering a description that 
can allow further development. This was mainly due to the fact that in our 
definition of a protocol implementation (equation 5.1) specified the way in 
which different behaviours involving well defined characteristics could be 
obtained by applying that particular equation. As a result, the behaviour of 
Protocol X is well documented and can be summarised through equation 5.1 
into 7 values within the range of [0 - 10]. In order to interpret these values, a 
further understanding of the way in which each one of the characteristic pairs is 
defined must be present. Thence, the results obtained, combined with the 
corresponding quantised range (figure 6.13) can be interpreted as a complete 
specification of Protocol X. The main reason for such a mechanical approach to 
the simulation of any protocol lies in the ability to input the specification into 
the Swann system and obtain meaningful simulation results. 
As Protocol Y builds on the specification of Protocol X, it puts to use a number 
of available cryptographic primitives, each one of which carries a pre- 
220 
communication assumption. This technique was first tested on the DSDV 
protocol delivering four candidates that had the ability to withstand active 
attacks. The main focus within each design was the update control data being 
transmitted by DSDV and the means of securing their exchange on the network. 
Simulation results once more confirmed the trade-off of security with respect to 
conventional metrics, exchanging higher overheads of network traffic for a 
higher delivery ratio of data. In the second step of the design process, a known 
protocol was offered a number of security extensions detailing the control data 
being generated for DSDV to function coherently. 
The third step of the protocol design aimed to secure the derived 
implementation of Protocol X, responsible for handling passive attacks, so that 
it could also handle active attacks as well. Protocol Y based its operation on a 
fundamental assumption; a symmetric key between each node-pair within the 
network. Even though this can be challenged, it represents an add-on in the list 
of prerequisites. 
Aspects such as a fully charged set of batteries on the device come to be added 
to the secure exchange of symmetric keys prior to deployment of the MNs in a 
highly mobile environment. Such is the nature of ad hoc networking to assume 
that a minimum number of prerequisites are present prior to any communication 
taking place. Adding a security requirement that relates to layers other than the 
physical layer should come as no surprise; it simply represents the need to also 
take into account factors related to those layers. After all, the physical layer 
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merely enables communications; layers above that are responsible for the 
exchange and the security of the information transmitted. 
From a design perspective, having tackled the last out of the five digits that 
describe the maliciousLevel of a MN, the next step would be to feed Protocol Y 
in a number of colluding adversarial scenarios. In this attempt, a specification 
(from the already utilised elements of the secure protocol package) would be 
obtained that would have the ability to match more complicated adversarial 
behaviour. 
7.3 Future directions 
From this effort, two directions for further work, one focusing on emergence 
and one on wireless routing, are immediately apparent. For emergence, we 
consider the development of a second generation pandemonium that can avoid 
loopholes in the adaptive design phase. For wireless routing, the ways in which 
extensions to the secure protocol package specification can be designed are 
contemplated. 
7.3.1 Improvements on the secure protocol package 
In describing the general characteristics of a wireless routing protocol, we 
selected seven characteristic pairs that were treated equally within our solution 
environment. Even though this was the case, a number of further characteristics 
of smaller importance can also be taken into consideration, involving packet 
types, reply requests and so on. As these would not be as general as those used 
in this work, a different weighting would have to be given to each one, perhaps 
as a subset of one of the seven general characteristics seen above. 
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Furthennore, a number of more advanced cryptographic primitives can be 
developed for usage within the secure protocol package. Such techniques could 
include threshold cryptography (sub-section 3.5.2.1) as well as protocol 
correctness techniques that would help avoid conflicts within a design. 
A potential hazard in such an expansion relates to the complexity of the system. 
Thus, caution should be taken with regards to such additions, as they would go 
beyond affecting the sending, receiving and forwarding methods available 
through a protocol specification to each node. Inversely, any methods specified 
would have to hold greater generality than the ones used, so that to incorporate 
actions such as the transmission of packets but also facilitate techniques such as 
threshold cryptography. This would result in a revisit of methods such as send 
for transmitting packets, with methods like useSecureSymmelricChannel for the 
transmission of symmetrically encrypted control data. In such a system, 
correctness proofs could be built into the system as a verification technique for 
the proposed protocol architecture. 
7.3.2 A second generation pandemonium 
In the adaptive system developed, little control is given to the user with regards 
to the selection and biasing of the adaptive properties involved in the selection 
process. Thus, the definition of our adaptive plan facilitates for improvement 
within neighbouring structures, upon finding a partially successful candidate. 
Our motivation behind a second generation system lies that designs presented in 
the current version of Swarm can lead to local maxima appearing as the best 
possible solutions within a much larger environment. For the purpose of our 
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work, this fact was outweighed from the numerous repetitions and random 
initial conditions, which gave us the opportunity to select characteristic 
descriptions. 
In a second generation simulator, we suggest a much more complex adaptive 
plan, having the capability to overcome this limitation, by not only improving 
on local values, but also randomly selecting other regions within the 
environment. Consequently, a second generation pandemonium would 
incorporate a technique for further reporting on any emergent properties 
discovered and allow for a linear, as well as a non-linear decision making 
process in the adaptive plan. A way of achieving this would be to introduce an 
"evil daemon" in layer I that instead of selecting optimal values, would review 
worst case scenarios as best and vice versa. Naturally, such as a process would 
have to take place for a limited amount of time only, for a successful protocol to 
emerge from the system. 
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